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This thesis investigates how the performance of UK voluntary organisations 
is managed. In particular, it considers the role of performance measures in 
the management of voluntary hospices. The voluntary sector has come 
under increasing pressure to account for its performance but it faces 
difficulties in how to measure this effectively. The mission of voluntary 
hospices is to ensure ‘a good death’; an intangible and complex outcome. 
This thesis considers how voluntary hospices manage the unmeasurable by 
advocating that performance management should not be limited to 
performance measures but incorporate broader notions of management 
control. By comparing the literature of general theories of management 
control to that of voluntary sector performance measurement, gaps are 
identified.  Effective management control is considered to have various 
characteristics, including diverse measures, aligned measurement systems, 
integrated and comprehensive performance management. However, 
management control includes broader notions of control as a package 
(Malmi and Brown, 2008). This thesis argues that this is evident in 
voluntary sector organisations, but not acknowledged within its 
performance measurement literature. Adopting middle-range thinking 
(Laughlin,1995), this research develops a skeletal framework from both 
these literatures as well as from an analysis of the statutory returns of 148 
voluntary hospices in England and Wales.  The ‘flesh’ is then put on the 
skeleton by carrying out an analysis of five case hospices. This thesis makes 
a contribution to knowledge in several ways. First, it suggests that 
voluntary sector performance measurement literature should be 
broadened to include notions of management control as a package. 
Second, it argues that general management control frameworks need 
refinement to accommodate voluntary sector characteristics. Third, it 
proposes a voluntary sector performance management framework, 
informed by Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control, but substantially 
reconfigured for use in the voluntary sector, incorporating levers which 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction  
Voluntary sector organisations are coming under increasing 
pressure to account for their performance to a wide range of stakeholders 
in a variety of ways. This thesis investigates how performance is measured 
in one sub-sector – voluntary hospices within English and Welsh charities. 
Along with many other voluntary sector organisations, hospices face 
difficulties in how to measure intangible and complex outcomes. This thesis 
not only considers how performance measures are reported to external 
stakeholders but how they are used internally to manage their operations. 
It questions what role performance measures play in managing voluntary 
sector organisations. In the case of hospices, it asks whether it is 
meaningful to measure its fundamental purpose: enabling its beneficiaries 
to experience a ‘good’ death. How do they manage the unmeasurable? 
 This thesis draws on both the literatures of management control 
and voluntary sector performance measurement. Performance 
management has a long established research tradition within management 
accounting. Management control theory, which includes performance 
management, has developed from the seminal work of Anthony (Berry, et 
al., 2005) which considers how organisations achieved their objectives 
efficiently and effectively. There is also an extensive and growing range of 
literature on voluntary sector performance measurement and 
organisational effectiveness. This thesis considers how the theories from 
each set of literature could influence the other and how frameworks 
developed in one might be applied effectively in the other. In particular, 
this research considers the applicability of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009)  
Performance Management and Control system (PMCS) and Simons’ (1995) 
Levers of Control (LOC) to the research of management control within a 
voluntary sector setting. These frameworks are used to understand how 
measures are used in the management of voluntary hospices. Derived from 




the literature and empirical findings, the thesis proposes a new 
performance management framework for hospices and the voluntary 
sector. It also suggests refinements to the existing generic performance 
management frameworks. 
 
1.2 The UK voluntary sector 
The role of the voluntary sector is changing both in the UK and on 
the world stage where Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) ‘have 
become perceived as major agents in development and poverty reduction’ 
with a ‘boom period’ following structural change in global state, market 
and civil society relationships (Ahmed & Hopper, 2015, p. 17 & 25). Anheier 
(2005, p. 11) boldly claims that ‘the full recognition of the immensely 
elevated position and role of non-profit organisations in the beginning of 
the 21st century is the main difference to the latter part of the previous 
century when non-profits were rediscovered as providers of human 
services in the welfare state.’ In the UK, the political climate has promoted 
the role of the voluntary sector in the last decade. Calls for the ‘Big Society’ 
by David Cameron were built on philosophies developed under New 
Labour, encouraging the public sector to outsource more activity to the 
voluntary sector and encourage involvement of the public in social service 
provision (Arvidson, 2009) but has also been met with scepticism 
(Macmillan, 2013).  Hybrid organisational models, such as social 
enterprises, bridge private sector practice with voluntary sector mission 
(Dart, 2004; Nicholls, 2009). Thus, there is a blurring of distinctions 
between the private, public and voluntary sector (Anheier, 2005; Bruce & 
Chew, 2011).  
The voluntary sector is so diverse that its definition and terminology 
lacks clarity and is famously described by Kendall and Knapp (1996) as a 
‘loose and baggy monster.’ In the UK,  the third sector comprises a ‘myriad 
of organisations’ (Arvidson, 2009) with a wide-range of civil society 




activities from social services with an income of £9.7bn in 2014-15 to 
culture (£5.1bn), health (£4.6bn), international (£4.5bn), environment 
(£2.8bn), education (£1.8bn), religion (£5.1bn) and housing (£1.4bn) 
amongst others (NCVO, 2017). It is variously described as the civil society 
or the third sector and includes non-profit (NPO) and non-governmental 
(NGO) organisations. The National Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(NCVO) adopts a broad definition of ‘civil society’, including organisations 
as diverse as co-operatives and village halls while the term third sector 
envisages it as a space between state and the market, providing services 
where markets have failed and that governments cannot provide (Anheier, 
2005; Barman, 2007). In the UK, charities are a defined group due to their 
legal status and represent under half of the number of organisations within 
civil society (NCVO, 2017). In this thesis, the term voluntary sector will be 
used for general context and, where applicable, the name charitable sector 
is utilized where it includes a specific set of legal entities registered with 
the UK Charity Commission. The features of such organisations are 
disputed, given ‘the lack of unanimity (which) reflects different perceptions 
of highly ambiguous organisations working within contested moral and 
political domains of development and practice’ (Ahmed & Hopper, 2015, p. 
19). However, Salamon and Anheier (1997) have provided a widely 
accepted definition of five key features: they are formally organised with 
meetings and officers; they are not funded by the state although may 
receive income from the government; they are non-profit-distributing so 
any financial surplus is not given back to owners or directors; they are self-
governing and manage their own affairs; and they are voluntary, with 
volunteers helping to some meaningful extent. This definition will be used 
in this thesis, albeit supplemented by recognising its mission-driven 
approach described by the World Bank as ‘characterised primarily by 
humanitarian or co-operative rather than commercial objectives, and that 
generally seek to relieve, promote the interests of the poor, protect the 
environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community 
development’ (World Bank 1997, cited by Ahmed and Hopper, 2015 p.19). 




The charity sector in the UK is growing fast and contributes 
significantly to society, not only in its social mission but also economically 
and politically (Cordery & Sinclair, 2013; Hoque & Parker, 2015). In the UK, 
there were 167,063 registered charities in England and Wales, with a total 
annual revenue of £74.5bn in March 2017. The numbers of employees 
working within the sector are significant at over 800,000 (Charity 
Commission, 2018)  and it is estimated that 14m people are engaged in 
voluntary activities at least once a month (NCVO, 2017). There is a wide 
range of size within the sector: the smallest 39% of charities generate less 
than 0.3% of the income, while those with income of over £5m represent 
just 1.3% in number but 72% of the total charitable income (Charity 
Commission, 2018). In England and Wales, charities are regulated by the 
Charity Commission, with Scotland and Northern Ireland having their own 
regulators. The extent of reporting in England and Wales is determined by 
their income levels. Charities can also be constituted in different ways and 
so can be subject simultaneously to other regulation, such as company law.  
Thus, charities are subject to a complex mix of regulation, depending on 
geography, size, and legal status.    
 
1.3 Performance measurement in the voluntary sector 
  With the growth in the number and influence of voluntary sector 
organisations both in the UK and abroad, there have been some major 
developments in how they are expected to operate, including significant 
pressures on demonstrating their performance (Carman, 2009). Different 
contractual relationships are emerging as voluntary organisations move 
from funded models to receiving grants or contracts dependent on service 
provision, particularly from government sources (Moxham, 2013; Furneaux 
& Ryan, 2015; Morris, et al., 2015). There is increased competition for 
limited funding in the years of austerity with a greater proportion of 
funding coming from commercial sources (McKay, et al., 2011). Donations 




from the public remain a significant part of the funding regime but they too 
are less willing to rely on trust. The financial consequences of the recent 
scandals in Oxfam, Save the Children and other humanitarian organisations 
are beginning to emerge. Organisations such as New Philanthropic Capital 
(NPC) and the NCVO are promoting more responsible giving through 
informed decision-making dependent on improved performance 
information (Connolly, et al., 2015; Harlock, 2013).  Influenced by 
developments in the public sector, notably New Public Management, 
voluntary sector organisations have come under pressure to account for 
their operations with greater transparency (Buckmaster, 1999; Morris, et 
al., 2015; LeRoux & Wright, 2010; Manville & Broad, 2013). Barman (2007, 
p. 112) argues that performance measurement is a socially constructed 
concept and, in the UK voluntary sector, it ‘waxes and wanes’ with an 
increase in the early twentieth century followed by a decline as the welfare 
state grew in the mid-century. However, since the 1990s there has been a 
significant increase in pressure to measure activities to demonstrate 
competence. Some argue that this is due to isomorphism whereby 
voluntary sector organisations are adopting certain practices to gain 
legitimacy (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). Others take a less cynical view 
and suggest it is self-imposed by voluntary organisations trying to provide 
the best service (Cairns, et al., 2005). It has certainly become more 
complicated as organisations seek to demonstrate their effectiveness as 
part of wider networks and partnerships (Lecy, et al., 2012).  
 
1.4 The UK voluntary hospice sub-sector 
  This research has been limited to one sub-sector: voluntary 
hospices in England and Wales. Anthony and Young (2003) argue that 
management control systems are highly contingent on sub-sector 
characteristics while NPC (Pritchard, et al., 2012) is considering sub-sector 
specific performance measures as the most meaningful way of measuring 




performance.  Although voluntary hospices represent only a small part of 
the charitable sector with £1.3bn received in revenue in 2014/15 
(HospiceUK, 2017), they are a clearly defined group within the UK voluntary 
sector. Their umbrella organisation, Hospice UK (formerly Help the 
Hospices), gives a collective voice for the hospices and provides a definitive 
list of English and Welsh hospices. Its website provides much information 
on the issues facing this sub-sector, including guidance on performance 
measurement. They share many characteristics of the sector as a whole.  
There is a range of organisational size, although not as diverse as the whole 
sector:  48% of hospices spend over £5m but account for 75% of total 
sector expenditure while the smallest hospices (with expenditure of under 
£2m) represent 20% in number but only 4% of expenditure. Funding is 
fragmented and volatile resulting in the declining reserves of the top 35 
English hospices since the financial crisis (Haslam, et al., 2017).  
Government funding is a significant part of its revenue, providing 33% of 
funding for adult hospices in 2014-15. They are simultaneously facing 
funding pressures and increased demands for their services (HospiceUK, 
2017) and are experiencing changing relationships with the public sector, 
particularly with NHS commissioners. The hospice sector also remains 
dependent on donations from the public, particularly for child hospices 
(59% of total income in 2014-15).   It is also typical of wider trends by 
actively working to generate income from trading activity: 13% of adult and 
4% of child hospices income is derived from trading profit (HospiceUK, 
2017). Moreover, hospices share many issues other than funding pressures 
with the voluntary sector as a whole, such as amorphous missions, 
complicated patterns of service delivery, outcomes shared with other 
providers and multiple stakeholders. All of these factors have implications 
for their performance measurement and management. This study is 
therefore not just intended to enhance understanding of voluntary 
hospices but has relevance for the voluntary sector as a whole. 
 




1.4.1 Amorphous aims 
 A hospice’s mission is intangible; the concept of measuring a ‘good 
death’ is an anathema to many (McKenzie, et al., 2012). The Chief 
Executive of Sue Ryder admitted to struggling with such a concept on his 
appointment. His staff found it difficult to come up with even a set of 
measures, finally concurring that ‘they are seeking the maximum possible 
well-being for users suffering various conditions’ (McKenzie, et al., 2012, p. 
2). This too presents difficulties since a deterioration of such measures (eg 
mobility, level of consciousness) is ‘not in itself a measure of poor care’ 
(Department of Health, 2008, p. 134). The modern hospice movement is 
committed to holistic approaches to end-of-life care, meeting the physical, 
emotional and spiritual needs of patients and their families.   Cecily 
Saunders, who is credited with founding the modern hospice movement, 
wrote:  
‘Palliative care is a philosophy based not on physical facilities but on 
attitudes and skills’ (Saunders, 2001, p. 432).  
This is very clearly echoed in the aims of individual voluntary hospices, as 
expressed in their statutory returns. ’Dying is an important part of living. 
The last chapter of people’s lives is of high value and it strives for the best 
quality of life during this period’ (Hospiscare, 2012).  They ‘aim to treasure 
life by improving the quality of life for those who have a life limiting illness’ 
(Willowburn,2012) or in the case of children, make ‘the most of short 
precious lives’ (Childrens’ South West,2012) , ‘no matter how severe their 
disabilities‘ (Zoe’s Place,2012).  
 
1.4.2 Complicated patient journeys 
The palliative care of a patient is complicated but sees death as a 
normal part of life. ‘It aims neither to hasten or postpone death’ (Joy & 
Sandford, 2012, p. 5). By attempting to alleviate ‘total pain’, it not only 




provides relief from physical symptoms but provides holistic support for 
the social, psychological and spiritual needs of patients. ‘We believe that 
our patients are whole people who have, in addition to their physical 
problems, psychological, emotional and spiritual needs that should be 
addressed in the course of their care’ (St Leonards,2012). Terminal illness 
can be seen as a ‘patient journey’ beginning even before diagnosis.  It 
includes medical treatments, such as surgery, chemotherapy and 
radiotherapy after diagnosis.  Palliative care provides support through this 
treatment period, but its provision increases towards the end-of-life with 
nursing care, pain and symptom management and ‘total pain’ relief.  As 
‘each person is more than an illness,’ (Nottingham, 2012), they are 
‘respecting the uniqueness of each person and family’ (Dorothy House, 
2012). Measurement of standardised services is difficult as patient 













Figure 1. 1 Patient pathways (Joy & Sandford, 2012, p. 16) 




Palliative care can take place in different settings: hospitals, 
hospices, in patients’ homes or in care homes.  It involves a multi-
disciplinary approach, with teams made up of specialist and generalist 
clinicians and other social/healthcare professionals.   Often these come 
from different service providers, from the public, voluntary and 
occasionally the private sector. ‘We aim to help all patients achieve a good 
death…through direct provision of our services (and) through working 
collaboratively with other health care providers’ (St Michaels, 
Harrogate,2012).  Hospices are one part of a complicated network, seen in 













As with other voluntary organisations, hospices have multiple 
stakeholders including patients, families, carers, staff and volunteers. They 
aim to ‘meet the needs of the whole family, from diagnosis to 
bereavement and beyond’ (Demelza,2012).  Services are delivered in 
Figure 1.2 Palliative care networks (Joy & Sandford, 2012, p. 




different ways, from in-patient hospital beds to outpatient clinics, 
community nurse specialists, home visits and telephone advice (HospiceUK, 
2017).  Many hospice services extend beyond the care of patients and their 
families, offering research and education to professionals. 
 
1.4.3 Funding of palliative care 
Such complicated ‘patient journeys’ have significant implications for 
how palliative care is funded effectively. ‘The economic cost of dying is 
high’ (Joy & Sandford, 2012, p. 7) but there is a ‘stunning lack of good data 
surrounding costs for palliative care in England’ (Hughes-Hallet, et al., 
2011, p. 9). It is almost impossible to calculate the total national cost of the 
end-of-life care, partly because it is hard to define when ‘the end’ starts. 
However, the Demos think tank has estimated that end-of-life care is about 
20% of NHS spend, or £20bn (The National Council for Palliative Care, 
2011).  Hospice UK (2017) reports that £868m was spent by the voluntary 
hospices in 2014-15, around 30% of which is funded from government 
sources. This excludes the 125,000 volunteers (HospiceUK, 2017). Even 
before the financial crisis, the End-of-Life Care Strategy acknowledged that 
funding issues needed to be addressed.  For ‘too long the NHS had 
regarded specialist palliative care as an optional extra and that the NHS has 
relied too heavily upon the goodwill and funding of charities’ (Department 
of Health, 2008, p. 30). 
In 2010, a Palliative Care Funding Review was charged with 
establishing funding mechanisms based on a tariff to ensure fairness across 
all service providers  (HospiceUK, 2017). In the meantime, the UK health 
care systems have changed from centrally managed payment by results to 
devolved systems with more emphasis on quality, impact and outcomes, 
following the Health and Social Care Act in 2012.  The Palliative Care 
Funding  Review team  has not been able to establish any tariffs for 
palliative care services but has instead published ‘currencies’ in early 2017, 




based on four phases of palliative care. The intention is that these can be 
used by clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) in their commissioning of 
hospice services as a framework or language to create common 
understandings between themselves and hospices.  It is designed not to be 
a prescriptive funding mechanism set by NHS England but provide an 
evidenced-based approach for local funding decisions (HospiceUK, 2017).  
 
1.4.4. Other challenges 
End-of-life care provision in the UK, including hospices face 
considerable future challenges, quite apart from funding issues. Hospice 
UK estimates that 100,000 people currently have an unmet need for expert 
end-of-life care (HospiceUK, 2017). Demographic changes are increasing 
the demand for palliative care services. Between 2015 and 2020, there is 
expected to be a 18% increase of those aged over 85, compared to a 
general population increase of 3% (Parliament, 2018). The proportion of 
life spent in ill-health will also increase, with men currently expecting 14.7 
years and women 16.9 years of ill-health. The Dilnot Commission on 
funding of care showed the lack of public awareness of the need to cover 
the increased costs of demographic change (The National Council for 
Palliative Care, 2012a, p. 4). While the End-of-Life Care Strategy recognised 
‘the large and sustained contribution of the voluntary sector to the 
development of hospices and specialist palliative care service’ (Department 
of Health, 2008, p. 96) , it presents them with a number of issues to 
consider. Concern is expressed over geographical variation of provision as 
hospices have grown in an adhoc fashion. For example, 5.9% of deaths 
occur in hospices in the south-east compared to 2.5% in the north-west of 
England. There is also an inequitable social and ethnic mix of those who are 
admitted to hospices (Department of Health, 2008). In 2001, 8% of the UK 
population was made up of ethnic minorities but only 3% received 
palliative care (Joy & Sandford, 2012). Provision by hospices has 




predominantly been for cancer patients. While 25% of people die from 
cancer, only 5% of hospice in-patients are suffering from other conditions 
(Joy & Sandford, 2012). Other terminal conditions, such as circulatory, 
respiratory or dementia problems have not historically been part of a 
hospice’s remit. Caring for these ‘disadvantaged dying’ has significant 
implications as their disease trajectories are often far longer than for 
cancer.   
 
1.4.5 Hospice performance measurement and management 
Hospices, as so many organisations within the voluntary sector, face 
increasing demands for performance measurement. Hospices value their 
independence highly as it allows them to make a unique contribution, 
often at the forefront of innovation, but many hospices are dependent on 
statutory funding. With this dependence has come increased external 
demand for performance measurement. ‘Measurement of the end-of-life is 
a key lever for change and is essential if we are to monitor progress.  This 
will require measurement of structure, process and outcomes of care’ 
(Department of Health, 2008, p. 14). Attempts have been made to collect 
national non-financial data. Since 2008 progress has been made with a 
national survey of bereaved carers (VOICES), a quality assessment tool 
(ELQUA) National Council for Palliative Care,2011) and a minimum data set 
being established by the Dying Matters Coalition (The National Council for 
Palliative Care, 2012b). 
A NPC report (Joy & Sandford, 2012) suggests 3 key outcomes 
which might contribute to a ‘good death’:  quality of life, place of death 
and coping skills, for both patient and carer.  It analyses the different types 
of interventions (eg in-patient care, home nursing, day care, carer support) 
against these outcomes and compares their relative costs (See Table 1.1). It 
concludes that voluntary donations are essential to the continuation of 
compassionate care, suggesting funds are best directed at education or 




research (Joy & Sandford, 2012). The Commissioning End-of-Life care 
document recommended that hospices should have a vital role, not only in 
providing care but also training and developing the wider workforce and 
providing specialist advice (The National Council for Palliative Care, 2011).  
Table 1.1 Palliative care outcomes (Joy & Sandford, 2012, p. 21) 
GSF: Gold standard framework; LCP: Liverpool Care Pathway 
There is a NPC study into the management of a voluntary hospice:  
Sue Ryder (McKenzie, et al., 2012).  This reports that it is a ‘well-managed, 
progressive charity’  (McKenzie, et al., 2012, p. 1) with significant 
commercialisation of its operations with a new board with ‘business-like 
attitudes’ and closer relationships with for–profit organisations, such as 
care homes as well as a transition of services from the public to the 
voluntary sector. While most aspects of their operations were rated as 
‘good’ (eg activities, finance, leadership), the reporting of results was 
merely ‘satisfactory’ as it needed to develop a measurement capacity. 
Previously they had collated survey results, records of number of accidents 
and infections with external inspection reports.  However, they are moving 




to more extensive reporting of outcomes rather than outputs. Influenced 
by the government’s personalisation agenda, they are developing a ’Living 
Well’ document to assess the quality of an individual‘s experience of care. 
This is combined with other data such as evaluations of new services, 
regulatory reports, and feedback from user groups. It concludes that ‘the 
results culture at Sue Ryder is increasing, albeit from a low base’ 
(McKenzie, et al., 2012, p. 12).  
 
1.5 Research questions 
 The demand for performance measurement information is 
therefore increasing both within the voluntary hospices and in the 
voluntary sector as a whole. This presents many challenges, such as 
defining their aims in a meaningful way at a time when funding is more 
difficult to obtain. There are pressures both externally from multiple 
stakeholders and internally with changing attitudes to performance 
measurement. This research therefore investigates not only what 
performance measures are reported but how performance measurement 
information is used to manage voluntary hospices. This can be broken 
down into a number of sub-questions:  
1) How do voluntary hospices perceive ‘good’ performance?  
2) How can good performance be best delivered? 
3) How is performance measured in voluntary hospices? 
4) Who and what drives performance measurement information? 
5) For what purposes is hospice performance measurement 
information used? 








1.6 Thesis outline 
The following chapter (Chapter 2) sets out how organisational 
performance can be managed from the perspective of management 
control literature. It distinguishes between performance measures, 
performance measurement systems and performance management. It 
considers the uses of performance measurement information, including 
monitoring, decision-making, problem-identification and legitimation 
identified by Henri (2006). A typology of effective performance 
management control systems is also derived from the literature. This 
includes diverse performance measurement, incorporating non-financial as 
well as purely financial measures. It shows how performance measures 
need to be aligned to organisational strategy, illustrated by Ferreira and 
Otley’s (2009) PMCS. Performance management theory proposes causal 
models, integrating all aspects of the organisation, such as the balanced 
scorecard (BSC). However, reliance on mechanistic control systems alone 
has been questioned. Alternative theories of control include organic 
controls (Burns & Stalker, 1994). Ouchi (1979) and Merchant and Van der 
Stede (2012) have argued that clan and cultural/personnel control 
complement output, behaviour, results and action controls. These should 
be included in any comprehensive performance management system with 
Malmi and Brown (2008) making a case for a ‘package of controls’. The 
merits of two frameworks are considered as guides for the primary 
research: Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) PMCS and Simons’ (1995)  Levers of 
Control (LOC). Within this literature, there is little explicit research into the 
performance management of the voluntary sector. One example of an NGO 
using the LOC does not capture its defining characteristic of the dynamic 
tensions between its levers; another focuses on only two of the four levers.   
Chapter 3 then compares the typology of management control 
theory to performance measurement systems within the voluntary sector. 
It first considers the differences between the private, public and voluntary 
sectors to see how generic theories might be applicable. It discusses what 




constitutes organisational effectiveness in the voluntary sector such as goal 
attainment, effective use of resources and maintaining its reputation. The 
uses of performance measurement information including monitoring, 
problem-identification, decision-making, accountability and legitimacy are 
discussed in this context. Using the typology set out in Chapter 2, it shows 
the similarities between voluntary performance measurement systems and 
generic management control theory. However, it also suggests that the 
voluntary sector is yet to adopt broader concepts of control as a ‘package’ 
within their performance measurement frameworks. Research into charity 
UK statutory reporting also identifies a gap in research, calling for case 
studies to understand charity performance and its measurement.  
Chapter 4 presents the research design justifying why an inductive 
approach is an appropriate methodology for researching performance 
management in the voluntary sector. Given the paucity of research into 
management control within this sector, an exploratory approach is needed 
to build theory about how performance is managed within voluntary 
hospices.  This draws upon middle-range thinking – putting ‘flesh’ onto a 
‘skeletal’ framework (Laughlin, 1995). The research has been undertaken in 
two phases. First, analysis of 148 voluntary hospice Summary Information 
Returns (SIRs) and Trustee Annual Reports (TARs) is completed to provide 
an overview of performance measurement within this sub-sector. Second, 
case studies of five hospices were undertaken to investigate how 
performance is managed in practice. This chapter sets out how the cases 
were selected, how the interview protocol was drawn up and coding 
undertaken, using Ferreira and Otley’s PMCS. Thematic analysis was carried 
out on both the SIRs and TARs as well as the 25 semi-structured interviews, 
using NVivo, qualitative data analysis software. Multiple cases,  many 
knowledgeable informants with different perspectives and a wide range of 
documents such as strategies, management accounts, scorecards and 
clinical reporting enables nuanced theory-building. 




The following four chapters report on the findings of the research.  
Chapter 5 assesses performance measurement within the hospice sub-
sector by analysing the performance reported by 148 English and Welsh 
hospices in their statutory returns. This gives insight into the first 3 sub-
research questions: what is considered to be good performance, how is it 
best delivered and what is measured. This appears to support the claims of 
Connolly and Hyndman (2014;2013a) that performance measurement in 
voluntary organisations is weak, thus inferring that internal reporting is 
also likely to be poor. This is combined with the theories of both 
management control and voluntary sector performance measurement to 
develop a skeletal framework. In particular, Simons’ LOC is used to inform a 
comprehensive approach to voluntary sector performance management. 
Five voluntary English hospices are selected to enable the ‘flesh’ of hospice 
performance management to be put on the ‘skeletal’ framework. From 
this, a new performance management framework can be designed for the 
voluntary sector. 
Chapters 6 and 7 use Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) PMCS to 
understand internal performance measurement within the five case 
hospices. Chapter 6 seeks to answer four sub-research questions from the 
differing perspectives of trustees, CEOs and senior managers of the five 
case hospices. The first two sub-questions (also addressed in chapter 5) 
asks what they consider to be good performance and how it is best 
delivered. It also addresses who and what drives performance information 
and the purposes for which it used. The latter includes whether 
information is used either to ‘prove’ good performance to external 
audiences and/or to ‘improve’ the internal operations of the voluntary 
hospices. This reveals difficulties in defining what constitutes good 
performance and how it is successfully delivered with a lack of clarity over 
outcomes and outputs. 
Using the public sector logic model, Chapter 7 presents the findings 
of how the performance of the case hospices is measured (sub-question 3) 




through the reporting of inputs, outputs and outcomes.  This enables a 
discussion about how the case hospices measure efficiency and 
effectiveness, particularly how they attempt to cost their operations. Using 
criteria from management control literature, the diversity, alignment and 
integration of hospice performance measurement systems can be 
assessed. A comparison of the hospices’ findings to Ferreira and Otley’s 
(2009) PMCS shows the limitations of the framework in the voluntary 
sector. As not all aspects of hospice performance are (or arguably, can be) 
measured, it suggests that other types of control should also be considered 
for comprehensive performance management, including organic rather 
than mechanistic controls (Burns & Stalker, 1994) and by employing 
relational as well as instrumental rationalities (Broadbent & Laughlin, 
2009). This research suggests that a new lever of control – judgement – is 
appropriate as it can incorporate informal as well as formal diagnostic 
control. 
Informed by Simon’s (1995) Levers of Control, Chapter 8 considers 
how performance is managed, not merely through measures but by means 
of broader control systems. A holistic approach to voluntary sector control 
is recommended by considering it as a package.  The findings are used to 
redesign Simon’s Levers of Control for use in the voluntary sector. Three 
new levers are identified: ethos, responsibility and relationships. These are 
further explored to understand the interactions between them and the 
contribution they make to hospice performance management. The levers 
operate in more nuanced ways than envisaged by Simons. It is also 
suggested that these have implications for the general use of SLOC. 
 The development of a new framework for hospice performance 
management is set out in Chapter 9. Informed by both Ferreira and Otley’s 
(2009) PMCS and Simon’s (1995) Levers of Control, the ‘flesh’ from the 
findings from the five case hospices and the hospices’ externally reported 
performance is put on the ‘skeletal’ framework developed in Chapter 5.  
This framework is not hierarchical, nor causal; it is comprehensive including 




both informal and formal controls; and it explores how its levers interplay 
and overlap each other.  While designed for hospice performance 
management, it has relevance for voluntary organisations as a sector and 
has implications for the use of SLOC in all sectors. 
Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 10, identifying the contributions 
made by this thesis to knowledge and theory. The new performance 
management framework is proposed, developed from the empirical 
findings of the research and informed by the literatures of management 
control and voluntary sector performance measurement. It explores how 
the new levers of ethos, responsibility and judgement interact and overlap 
in the voluntary sector. It identifies how informal controls operate within 
SLOC generally.  It also discusses the limitations of the research and makes 
suggestions for further investigations.  
  




Chapter 2: Management control theory literature review 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter will identify themes in the general literature on 
management control, enabling a comparison to be drawn with specific 
voluntary sector performance measurement in chapter 3. It considers the 
uses of performance measurement information, including monitoring, 
decision-making, problem-identification and legitimation. It identifies 
characteristics of effective performance measurement and management, 
including purely financial measurement, diverse measurement 
incorporating both financial and non-financial measurements, aligned 
performance measurement systems which combine organisational 
strategies with measurement and integrated performance management 
systems, including causal models. As these can be considered to be 
mechanistic systems, this chapter will also explore organic control systems, 
including social and cultural controls, and informal as well as formal 
controls. These wider controls are part of a comprehensive approach to 
performance management, whereby different types of control are 
considered as a package. The chapter then sets out two performance 
management frameworks which are suitable for this research: Simons’ 
(1995) Levers of Control (LOC) and Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) Performance 
Management and Control System (PMCS). It argues that there is a 
significant gap in the management control literature as there is very limited 
use of these frameworks within a voluntary sector context. 
 
2.2 Definitions of performance measurement and management control 
The basic language of performance measurement and management 
is shared by all sectors. Performance measures are the metrics used in any 
organisation to quantify the efficiency and effectiveness of actions and can 
include financial, non-financial, internal and external, short or long-term 




and ex-post/ex-ante information.  Sets of metrics can be incorporated into 
performance measurement systems (PMSs) which can operate at three 
levels: individual, system and organisational (Neely, et al., 2005). The term 
performance management is more than a performance measurement 
system. ‘The move from ‘measurement to management is small but 
important one whereby management action results from performance 
measurement’ (Otley, 2001, p. 249).  However, this literature review goes 
further by seeing performance management as a complex network of 
formal and informal controls systems operating within organisations. (The 
term performance management should not be confused with its use within 
the Human Resource literature which has a specific application in dealing 
with under-performing employees). 
Management control theory has a long research history with most 
literature looking back to the 1960s as the beginning of ‘contemporary’ 
thinking, with the definition of management control offered by Anthony in 
1965 being ‘old but influential’ (Berry, et al., 2005, p. 18):  
‘The process by which managers assure that resources are obtained 
and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of 
organizations’ objectives’ (Anthony, 1965 cited by Berry et al, 2005 
p18). 
Anthony’s seminal definition reflects three basic themes which are still 
relevant and fundamental to defining performance management. These 
themes are ‘the establishment of purpose, the pursuit of effectiveness and 
the struggle for efficiency’ (cited by Berry et al., 2005, p.5). Anthony retains 
the essence of this, but has more recently modified his definition: ‘the 
management control process is the process by which managers at all levels 
ensure that the people they supervise implement their intended 
strategies.’ (Anthony & Govindarajan, 2004, p. p7) Flamholtz (1983, p. 154) 
takes a more behavioural view, defining organisational control as ‘any 
action or activities taken to influence the probability that people will 




behave in the ways which lead to the attainment of objectives’. Chenhall 
(2003) plots the evolution of management control systems from formal, 
financial, quantifiable information to a broader definition including 
external information (such as on customers, competitors) and 
incorporating informal personal and social controls. Fundamentally, 
management control should be delivering enhanced organisational 
performance, at least indirectly through role clarity and personal 
empowerment (Hall, 2008) although there is no compelling evidence that 
economic performance is enhanced as a result (Chenhall, 2003). 
2.3 Purposes of performance measurement information 
There are a number of typologies setting out the purposes of 
accounting. Burchell at al. (1980) in their seminal article on the role of 
accounting in society, identify four machines or uses of accounting 
information.  As an ‘answer’ machine, accounting information provides 
information for monitoring performance, and is appropriate where there is 
low uncertainty in both objective and causality. They suggest that 
accounting information can also be a ‘learning’ machine where the 
objectives are clear but the cause-and-effect uncertain and information can 
be used to assist decision-making through analysis. Alternatively, 
accounting information can be used for political ends as an ‘ammunition’ 
machine, or to justify and legitimise action retrospectively as a 
‘rationalization’ machine. Henri (2006) identifies four categories by 
combining the stakeholder perspective of Atkinson et al. (1997) who 
identify three roles (co-ordination, monitoring and diagnosis) with Simon et 
al.’s (1954) three categories: scorecard, problem-identification and 
attention-directing. He summarises this as: ‘monitoring’ as a diagnostic tool 
or scorecard (or answer machine); ‘attention focusing’ where senior 
management use information to identify problems, (which by signalling 
what is important to staff, can be considered an ammunition machine); 
‘strategic decision-making’ using performance measurement information 
to weigh up alternatives (similar to the learning machine) and ‘legitimising’ 




where information can also be used to justify management actions, (as a 
rationalisation machine).  Franco-Santos et al. (2007) identify five 
categories of roles of performance measurement systems but this is 
explicitly in a business context: measurement (monitoring and evaluation), 
strategy management, communication, influence of behaviour (including 
employee reward) and learning and improvement. Henri’s typology is used 
to address the 5th sub-question in this research (see Chapters 1 and 6.5), as 
it closely resembles the seminal work of Burchell et al. (1980) but 
addresses performance measurement rather than accounting information. 
Franco-Santos et al. (2007) also include communication and influencing 
behaviour but these can be regarded as how measures are used rather 
than the underlying purposes of performance measurement information 
and are implicit in all of Henri’s categories. 
 
2.4    Characteristics of effective performance measurement systems 
2.4.1 Diverse: financial and non-financial information 
Performance measurement historically has been dominated by 
accounting measures. In particular, management accounting, with 
budgetary control as the dominant technique, provided ‘the centrepiece of 
many organisational and decision making and control approaches’ (Otley, 
2016, p. 45). In most of the 20th century, performance was predominantly 
measured in financial terms and control understood in terms of formal 
accounting reporting mechanisms. ‘Accounting is the attempt to wrest 
coherence and meaning out of more reality than we ordinarily deal with’ 
(Weick [1979], cited by Berry et al., 2005, p.12). Accounting is a ‘convenient 
language for discussing the impact of a wide range of disparate activities’ 
and is ‘one of the few integrative systems capable of summarising the 
effect of organisational actions in quantitative terms’ (Emmanuel, et al., 
1990, p. 3). It offers comparable data across organisations and industries, 
particularly helpful when the private sector goal of maximising shareholder 




value is expressed in monetary terms.  However, Otley (2005, p. 80) 
surmises that management accounting had reached a ‘high point of 
accounting’ as early as 1965. Johnson and Kaplan (1987) in their seminal 
book Relevance Lost argue that management accounting techniques were 
failing to adapt to the changing business environment, constrained by the 
dominance of financial accounting. Core management accounting 
techniques, such as absorption costing, standard costing, cost-volume-
profit analysis had been developed by 1925 and had not changed since 
then. One key characteristic is the lack of a broad range of key 
performance measures through which changing business needs could be 
assessed.  
Non-financial measures have therefore been incorporated into 
performance measurement systems. Franco-Santos et al. (2012) use the 
inclusion of both financial and nonfinancial measures as the defining 
criterion of a performance measurement system. Ittner and Larcker (1998) 
cite case studies carried out by Fisher and Brancato in 1995, identifying 
reasons why firms began to use a wider range of non-financial measures. 
Financial measures are considered historic, backward-looking, lacking 
predictive powers to explain future trends, and reward short term 
behaviours. They fail to identify root causes of problems as the information 
comes too late and is too aggregated. They reflect vertical hierarchical 
structures, not horizontal processes, and are limited in scope, particularly 
with respect to intangible assets. Experiencing environmental uncertainty, 
firms need to understand the non-financial value drivers to respond to new 
competitive pressures. Non-financial measures have since proliferated with 
the diversity of metrics being seen as an important factor in organisational 
success (Ittner, et al., 2003), as they incorporate measurement 
information, from HR, marketing as well as manufacturing (Chenhall & 
Langfield-Smith, 2007). Performance measurement frameworks such as the 
Performance Pyramid (Lynch & Cross, 1995), Results and Determinants 
Framework (Fitzgerald & Moon, 1996) and the Performance Prism (Neely, 




et al., 2001) as well as more famously the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (Kaplan 
& Norton, 1992; 1996; 2000) have been developed to include a diversity of 
performance measures.  
 
2.4.2 Aligned: strategic performance measurement systems (SPMSs) 
Effective performance measurement depends on more than simply 
reporting a wide range of financial and non-financial measures. It is argued 
that the measures should be aligned with the organisation’s strategy 
(Chenhall, 2005; Hall, 2008). Management control systems have been 
based on hierarchical concepts of control, using information primarily 
extracted from accounting systems. To achieve its purpose efficiently and 
effectively, Anthony and Govindarajan  (2004, p. 4) argue that 
‘organisations are led by a hierarchy of managers’ with strategic control, at 
the top of the hierarchy, task control at the bottom and a middle layer 
concerned with the implementation of strategy. In this context, clear 
distinctions are drawn between the formulation of strategy and its 
implementation (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012; Anthony & 
Govindarajan, 2004). Management control, positioned between externally 
focused strategic control and task control, is considered to have an internal 
focus and is concerned with influencing employees’ behaviour ensuring 
’that the behaviours and decisions of their employees are consistent with 
organisations objectives and strategies’ (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012, 
p. 6). They argue that ‘control then is at the back end of the management 
process’ and categorise management control systems as a process, distinct 
from objectives setting and strategy formulation. 
  However, Otley (2005, p. 80) disagrees with this separation of 
strategic formulation and implementation.  
‘Strategic planning cannot be divorced from control for effective 
control involves changing plans and objectives. Nor can operational 




control be kept separate from management control as its 
technological complexities impinge directly on the control process’.  
His performance management framework of 1999 encourages the 
interconnections between these processes. It is designed to answer five 
key questions, considering both the ends (strategies and objectives) and 
the means to achieve them, (target setting, the role of rewards and 
information flows), seen in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Otley’s Key Questions (Otley, (1999), p.365) 
What are the key objectives that are central to the organisations’ success 
and how does it go about evaluating its achievement of each of these 
objectives? 
What strategies and plans has the organisation adopted and what are 
the processes and activities that is has decided will be required for it to 
successfully implement these? How does it assess and measure the 
performance of these activities? 
What level of performance does the organisation need to achieve in 
each of these areas defined in the above two questions and how does it 
go about setting appropriate performance targets for them? 
What rewards will managers gain by achieving these targets (or 
conversely what penalties will they suffer by failing to achieve them)? 
What are the information flows (feedback and feed-forward loops) that 
are necessary to enable the organisation to learn from its experience and 
to adapt its current behaviour in light of these experiences? 
 
 
2.4.3 Integrated: performance management 
While aligning performance measures to strategy is a first step to 
managing the performance of an organisation, it falls short of the 
integrated performance measurement system, envisaged by Kaplan and 
Norton (1992; 1993; 1996; 2000). Their BSC is the best known Strategic 
Performance Management System (SPMS) and initially claimed to be an 
improved performance measurement system (Kaplan & Norton, 1992) (see 




figure 2.1). However, Kaplan and Norton (1996) argue that it is ‘a new 
strategic management system.’ Four business processes are identified – 
translating the vision into objectives and measures; communicating the 
long-term strategy throughout the business; integrating diverse interests 
into one business plan with unit or personal scorecards; and creating 
capacity for strategic learning or feedback by means of linking the four 
perspectives. It has been labelled as one of the most influential 
management instruments of the 20th century by the Harvard Business 
Review (De Geuser, et al., 2009). Several surveys attest to its widespread 
diffusion in the private sector with Neely (2005) citing research that 
indicates between 30% to 60% of firms have adopted it. Its success is 
attributed to characteristics such as the identification of key but a limited 
number of measures and diverse measures grouped in perspectives or 
clusters (financial, customer, business processes and learning and growth) 




Figure 2.1: The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (Kaplan & Norton, 1992)  




It is, however, the causal linkages of the BSC, described as 
‘integrativeness’ by Chenhall (2005) that are considered one of its most 
innovative features.  ‘It is distinct from other strategic measurement 
systems in that it contains outcome measures and performance drivers of 
outcomes, linked together in cause-and-effect relationships’ (Nørreklit, 
2000, p. 67). Kaplan and Norton (2000) develop the concepts of ‘strategy 
maps’, causal linkages between the different perspectives. One perspective 
drives another: learning and growth promotes innovative ideas, which are 
incorporated into internal business processes that ultimately increase sales 
to customers and deliver financial prosperity. Although different typologies 
have been developed to analyse the different evolutionary stages of the 
BSC, these identify causality as an advanced feature. Speckbacher et al. 
(2003) identify the first stage as ‘describing strategy’ including financial and 
non-financial measures, and a second stage including cause-and-effect 
relationships. Lawrie and Cobbold (2004) claim the BSC was ‘initially a 
rather vague concept’ lacking clear definition and facing ‘severe design 
challenges’. Their second generation BSC also introduces ideas of causality. 
The BSC is not without its critics (De Geuser, et al., 2009; Cokins, 2010; 
Malina & Selto, 2001; Sundin, et al., 2010) and the effectiveness of its 
causality has been questioned. Although it has been credited with 
improving performance in the private sector (Hoque & James, 2000; Davis 
& Albright, 2004; Crabtree & DeBusk, 2008; Braam & Nijssen, 2004), it is 
criticised for its lack of detail regarding implementation, such as setting 
targets, resource allocations and rewards systems (Otley, 2001). While 
ostensibly objective, its actual use has been found to be highly subjective 
with different weightings being given to the four dimensions (Ittner, et al., 
2003) and dependent on its presentation (Lipe & Salterio, 2002; Cardinaels 
& van Veen-Dirks, 2010). It has also come under academic criticism from 
both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Nørreklit (2000, p. 76) has 
challenged the theoretical nature of the linkages, concluding that ‘the 
causality claimed to hold between the perspectives is problematic.’ 
Without a tight time-frame, causality becomes meaningless. ‘The time lag 




and complexities between drivers and outcomes obscure the relationship 
between operations and end performance i.e. exactly the relationship 
upon whose clarity the BSC depends’ (Nørreklit & Mitchell, 2007, p. 183). 
Nørreklit (2003) argues that the apparent success of the BSC may be 
attributed to the ‘ethos’ (or the marketing abilities of its Harvard authors) 
and ‘pathos’ (using the language of consultants) and not its ‘logos’ or 
theoretical foundation. Ittner and Larcker (2003) question the empirical 
evidence of the causality being put into practice effectively. Few companies 
have realised the benefit from using non-financial measures through failure 
to identify, analyse and act on the right information. Measures are not 
linked to strategy, causal links are not validated, wrong targets are set or 
measured incorrectly. However, where causal modelling is carried out, they 
found significant economic improvements. 
 Chenhall (2003) argues it may not be the BSC per se which creates 
competitive advantage through organisational learning. He found 
organisations without the BSC achieving high levels of integrativeness and 
some using the BSC but without integrating the financial and non-financial 
information within it. He examines the links between strategy and various 
elements of the value chain, not merely internally to manufacturing 
operations but externally to customer and suppliers. He argues that the 
integration as well as the diversity of performance measures contributes to 
organisational learning. Hall (2008) concludes that comprehensive 
performance measurement systems (i.e. those that are diverse and 
integrated) had an indirect effect on managerial performance through goal 
clarity and psychological empowerment (i.e. cognition and motivation). It is 
therefore the integrated and comprehensive characteristic of an SPMS that 
is a significant factor in effective performance management. 
 
2.5   Comprehensive management control 
Performance management therefore would seem to be the 
effective use of performance measurement systems, such as the 




management processes defined by Kaplan and Norton, including the 
translation of objectives into measures, communication and organisational 
learning through feedback. However, there are broader definitions of 
management control within the literature. Burns and Stalker (1994) draw 
distinctions between organic and mechanistic controls. Ouchi (1979) 
contrasts output and behaviour controls found in mechanistic structures 
with clan controls, more typical of organic organisations. Merchant and 
Van der Stede (2012) argue that personnel and cultural control can be 
more effective than results and action controls. Daft and Macintosh (1984) 
consider how informal controls complement formal ones. Malmi and 
Brown (2008) therefore invite us to consider management control as a 
‘package,’ including cultural controls as well as performance measurement 
systems. 
2.5.1 Mechanistic and organic; formal and informal controls 
Mechanistic control systems play a fundamental role within 
performance management, not simply by reporting achievements but also 
as a means for managing performance through organisational learning.. In 
management control theory, four key conditions are identified, described 
as ‘contractability’ by Speklé and Verbeeten (2014): there must be a clear 
aim or purpose; whose outputs must be measurable; the measures need to 
be predictive, showing the cause-and-effect relationship; and corrective 
action must be able to follow (Emmanuel, et al., 1990, p. 8). More 
sophisticated models allow for second-order controls, not merely changing 
first-order inputs if desired results are not achieved, but include a review of 
objectives themselves (Berry, et al., 2005, p. 10). Models are adapted to 
allow for feed-forward ‘double loop’, or anticipatory measures as well as 
‘single loop’ feedback. By bringing coherence and systematic thinking to 
complex situations, they have provided much of the implicit logic of 
contemporary performance measurement systems in the private sector. 
Specifically, the first descriptions of BSC, developed by Kaplan and Norton 
in 1992, used the mechanistic picture of the dials of an airplane cockpit. 




They employed scientific metaphors and concepts, particularly about 
cause-and-effect, arguably to gain authenticity (Nørreklit, 2003).  
This mechanistic view of performance measurement is considered 
to have serious limitations. Burns and Stalker (1994) in their seminal study 
of the electronics industries of Scotland and England in the 1960s set out 
two ideal types of organisation: mechanistic and organic (see Table 2.2). In 
trying to understand the most conducive environment for innovation at a 
time of fast technological development, they argue that an organic 
organisation is more appropriate than a mechanistic one.  The latter, 
suitable for stable environments, is characterised by a hierarchical 
structure with precisely defined roles. In contrast, an organic organisation 
is most suitable for an unstable environment and most likely to promote 
innovation. Staff have loosely defined roles, determined by their 
knowledge of common task. There is commitment to the whole 
organisation with lateral communications.  
Table 2.2 Mechanistic and Organic controls adapted from Burns and 
Stalker (1994) 
 Mechanistic Organic 
Environment Stable Uncertain 
Structure Hierarchical authority Network  
Roles Specialised, functional Contributive 
Tasks Technical, defined Knowledge-based 




Authority Rights, obligations Responsibility 
Interaction Superior subordinate Lateral, network 









Through their observations and conversations, Burns and Stalker 
(1994) conclude that an informal organisation operates alongside the 
formal one. They define the formal organisation as rationally-ordered with 
clear goals. In their view, an informal organisation is one made up of 
individuals having private motivations and political purposes which are not 
necessarily working for the same ends as the organisation as a whole. They 
look to the CEO to provide leadership which can combine the formal and 
informal ‘in a complex social process’ (p.104) dependent on the strength of 
self-interest as well as external change. Researchers argue that informal 
and formal approaches are complementary (Daft and Mackintosh (1984) 
and the creative tension between them enhances control  (Chenhall and 
Morris,1995).  Chenhall et al. (2011), in their research into Russian profit-
making organisations add social networking to the definition of informal 
control. Interestingly they find that large organisations are associated with 
organic control, contradicting others who associate small organisations 
with informal controls (Arjaliès & Mundy, 2013).   
 
2.5.2 Output and results; behaviour and action controls 
Ouchi (1978) describes two kinds of control operating within 
mechanistic organisations. He contrasts output and behavioural controls, 
both used by hierarchical, bureaucratic organisations. Where the work is 
predictable and the products are homogenous, control can be exercised by 
assessing the outputs. Where the task is unpredictable, he advocated 
performance being judged by behaviours. His work was used by Merchant 
and Van der Stede (2012, p. 9) who argue that ‘management controls are 
necessary to guard against the possibilities that people will do something 
that the organisation does not want them to or fail to do something they 
should do.’ They identify three major sources of control problems: lack of 
clear direction, motivation and personal limitations. This contrasts with the 




features of a good management control system: cost-effective, objectives-
driven and future-orientated. Results control is linked to performance 
measurement whereby rewards are based on achievement of previously 
determined levels of success; ie: Ouchi’s output control.  All of the 
conditions previously defined are needed: knowledge of desired results, 
ability to control and measure effectively with precision, and objectivity. 
Results must be timely, understandable and cost-effective. They argue that 
it is most suitable in decentralised organisations, where objectives can be 
clearly aligned to overall organisational goals. Unintended consequences of 
poorly defined measures are well documented with the frequently cited 
phrase: ‘what you measure is what you get.’ 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2012) extend Ouchi’s behaviour 
controls to describe how action controls can ensure that employees act in 
the best interest of the organisation where tasks are not standard and 
ambiguous. They advocate four methods:  behavioural constraints (such as 
expenditure approvals), pre-action reviews (such as agreeing budgets), 
action accountability (such as procedures, policies) and redundancy 
(Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012). Of these, pre-action reviews and action 
accountability are best suited to minimise the three major problems of 
management control, and are effective at prevention rather than detection 
after problems arise. However, they require confidence in knowing how 
certain actions will result in the achievement of organisational goals and 
the ability to ensure those actions are taken. 
 
2.5.3 Clan, personnel and cultural control 
Rather than using the term organic (Burns & Stalker, 1994), Ouchi 
describes controls based on shared values, traditions and ways of behaving 
as clan control. Merchant and Van der Stede (2012, p. 217) divide this into 
two further control types: personnel and cultural. They suggest that 
personnel controls, built on the intrinsic motivation and loyalty of 




employees, can be influenced through recruitment and training and is 
based on self-monitoring.  Cultural control encourages mutual monitoring 
through shared beliefs. Merchant and Van der Stede (2012, p. 94) argue 
that ‘taken together, personnel and cultural controls are capable of 
addressing all of the control problems.’ These controls are not measurable, 
but are unobtrusive, incur lower costs and have fewer harmful side effects. 
Chenhall (2003) puts these various types of control into Burns and Stalker’s 
typology, showing how they typically fit with different control systems (see 
Table 2.3). 
 




2.5.4 Management control as a package 
In the private sector, there are debates around ‘the importance of 
order and control versus innovation and change’ (Henri, 2006, p. 78). 
Indeed, the need for control itself has been challenged, reflecting 
assessments of the changing business climate. Welch, as CEO of G.E. is 
quoted in 1993 saying: ‘The old order was built on control, but the world 
Control Systems More Mechanistic More Organic 
Control (Ouchi) Behaviour, output Clan 
Control (Merchant) Results, action Personnel, cultural  
Management Control 
System 
Narrow Broad, flexible, 
integrative 
Budgetary control Constrained Participative, flexible 




Costing Standard costing Competitor focused 




has changed. The world is moving at such a pace that control itself has 
become a limitation. It slows you down. You’ve got to balance freedom 
with some control but you’ve got to have more freedom than you have 
ever dreamed of’ (Nixon & Burns, 2005). Organisations have responded to 
environmental change (such as technology, global competitiveness, 
deregulation and the development of the internet) by having less 
hierarchical structures and more cross-functional teams (Otley, 2016). Even 
the core management accounting tool of budgeting has been criticised for 
inhibiting innovation with Hope and Fraser (2003) arguing that budgeting is 
no longer appropriate in the information age where command and control 
models are being replaced with participative, networking structures. In this 
context, a much broader definition of management control has emerged. 
Old, hierarchical views, including predictability, stability, rigidity, 
conformity and formality are being replaced with alternative organisational 
values: flexibility incorporating spontaneity, change, openness, adaptability 
and responsiveness (Henri, 2006).  
Flamholtz (1983) had earlier incorporated such ideas within one 
broad concept of management control. With core control systems (such as 
budgets) at the centre, he adds two concentric circles surrounding this for 
organisational structures (such as rules and procedures) and organisational 
culture. More recent debate distinguishes between management control 
‘packages’ and ‘systems’, whereby the former is loosely coupled with a 
collection of controls that coexist rather than being interdependent and 
designed (Bedford, et al., 2016).The same result can be achieved by 
different combinations of controls, called ‘equafinity’ (Sandelin, 2008). 
Arguing that management control research needs a more comprehensive 
approach, Malmi and Brown (2008, p. 287) have developed a typology for 
management control as a ‘package’ incorporating three layers (see figure 
2.2). Cultural controls are pictured at the top ‘to indicate they are broad 
yet subtle controls’ such as Ouchi’s (1979) clan controls. These are used by 
mangers to ‘ensure that the behaviour of employees or some other 




relevant party, such as a collaborating organisation is consistent with the 
organisations objectives and strategy’ (Malmi & Brown, 2008, p. 295). They 
identify three types of cultural control: clan, values and symbols. The 
middle layer is made up of planning, cybernetic controls, and reward and 
compensation systems. Planning includes action and long-range range 
planning which they consider are separate from a financial results controls 
system. Cybernetic systems include budgets, financial, non-financial and 
hybrid systems (such as the BSC). They add a third bottom layer, including 
internal governance, operational structures and policies and procedures. 
While not overtly considered within their typology, they do suggest that 
controls can reach beyond the immediate organisation, such as cultural 
controls applying to collaborative organisations. As part of their themes for 
further research, they broaden the concept of performance from 
maximising shareholder wealth ‘to satisfy a broader set of stakeholders 
such as environment and social stakeholders’ (Malmi & Brown, 2008, p. 
297).  
 
Figure 2.2: Management control as a package (Malmi & Brown, 
2008) 




2.6    Possible research frameworks 
This literature review draws distinctions between performance 
measures, such as financial and non-financial indicators and performance 
measurement systems which align strategies, objectives and measures. 
Integrated performance measurement systems incorporate causality by 
linking performance measures. Performance management is a series of 
processes which communicate strategies and use feedback for 
organisational learning. To be comprehensive, they should include organic 
and informal controls, acknowledging the role of culture and values, as well 
as governance structures to complete the package of effective control.  
Two frameworks include such attributes: Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control 
(LOC) and Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) Performance Management and 
Control System. Both are considered here as possible frameworks for 
research into performance management within the voluntary sector. 
 
2.7 Simons’ Levers of Control (LOC) 
 Responding to the changing business environment, Simons (1995, 
p.3) designed a ‘Levers of Control’ framework, claiming to provide ‘a new 
comprehensive theory for controlling business strategy.’ He proposed the 
following definition of management control systems: ‘formal, information-
based routines and procedures managers use to maintain or alter patterns 
in organisational activities’ (Simons, 1995, p. 5) (see figure 2.3). Arguably 
this was not radically different to the earlier definitions of management 
control; his intention was to address deficiencies in management focus, 
calling for more attention on the implementation and control of corporate 
strategy rather than the design of the strategy itself. However, he also 
challenges traditional concepts of management control, contrasting the 
top-down strategies imposed by managers with a new flexible approach, 
incorporating the empowerment and continual innovation of employees. 
Central to Simons’ framework is the balancing of dynamic tensions 




between the old hierarchical and the new flexible values. He argues (1995, 
p.4) that ‘inherent tensions must be controlled, tensions between freedom 
and constraint, between empowerment and accountability, between top 
down direction and bottom up creativity, between experimentation and 
efficiency.’ Emergent strategies should be combined with intended 
strategies. He acknowledges the complexities of employee motivations, 
suggesting that their desire to do what is right, to achieve and to create 
should be balanced with the need to set boundaries on their behaviour. A 
management control system should be ‘capable of reconciling tensions 
between individual self-interest and innate desires to contribute’ (p.29). 
Companies must work ‘to unlock the potential for opportunity seeking’ 
(p.30) while ensuring managers give their attention to achieving 
organisational goals. He identifies four strategic variables which each need 
to be controlled: core values; risks to be avoided; critical performance 
variables; and strategic uncertainty. Each variable needs to be controlled 
by a lever: belief; boundary; diagnostic; and interactive. Thus, focus moves 
away from purely diagnostic measurement systems to a more 
comprehensive set of management tools.  
Simons (1995) describes the levers in terms of positive and negative 
forces, citing the ‘yang’ and ‘yin’ in Chinese philosophy. Belief and 
interactive controls act together as ‘yang’, or positive influences, described 
as forces of sunlight and warmth (p.57). Boundary and diagnostic controls 
are described as the ‘yin’, or negative influences, forces of darkness and 
cold. ‘Their collective power lies in the tension generated by each lever’ 
(Simons, 1995, p. 5). This has been challenged by Tessier and Otley (2012) 
who suggest that the term positive and negative have connotations of 
being good and bad, rather than just acting in different ways. They 
advocate the use of the terms enabling and constraining – used by Mundy 
(2010) and Chenhall et al. (2010). Performance measurement systems are 
therefore one part of a more complex network of controls.   













2.7.1 First lever of control: belief or ‘core values’                                                                         
Simons (1995 p.34) described his first lever of control as an ‘explicit 
set of organisational definitions that senior management communicate 
formally and reinforce systematically to provide basic values, purpose and 
direction of the organisation’. He argues that it is communicated by 
documented credos, mission statements and statements of purpose. They 
can be considered part of a system ‘when they are 1) formal; 2) 
information- based; 3) used by managers to maintain or alter patterns in 
organizational activities’ (Simons, 1995 p.36). They should be value-laden, 
inspirational and broad enough to include all organisational practices but 
are too vague for a platform from which to determine performance 
measures (Simons, 1995, p.38). Written from a private sector perspective, 
they are designed to ‘motivate employees to find new ways of creating 
value’ and ‘to inspire and guide organizational search and discovery’ 
(Simons, 1995, p.36). The mission statement, according to Simons, 
documents formal belief systems, asserting the uniqueness and prestige of 
the organisation and allows the use of documents as symbols of what the 
organisation represents (Simons, 1995, p.37). Evans and Tucker (2015) 
Figure 2.3: Simons’ Levers of Control (Simons, 1995) 




warn of the danger of decoupling; where a formal mission statement is 
being used for window-dressing while a different set of values can be 
operating in practice, thus threatening the coherence of the control 
system. 
 
2.7.2 Second Lever of Control: boundary or ‘risks to be avoided’ 
 Belief controls, according to Simons, work in tandem with boundary 
controls, setting limits of acceptable behaviours through codes and rules. 
He defines these as systems which ‘delineate the acceptable domain of 
activity for organisational participants’ which ‘establish limits, based on 
defined business risks to opportunity seeking’ (Simons, 1995 p.39). These 
are often ex-ante, determining proscriptions ahead of action and ‘stated in 
negative terms or set as minimum standards’ (Simons, 1995, p.40). Simons 
suggests that there are two types of boundary control. First, business 
conduct defines acceptable behaviours and business strategy which limits 
opportunistic activities. He gives examples of codes of behaviour derived 
from society’s laws, organisational belief systems and professional codes of 
conduct. Second, strategic boundaries are set through the strategic 
planning processes, defining acceptable areas of business opportunity and 
capital expenditure. He envisages boundaries being appropriate where 
external strategic uncertainty is high and internal trust is low, giving 
examples of banks and commodity traders. Thus, two of Simons’ constructs 
- values and risks to be avoided – are balanced by employing belief and 
boundary levers of control. 
 
2.7.3 Third Lever of Control: diagnostic or ‘critical performance variables’ 
Simons (1995, p. 59) describes diagnostic controls as the ‘feedback systems 
which are the backbone of traditional management control.’ They ‘monitor 
organisational outcomes and correct deviations from pre-set standards of 
performance’ (Simons, 1995, p.59). Controlling intended strategies, they 




report ex-post against predicted goal achievement or critical performance 
variables. Simons (1995, p.59) sets out three conditions for the effective 
use of diagnostic systems: the ability to measure outputs; the existence of 
pre-determined standards; and the ability to correct deviations.  These are 
similar to the four conditions defined by Emmanuel et al. (1990, p. 8). 
Simons associates them with the output/results controls of Ouchi (1979) 
and Merchant and Van der Stede (2012), suggesting that profit plans and 
budgets are the most pervasive example in businesses (p.61).  Diagnostic 
control depends on the identification of critical performance variables that 
can be measured, arguing that they should be objective, complete and 
capable of being influenced by individuals. He suggests that this is not 
appropriate for nebulous concepts such as success (p.72) and offers 
alternatives including the control of inputs (giving the example of ensuring 
the quality of a diamond before cutting). 
 
2.7.4 Fourth Lever of Control: interactive or ‘dealing with strategic 
uncertainty’  
Simons’ (1995, p.95) definition of his fourth, interactive lever of 
control system is the ‘formal information systems managers use to involve 
themselves regularly and personally in the decision activities of 
subordinates’. He explains that ‘interactive control systems focus attention 
and force dialogue throughout the organisation’ (Simons, 1995, p.96). He 
envisages this as face-to-face meetings between senior managers and their 
subordinates. Just as belief and boundary levers work in tandem, 
interactive and diagnostic controls are complementary, balancing strategic 
uncertainty with critical performance variables.  He sets these senior 
managers in a specific context: highly competitive commercial 
environments where managers face strategic uncertainty. He suggests that 
there are four defining characteristics and it is specifically linked to data 
generated by formal information systems, such as project management, 




profit planning or brand revenue management systems. These 
characteristics are information 1) being used by the highest levels of the 
management; 2) given frequent and regular attention by operating 
managers; 3) being discussed in face-to-face meetings; 4) being a catalyst 
for challenge and debate. Simons envisages ‘an army of people’ analysing 
data, such as national marketing trends or technological developments, to 
ask the fundamental questions about where the business should be 
heading and thus develop a bottom-up or emergent strategy. This is in 
contrast to diagnostic systems which analyse performance against an 
intended strategy and answer (rather than ask) questions about critical 
success factors. ‘Through dialogue debate and learning that surround the 
interactive process, new strategies emerge’ (Simons, 1995, p.102). He 
envisages diagnostic systems as ‘constraining innovation and opportunity–
seeking to ensure predictable goal achievement’ (p.91). He therefore 
argues that other control systems, notably interactive controls systems, 
must stimulate search and learning, designed specifically to identify new 
strategies. 
2.7.5  Suitability of Simons’ Levers of Control framework 
Simons’ Levers of Control (1995) has been described as a 
‘conceptual framework’ (Tuomela, 2005; Kominis & Dudau, 2012; Martyn, 
et al., 2016) and has been cited in both qualitative and quantitative 
research over the past twenty-five years. Recent analysis has shown that its 
popularity is increasing although it is predominantly used in qualitative 
research, particularly case studies, to understand how the ‘strategic 
management tool’ operates in practice (Martyn, et al., 2016). Simons 
specifies his levers in detail with the explicit characteristics of formal 
information systems. His purpose is to address the needs of business to 
control and implement their corporate strategy, enabling them to compete 
effectively. This involves top managers balancing his four strategic variables 
of core values, strategic uncertainties, risks to be avoided and critical 
performance variables. Should Simons’ framework be used as he describes 




it, there would be some significant limitations in its applicability to 
voluntary sector. Developed in a business context, the language used is 
competitive and it assumes the profit motivation of employees. It is 
designed to reveal how strategy is implemented by senior managers, 
excluding operational management by other staff. It relies on formal 
information systems, without incorporating informal controls. Subsequent 
research however has sought to overcome these limitations by applying 
the framework in different sectors, at various levels of management and 
with wider interpretations of control.  
 
2.7.6 Defining characteristic of SLOC:  inter-dependency of all four levers   
 The inter-dependency of the four levers and creation of dynamic 
tension between them is the fundamental characteristic of Simons’ 
framework. Central to his argument is that his four levers of control are 
‘nested’; ‘they work simultaneously but for different purposes. Their 
collective power lies in the tension generated by each lever’ (1995, p. 5). 
This view is supported by Martyn et al. (2016, p. 283) who argue that ‘each 
of these variables is highly interdependent and thus must be considered 
together or an incomplete analysis of the issues will emerge.’ This theme is 
echoed throughout much of the research applying his framework. Tuomela 
(2005, p. 297) observes all four levers working simultaneously in the BSC, 
stating that ‘a core idea in this strategic framework is that it balances needs 
for innovation and constraints’. Bruining et al. (2004) observe the balancing 
of two opposing forces in management buy-outs: one to stimulate the 
creativity and innovation of employees and the other to take corrective 
actions and minimise surprises. Their ‘cases emphasise the importance of 
adopting a comprehensive control system rather than examining isolated 
control mechanisms’ (p.156). Mundy’s (2010) central argument is the 
balancing of dynamic tensions within management control systems with 
the ‘enabling’ belief and interactive levers controls opposing the 




‘constraining’ boundary and diagnostic levers. With Arjaliès (2013, p. 287) 
she writes ‘that the full potential of the four levers of control is realised 
when they are mobilised together’.  Plesner Rossing (2013) employs a case 
study on transfer pricing policy to illustrate how all four types of control 
were used to create positive and negative forces in the implementation of 
a new compliance tax strategy.  
 Martyn et al. (2016) have identified 45 articles where the LOC 
framework has been applied in Grade 3 and 4 accounting, strategic and 
general management journals. They include articles where one or more 
levers of control was studied, distinguishing between those who use the 
framework to inform design as well as interpret the results. However, of 31 
qualitative studies, only 11 considered all four levers in their research and, 
in their judgment, only 8 of these used the framework to both inform the 
design and interpret results. Of these, no prior research has explored how 
all four levers operating in this way in the voluntary sector.   Given the 
importance of the dynamic tension between the levers with Simons’ LOC 
and the lack of voluntary sector literature considering this, there is clearly 
an opportunity for research into how this operates within the voluntary 
sector. The one study of an NGO citing all four levers of Simons’ (1995) LOC 
(Chenhall, et al., 2010) focuses on how it can contribute to the concept of 
social capital rather than how the levers operate together. 
 
2.7.7  SLOC: extended application into different contexts 
 Simons (1995) derived his framework from observations in private 
sector organisations and his purpose is to enhance understanding of the 
implementation and control of corporate strategy. His primary concern is 
for achieving competitive advantage with the language of business used 
throughout his book.  Most of the qualitative studies identified by Martyn 
et al. (2016) are in the private sector: Arjaliès and Mundy (2013) surveyed 
large French listed companies; Plesner Rossing (2013) studied an European  




multinational high-technology manufacturer;  Frow et al. (2010) carried out 
a case study of a large global technology company; Mundy (2010) 
compares two divisions of a financial services business; Tuomela (2005) 
investigates a subsidiary of a Finnish power company; Bruining et al. (2004) 
contrast two management buy-outs; Marginson (2002) analyses a large UK 
telecommunications company. However, Simons’ LOC has been 
successfully applied in non-private sector contexts. Martyn et al. (2016) 
find 25% of studies including quantitative research are in the public sector.  
Yet, they only identify two qualitative studies referring to voluntary sector 
organisations (Kominis & Dudau, 2012; Chenhall, et al., 2010). This suggests 
not only that qualitative research into the voluntary sector would be 
compatible with Simons’ framework, but also that the application of the 
LOC in the voluntary sector has been under-researched. While his 
terminology concerns the private sector, in his discussion of employee 
motivation, Simons (1995, p.26) recognises divergent assumptions about 
human behaviour. Indeed, he argues that attempts to limit self-interest 
must be balanced against a desire to do right, recognising that ‘worthwhile 
causes can create forces that influence the direction of opportunity 
seeking’. 
 
2.7.8  SLOC: extended to operational management  
Much research concentrates on corporate strategic control as 
Simons intends (eg Marginson, 2002; Bruining et al., 2004; Tuomela, 2005; 
Mundy, 2010). However, this has been extended to include how these 
controls can be employed at an operational level. There is research into 
specific corporate issues such as the tax strategy relating to transfer pricing 
policy, described as ‘functional’ strategy by Plesner Rossing (2013). Arjaliès 
and Mundy (2013) studied the emergent and intended strategies relating 
to corporate strategic responsibility. Others have used the framework to 
understand controls operating within the context of one particular control 




system, such as budgets (Frow, et al., 2010) and performance 
measurement systems (Tuomela, 2005). However, the use of the 
framework has not been confined to strategic or accounting control. 
Bruining et al. (2004, p. 169) argue that it can be applied beyond traditional 
management accounting systems to quality control throughout the 
organisation. Simons (1995) describes his control systems as formal 
systems used by senior managers. Much research takes a senior 
management perspective but others have looked at the role of middle 
managers. For example, Marginson (2002) has a middle management focus 
in his study of a telecommunications multinational, observing 
administrative control across different levels of the company.  Mundy 
(2010) argues that control systems straddle senior and middle 
management. Frow et al. (2010) ask who is using particular control 
systems, studying the operation of control systems at all levels. Tessier and 
Otley (2012) in their theoretical analysis argue that operational control 
should be distinguished from strategic control.  
 
2.7.9  SLOC: extended to external stakeholders  
More recent research has not limited control to internal managers 
but included external stakeholders. Arjaliès and Mundy (2013) describe the 
interactive processes with NGOs, investors and local communities in the 
determination of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies. Chenhall 
at al. (2010) consider the collaboration between an NGO and other 
agencies in the welfare service provision, as building social capital through 
structural ‘bridging’ networks. Kominis and Dudau (2012) see the change 
from diagnostic to interactive relationships in networks between a local 
authority and private and voluntary sector partners, following new 
legislative arrangements of child safeguarding. Plesner Rossing (2013) 
shows how informal inter-organisational networks share best tax practice. 
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that, while Simons’ own research 




was limited to corporate strategy formulated by senior managers, his 
framework can be applied more widely. 
 
2.7.10  SLOC: extended to informal control systems 
Simons (1995) describes each of his levers of control as formal, 
information systems. Diagnostic systems consist of the formal reporting of 
performance measures, boundary systems include formal strategic plans 
and codes of conduct, mission statements provide formal belief systems 
and interactive control is exercised through formal meetings. Tessier and 
Otley (2012), in their theoretical paper, distinguish between two types of 
control – technical and social. Arguably, Simons has not included social 
controls as he is only concerned with the formal systems. This narrow 
interpretation of control has been challenged. Collier (2005) criticises 
Simons’ definition of belief controls for being too restricted, excluding 
wider cultural influences. He argues that group norms, socialisation and 
culture are, to some extent at least, implicit in belief systems. ‘A criticism 
of Simons and Ferreira and Otley is that they pay too little attention to 
belief systems, or more precisely too socio-ideological (Ditillo, 2004) forms 
of control’ (Collier, 2005, p. 336). Much of the lever of control research 
refers to informal control while acknowledging that this needs to be 
studied further (Tuomela, 2005; Mundy, 2010).  Arjaliès and Mundy (2013, 
p. 298) recognise this as a limitation in their research as they had excluded 
informal processes, arguing that ‘a fruitful avenue of research would 
therefore be to consider the relation between the use of formal and 
informal controls in CSR strategy’. Marginson (2002)  recognises that 
informal interaction contributes to the development of emergent strategy 
but admits it was not intentionally investigated. Bruining at al. (2004) 
comment on the process of formalisation as management buy-outs 
develop formal reporting processes without addressing the relationships 
between formal and informal controls explicitly. Arjaliès and Mundy (2013) 




suggest that the size of organisation impacts on the degree of formality of 
control systems. Kominis and Dudau (2012, p. 153) contrast managerial 
and non-managerial control. The latter is identified as the cooperation and 
dialogue between inter-organisation partners; an area they identifying as 
needing more research. Consequently, informal control has been identified 
as a potential area for further research by Martyn et al. (2016, p. 294): 
‘Further consideration of the usefulness of Simons’ framework to examine 
informal controls should prove useful in further research’.  
 
2.7.11  SLOC:  Existence and use of control levers 
 Simons (1995 p.3) explicitly declares his intention to show senior 
managers ‘how to implement and control their strategies.’ He states that 
his framework should enable the balancing of tensions, ‘not only in the 
technical design of these systems but, more important, in an 
understanding of how effective managers use the systems’ (p.5). He 
demonstrates how each of the four levers is designed to achieve a different 
objective (p.7). Belief systems are used to inspire direct search for new 
opportunities; boundary systems are used to set limits on opportunity 
seeking; diagnostic systems are used to motivat, monitor, reward 
achievement; and interactive systems are used to stimulate organisational 
learning and the emergence of new ideas and strategies. This emphasis on 
the use, rather than existence, of information is a significant contribution 
of the lever of control framework. Research shows how management 
control systems can be used in different ways, rather than just adopting 
Simons’ terminology to describe the controls they observe. Citing Simons 
(1995), Marginson (2002) uses a case study of a large telecommunication 
firm to show how management control systems can be used interactively 
or diagnostically. Diagnostic systems provide feedback or single-loop 
learning whereas they can be used interactively to provide double-loop 
learning, a theme cited in the literature (Henri, 2006; Tuomela, 2005). For 




example, Frow et al. (2010) study the diagnostic and interactive use of 
budgetary control. Budgetary information can be used to monitor 
operational performance diagnostically or to make decisions through 
discussions with their managers interactively. Tuomela (2005, p. 298) 
suggests ‘that performance measurement systems are connected to all the 
four levers of strategic control’. He gives the example of performance 
measures which can be used diagnostically like traffic lights. Alternatively, 
they can be used interactively with double-loop learning, informing 
emerging strategies. He concludes by saying that his study is about the role 
of SPMSs in the respect of the interplay between different control levers. 
He primarily analyses the diagnostic and interactive use of controls but 
acknowledges there are implications for belief and boundary control (such 
as using performance measurement systems to strength or weaken beliefs 
and strategic boundaries). While some distinguish between interactive 
and diagnostic use of management control systems, others contrast the 
enabling and constraining functions of the different levers (Mundy, 2010). 
Chenhall et al. (2010) cite Adler and Borys (1996) whose forms of 
bureaucracy included enabling and coercive controls. Tessier and Otley 
(2012), in disputing the negative ‘yin’ and positive ‘yang’ portrayal of 
different controls, draw the distinction between performance and 
compliance (see Chapter 2). 
 Simons’ LOC is criticised for its ambiguity. Ferreira and Otley (2009) 
suggest there is a lack of clarity, particularly in application of interactive 
controls. Tessier and Otley (2012, p. 178) argue that diagnostic and 
interactive controls should only be considered as a description of how 
controls are used, not as control systems in their own right. This literature 
review suggests that there is still confusion over what a control is and how 
it is used.  Some light is shed within Simons’ (1995, p.180) own diagram in 
an appendix (see Figure 2.4).  
 





He implies that there are types of control such as belief and boundary 
which he describes as ‘design attributes’. There are also ways in which 
controls are used, described as ‘attention patterns’ and made up of 
diagnostic and interactive control. However, his diagram also shows that 
‘diagnostic’ can be interpreted in two ways - either as measurement 
system or as diagnostic use. Arjaliès and Mundy (2013, p. 287) describe 
diagnostic controls as making ‘tangible and visible the activities of 
employees’. There are clearly diagnostic systems, such as SPMSs, as well as 
the way in which they are used. This research therefore considers that 
there are diagnostic systems as well as diagnostic use. This is in contrast to 





Figure 2.4 Distinguishing features of LOC (Simons, 1995) 




2.8 Otley and Ferreira’s Performance Management and Control system 
(PMCS) 
 A second possible framework is set out by Ferreira and Otley (2009) 
whose PMCS provides structure for research. This is described, not as a 
normative framework, but a heuristic tool to help researchers describe and 
structure their findings. The framework ‘suggests a number of issues to be 
considered in designing and operating a control system rather than 
adopting prescriptive approaches based on an ideal model’ (p.266). 
Stringer (2007) cites the benefits of the 1999 Otley model in its breadth 
and depth with its unambiguous questions but also criticises it for being 
too prescriptive, rational and linear. The updated framework of 2009 
therefore addresses some of the weaknesses of Otley’s (1999) initial 
framework. While objectives were clearly part of his original questions, the 
updated framework explicitly incorporates processes to convey the mission 
of organisations to its employees. The 2009 framework attempts to 
incorporate the broad concept of control in Malmi and Brown’s (2008) 
typology; rather than asking merely what systems exist, it asks how 
managers use the systems to manage performance. Ferreira and Otley 
(2009) acknowledge that the first model was seen to be static rather than 
dynamic and could more explicitly note the interconnections between the 
different parts. They set out to provide an ‘extended framework to provide 
a broad view of key aspects of SPMSs and to form the basis upon which 
further investigations can be developed’ (p.266).   
The focus of Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework is still the 
alignment of performance measures with organisational objectives, 
reflected in the core questions 1-8. Of these, question 5 concerns 
performance measurement explicitly and the majority of the others 
questions are closely linked. Without measures, targets cannot be set 
(question 6), performance evaluated (question 7) or rewards typically given 
(question 8). Key performance measures link these questions to 3 of the 
first 4 questions as they are ‘used to evaluate success in achieving their 




objectives, key success factors, strategies and plans’ (questions 2 and 4) 
(p.271). However, Otley argues that ‘a performance measurement system 
has to be concerned with measures of outcomes or results and the means 
by which such results are achieved’ (Otley, 2005, p. 84). This therefore 
incorporates organisation structure (question 2) in its widest sense of 
including relationships and processes, both in internal and external 
networks. Information flows (question 9) are not restricted to accounting 
systems but include other operating systems and informal networks of 
individuals. The use made of information and controls (question 10) rather 
than the design of such systems is considered to be the ‘cornerstone of 
PMS’ (p.275). Their final questions address how a PMS changes over time 
and its overall coherence. ‘Like any other system, a PMS is greater than the 
sum of its parts and there is need for alignment and co-ordination between 
the different components for the whole to deliver efficient and effective 
outcomes’ (p.275). In other words, the emphasis has moved from 
performance measurement to performance management. Strategic 
alignment is a central concept within this, capturing financial and non-
financial outcomes and linking strategy vertically with measures and 
horizontally to the value chain (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Chenhall, 2003). 
Thus, Ferreira and Otley endorse the concept of management control as a 
package of loosely coupled but coherent parts (rather than a planned, 
consciously designed system).   
 Ferreira and Otley’s PMCS is therefore a suitable framework for 
research into performance management within the voluntary sector. 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) themselves argue that it is suitable for both for-
profit and non-profit organisations (p.277), albeit only referring to this in 
their conclusions. It provides a holistic framework but without prescription. 
They suggest that stakeholder rather than shareholders views can be 
included. It lays out clear questions, which they suggest provides structure 
to the large amounts of data collected within cases. It supports the concept 
of control as a package, advocated by Malmi and Brown (2008). 






2.8.1  Suitability of Ferreira and Otley’s PMCS 
 A second framework, Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) PMCS is 
considered as a possible research framework.  In light of criticism, Ferreira 
and Otley (2009) extended Otley’s 1999 management control framework 
by including four additional questions (9-12 see Figure 2.5) addressing PMS 
change, PMS use as well as strength and coherence, and information flows 
and networks. It therefore purports to be a comprehensive framework to 
study management control. The PMCS would therefore appear to be a 
suitable framework for research into performance management within the 
voluntary sector. Ferreira and Otley (2009) themselves argue that it is 
applicable in both for-profit and non-profit organisations (p.277) as it 
provides a holistic framework but without prescription. They suggest that 
stakeholder rather than shareholders views can be included. It lays out 
clear questions, which they suggest provides structure to the large 
Figure 2.5: Performance Management and Control System 
(Ferreira & Otley, 2009) 
 




amounts of data collected within cases. It supports the concept of control 
as package concept, advocated by Malmi and Brown (2008).  It also implies 
that some modification of Simons’ LOC might be beneficial. By mapping 
Simons’ LOC onto Ferreira and Otley’s PMCS framework (see Table 2.4), it 
can be seen that eight core questions which involve management control 
processes all have some interactivity. This suggests that interactivity is not 
a lever as such but is ubiquitous in any organisation as the way in which the 
other levers are used.  This research therefore supports the view that the 
types of control (belief, boundary and diagnostic) should be distinguished 
from their use (interactive and diagnostic). Ferreira and Otley’s framework 
is therefore considered to be a very useful guide for framing research 
questions and formulating questions within an interview protocol. 
Table 2.4 Mapping Ferreira/Otley PMCS to Simons’ LOC 
 
Source: author’s interpretation, developed from management control 
literature 
While Ferreira and Otley’s framework has much to recommend it as 
a framework for management control research, it does have some 
limitations. The authors only refer to its potential application to the 
voluntary sector briefly in their conclusions. One notable limitation of its 
use within the voluntary sector is that the PMCS framework assumes that 
staff motivations are extrinsic with reward systems based on targets. Even 
QUESTION THEME BELIEF BOUNDARY DIAGNOSTIC INTERACTIVE 
1 Vision/mission x   x 
2 Key success 
factors 
 x x x 
3 Organisation 
structure 
 x  x 
4 Strategies/plans  x x x 
5 KPIs    x x 
6 Targets   x x 
7 Performance 
evaluation 
  x x 
8 Reward 
systems  
x  x x 




the modified PMCS framework is not without its critics. While Ferreira and 
Otley refute the arguments of Collier (2005) that not all four levers of 
Simons’ control systems are fully incorporated nor are informal controls 
adequately included, they do accept that they have not explicitly addressed 
the contextual factors and the organisational context within their 
framework. Broadbent and Laughlin (2009, p. 284) propose an extension to 
Ferreira and Otley’s framework, addressing the ambiguity in their final four 
questions, suggesting that Ferreira and Otley ‘deliberately distance 
themselves’ from contextual and cultural factors.  They develop a ‘middle- 
range’ framework, conceptualising alternative natures of PMSs along a 
continuum from transactional to relational. They distinguish between 
Weber’s instrumental rationality and Habermas’ communicative 
rationality. Instrumental rationality has an intentional end-state achieved 
through rational social action and is therefore goal orientated. Habermas’ 
end-state is a result of discourse between participants or stakeholders, 
achieving a consensus.  They link these with four other rationalities: formal; 
substantive; theoretical; and practical (see Table 2.5). 
A transactional PMS, driven by instrumental rationality, has a high 
degree of specificity about the ends to be achieved, and often clearly 
defined means to the ends. It is highly functional, with rules of behaviour. 
Performance indicators are determined by a specific group through formal 
rationality and tend to be quantitative. They are derived from theoretical 
rationality and rely on a legal-rational authority for compliance. On the 
other hand, a relational PMS is driven by communicative rationality or 
discourse between stakeholders debating appropriate performance 
indicators based on substantive rationality, often including qualitative as 
well as quantitative measures. Rules can be included but only through 
discussion and consent of the participants. Targets are agreed between 
stakeholders as they are the owners of the PMS.  These are ideal types and 
represent two extremes at each end of a continuum. PMSs do not exist is 
isolation; they are set in organisational contexts, one of which is the 




regulatory environment which in itself could be transactional or 
communicative.  
 
Table 2.5 Instrumental and communicative rationalities adapted from 





 This chapter has discussed the nature and purposes of measures, 
performance measurement systems and performance management. It has 
identified some key characteristics of effective performance measurement 
systems, such as diversity, alignment, integrativeness and 
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concerned 
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broader concept than just taking action as a result of performance 
measurement. Management control incorporates a package of controls, 
including social, cultural and informal controls.  The suitability of using two 
performance management frameworks for research into the voluntary 
sector is considered.  Ferreira and Otley (2009) claim explicitly, albeit 
briefly, that their PMCS framework can be applied in the voluntary sector. 
As Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control has been used extensively in the public 
sector, its application in other types of non-profit organisations would also 
seem to be appropriate. It is therefore surprising that neither framework 
has been used fully to explore performance management in the voluntary 
sector. One only uses two of the four levers in analysing the interactive and 
diagnostic levers in relationships between public sector and voluntary 
organisations (Kominis & Dudau, 2012). A second cites all four levers in an 
NGO but does not explore the interactions between them (Chenhall, et al., 
2010). This review of management control literature therefore identifies a 










Chapter 3: Voluntary sector performance measurement 
literature review 





In Chapter 2, it is argued that there is a gap in the management 
control literature as there is no explicit focus on voluntary sector 
performance management within it. This chapter considers this from the 
perspective of the voluntary sector. By reviewing the literature on 
voluntary sector performance measurement, the extent of discussion 
around performance management within this sector can also be assessed. 
While there has been debate on how to most effectively measure and 
manage performance in general management control literature since the 
1960s, discussion on performance measurement in the voluntary sector is 
relatively recent (Moxham, 2009; Carman, 2007). With a changing 
accountability culture, stakeholders, particularly funders, are increasing 
their demands for performance reporting in a variety of ways, notably for 
the measurement of outcomes and social impact. However, the literature 
is fragmented and covers many academic disciplines from sociological, 
development and management perspectives to statutory reporting within 
accounting literature (Lecy, et al., 2012).  
This chapter considers how the differences between the private, 
public and voluntary sector and questions might affect the applicability of 
the generic performance measurement and management frameworks, 
discussed in Chapter 2 to this research. The purposes and uses of 
performance measurement information are placed in the context of 
organisational effectiveness within the voluntary sector, including goal 
attainment, managerial effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability. These 
are compared to the purposes of performance measurement information, 
outlined in Chapter 2 and later incorporated into an interview protocol. As 
voluntary hospices in the UK are required to report to the Charity 
Commission, their statutory reports show how they demonstrate their 
performance to an external audience, revealing how that performance is 
measured. However, this gives limited insight into internal performance 
measurement, resulting in calls for further research to fill this gap. This 




review of the literature on voluntary sector performance measurement  
reveals a second gap. While there are similarities to the diverse, aligned 
and integrated performance measurement systems identified in chapter 2, 
concepts of comprehensive performance management, including ‘control 
as a package’, are yet to be addressed in the voluntary sector literature. 
 
  
3.2 Differences between private, public and the voluntary sectors 
Chapter 2 sets out frameworks of performance management that 
could be used for researching performance management within the 
voluntary sector. Ferreira and Otley  (2009) argue that their PMCS 
framework is sufficiently generic to apply across all sectors including the 
voluntary sector. As it has been primarily used within the private sector, 
this literature review begins by considering the differences between the 
sectors to see if there is any reason why a generic framework might not be 
appropriate in this research. Despite the blurring of the sectors, the 
differences between voluntary, private and public sector organisations are 
frequently cited (Kendall & Knapp, 2000; Arvidson, 2009). We have seen 
the definition of the voluntary sector in Chapter 1 provided by Salamon 
and Anheier (1997) as formally organised; independent organisations that 
are predominantly not funded by the state; cannot distribute their surplus’; 
and benefit from volunteers’ help. Other characteristics are attributed to 
voluntary organisations including an inclusive, community focus (Arvidson, 
2009) and making contributions to society through advocacy and 
innovation (Kendall & Knapp, 2000). In the UK, charities have to meet 
particular legal requirements as they are expected to demonstrate their 
public benefit following legislative changes in the Charities Act 2006.  
This chapter discusses the extent to which these factors influence 
how their performance is measured and managed. Some would argue that 
the differences are sufficiently distinct that management practices from 
the private and public sector are not necessarily transferable. For example, 




Hind (2011) suggests that the Charity Commission should not operate in 
the same way as its fellow regulators, such as the FSA or Ofcom. Others 
argue that they are addressing similar management problems, and 
voluntary sector organisations can benefit from management practices 
from other sectors (Speckbacher, et al., 2003; Dart, 2004; Moxham, 2009; 
Tucker, et al., 2013). Certainly, the transferability of private sector 
management practices cannot be assumed and, at the very least, 
resistance to such practices can be anticipated (Harrow, et al., 1999; 
Moxham, 2010). Despite the diversity within the sector, voluntary 
organisations share some common characteristics: purpose and 
motivation; the role of finance; governance structures; and multiple 
stakeholders. All these factors contribute to the difficulties in measuring 
performance and invite the question of how far generic management 
control frameworks can be used within a specific context. As there is also 
diversity in the terminology used to describe the sector, the term voluntary 
sector will be used in this chapter except where authors use different 
terms in their own analysis (such as non-profit or NGO). This chapter will 
consider whether the concepts of management control theory can be 
applied and have meaning in a voluntary sector context. 
Voluntary sector organisations have a different purpose and 
motivation to their private sector counterparts, albeit sharing much with 
the public sector.  They are mission driven with an overriding purpose of 
providing benefit to others with objectives determined by values rather 
than money. Beamon and Balcik (2008) contrast the performance 
measurement in a humanitarian relief chain with that of a commercial 
supply chain, where the former is primarily concerned to relieve human 
suffering and the latter with cost reduction. They argue that diversity even 
within the sub-sector of humanitarian relief organisations is such that there 
can be no common approach to performance measurement. Missions can 
be intangible, multifaceted and amorphous and are notoriously difficult to 
measure (Forbes, 1998). Sawhill and Williamson (2001, p. 371) use the 




example of human suffering to illustrate this point. ‘Imagine an 
organisation whose mission is to alleviate human suffering. How can you 
measure such an abstract notion? How can an organisation meaningfully 
assess its direct contribution to such a broadly stated mission?’ In contrast, 
private sector organisations benefit from the ‘simple elegance of a financial 
measure’ (Kaplan, 2001) with a clear goal to maximise shareholder wealth 
by improving return on capital invested, although this may be a crude 
simplification of commercial motivations (Arvidson, 2009). ‘In the business 
world, market forces serve as feedback mechanisms’ with good financial 
results attracting capital and talent (Bradach, et al., 2008). They argue that 
missions are the primary magnet for non-profit organisations but ‘these 
are typically better at providing inspiration than direction’. Moreover, the 
very success in raising funds can result in the donors not making further 
donations. Speckbacher (2003) suggests that the private sector benefits 
from the ‘single bottom line’, by reducing complexity in three ways: 
primacy of owners; homogeneity and measurability of owner’s interest; 
and a common currency of assessment and delegation. He compares three 
economic models, concluding that the technological and property rights 
models suit private sector organisations but the third, the stakeholder 
view, is the only one appropriate for non-profit organisations.  
Consequently, the role of finance is quite different in a voluntary 
organisation organisation. It is a means to an end, rather than an end in 
itself. It is a facilitator to enable benefits to be given but it is also a 
constraint (Kaplan, 2001), limiting how far that benefit can be spread. 
Ironically, an increase of clients may present a problem for charities with 
limited resources rather than a benefit in private sector organisations. 
Revenues are raised from a variety of sources: donors, grant-making 
agencies as well as from the sales of goods and services; all subject to 
different legislative constraints (Beamon & Balcik, 2008). There is no simple 
transaction between customer and provider of the service. In the voluntary 
sector, the two roles of a customer, as receiver and payer of a service, can 




be separated. ‘Investors’, in this case funders, do not expect an economic 
return but look at the maximisation of the pass-through ratio, ensuring 
others get the greatest benefit from their donation (Connolly, et al., 2011). 
Lacking a common monetary value which represents an organisation’s 
primary objective, comparing cost with benefit of different courses of 
action becomes more problematic. Delegation of responsibility is more 
complicated where goals are diverse and difficult to measure. Comparison 
between projects, departments and organisations relies on subjective 
judgement. A single profit measure also provides an early warning system 
of future problems, which is much less clear in voluntary organisations 
(Anthony & Young, 2003). 
Even if voluntary sector organisations share similar motivations to 
the public sector, their governance structures differ. They lack the single 
line accountability to shareholders of the private sector or ‘the discipline of 
the ballot box’ of the public sector (Kendall & Knapp, 2000). Crawford et al. 
(2009) comment that accountability suffers due to the lack of a 
shareholder equivalent to which charity trustees could be held to account.  
Instead of a single corporate board, good governance depends on a 
triumvirate of trustees, directors and chairs (Harrow, et al., 1999). There is 
no ownership interest that can be sold, transferred or redeemed. Trustees 
operate in different ways to shareholders, corporate board members or 
non-executive directors: they are not paid, are arguably less informed and 
are often chosen for reasons other than good management abilities 
(Anthony & Young, 2003). The ‘absence of owners’ creates tensions 
between donors and managers, fundamentally hampering the 
management of non-profit organisations, according to Brown and Caughlin 
(2009). Harrow et al.  (1999) conclude that in small UK charities, trustees 
were reactive reviewers rather than active users of management 
information. They see their role as monitoring rather than contributing to 
the strategic direction of the organisation. Given that many are legally 
liable, they arguably put too much reliance on trusting the chair of the 




directors. The role of trust has been considered a distinguishing feature of 
the sector, with high levels of trust being associated with the reduced need 
for performance reporting (Harlock, 2013; Nicholls, 2009; Manville & 
Broad, 2013). 
With different governance structures and motivations, voluntary 
organisations have multiple stakeholders. Even within the private sector, 
accountability is now discussed, not in terms of shareholders but of all 
stakeholders, including an organisation’s corporate responsibility to the 
general public. Stakeholder theory suggests that different groups have 
saliency, depending on power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell, et al., 
1997). Their relative weight in each category determines their influence 
over the organisation and, by implication, what gets measured and 
reported. With more complex sets of stakeholder relationships than in the 
private and public sector, this is particularly pertinent to the voluntary 
sector in influencing what and how performance is measured. As well as 
theoretical complications, there are practical difficulties arising from 
multiple stakeholders ‘whose goals and needs may be quite 
heterogeneous’ (Speckbacher, 2003, p. 268). Balser and McCulsky (2005) 
argue that non-profit organisations operate in complex environments 
where multiple stakeholders create much uncertainty. They cite an 
example in a museum where the director wanted to use resources for 
shows for professional art historians whereas the donors wished to see 
accessible and popular exhibitions. There are likely to be different 
perspectives on how achievements are to be measured (Kendall & Knapp, 
2000). Consequently, there are more conflicts and trade-offs between 
stakeholders than in other sectors. Performance measurement systems are 
often set up in parallel to satisfy the needs of different stakeholders, 
creating confusion and demanding resource (Beamon & Balcik, 2008).  
These differences between the sectors (purpose, finance, 
governance and stakeholders) all need be taken into account when 
considering how to use generic frameworks to research into voluntary 




sector performance management. However, they are not so fundamental 
to undermine their applicability and relevance to research into how 
measures are used to manage performance in the voluntary sector.  
 
3.3 Organisational effectiveness 
To understand what needs to be measured in the voluntary sector, 
some concept of what constitutes organisational effectiveness must be 
considered but this is an ‘elusive and contested concept‘ (Herman & Renz, 
2008, p. 399). As this research explores how hospice performance can be 
managed effectively, this is a key consideration within this thesis. 
Organisational effectiveness in the voluntary sector is a highly contested 
area of debate; a product of fragmented discussions across disciplines as 
disparate as sociology, development, international relations and 
management. It is often not defined in the literature and research is 
predominantly theoretical rather than empirical (Lecy, et al., 2012).  
Herman and Renz (2008) have developed a series of theses of 
organisational effectiveness over a decade from their own and others’ 
research. They argue that, as organisational effectiveness is socially 
constructed, a reputational approach based on stakeholder perceptions is 
appropriate but there is no universal best practice. As such, any 
measurement needs to be comparative (to prior years and similar 
organisations). Any assessment has to be contextual, taking into account 
the size and activities of different types of voluntary organisations as well 
as considering different levels of performance, such as organisational and 
programme. Thus, they conclude that ‘as yet there is no commonly agreed 
basis for judging NPO effectiveness’ (Herman & Renz, 2008, p. 404). 
Forbes (1998), in a seminal article, categorized three main 
approaches to understanding organisational effectiveness in non-profit 
organisations. The first, goal attainment, is consistent with the seminal 
definition of effectiveness by Anthony (1965) cited by Berry et al. (2005) in 




management control theory. The second approach identified by Forbes 
(1998), the resource approach, concerns the viability or survival of the 
organisation. Sheehan (1996) suggests this can include internal processes 
and HR resources but criticises its focus on inputs not outcomes.  The third 
category, reputational, seeks the opinion of others including clients and 
professionals. Lecy et al. (2012) identify four domains of effectiveness. 
Three of these, legitimacy, programme and managerial effectiveness, 
correspond to Forbes’ reputation, mission attainment and resource 
management respectively.  The fourth domain, networks, is shared by 
Balser and McCulsky (2005) in the building of stakeholder relationships.  
 
3.4 Purposes of voluntary sector performance measurement information   
Different perceptions of organisational effectiveness influence the 
purposes of performance measurement information, by whom and how it 
is used.   Four purposes of performance measurement are identified by 
Henri (2006) in Chapter 2; monitoring; attention-seeking (problem-
identification); strategic decision-making; and legitimation. As these will 
inform the research sub-questions and interview protocol, their resonance 
with the different perceptions of organisational effectiveness in the 
voluntary sector is important.  To achieve their goals, voluntary sector 
organisations need to monitor their performance and identify the 
problems that inhibit their goal attainment. To use their resources 
effectively, they require information for decision-making. To enhance their 
reputation, they need performance measurement information to 
demonstrate their legitimacy and accountability.  
Much voluntary sector literature addresses a potential tension in 
the purposes of performance measurement. Practitioner literature has 
investigated how, on one hand, performance measurement information 
can be used to ‘improve’ the internal operations; and on the other, to 
‘prove’ its performance to external stakeholders, thus ensuring the 




accountability of the organisation (Pritchard, et al., 2012; New Economics 
Foundation, 2012). Buckmaster (1999, p. 157) argues that ‘while the 
pressure to measure outcomes is coming primarily from accountability 
requirements, the need to do so is primarily to learn and manage 
programmes promptly and properly’.  She suggests that organisational 
learning in non-profit organisations should not be limited to single-loop 
learning, such as controlling costs within a programme, but include double-
loop learning by considering the wider environment and developing higher 
levels of understanding of how outcomes might be best achieved. It is 
however recognised that these purposes are not necessarily clear-cut in 
practice. Lynch-Cerullo and Cooney (2011)  comment that most managers 
do not distinguish between reporting, monitoring, management practice 
and evaluation. 
 
3.4.1 Monitoring and problem-identification: goal achievement 
Voluntary sector performance measurement needs to provide 
information to enable the monitoring and evaluation of how an 
organisation has achieved its goals; Forbes’ (1998) first consideration of 
organisational effectiveness. However, this is often complicated and 
subjective, given amorphous aims and outcomes delivered by networks of 
organisations. Goals are set at different levels and often do not lend 
themselves to aggregation (Harlock, 2013) unlike the profit measure of the 
private sector. Sheehan (1996) advocates mission accomplishment rather 
than goal attainment as this is more likely to include organisation–wide 
measures which reflect impact rather than specific measures for particular 
activities. Sawhill and Williamson (2001), on the other hand argue mission 
is so vague that more specific goals are more realistic to measure 
meaningfully. Many voluntary organisations are primarily concerned with 
programme level achievements; the third domain defined by Lecy et al. 
(2012). A key issue within voluntary sector performance measurement is 




how to link outcome achievement from the point of view of beneficiaries 
to programmes and ultimately to organisational mission (Campbell, 2002). 
‘Organisations delivering multiple programmes have often found that 
programmatic success does not equate to success in fulfilling overall 
organisational mission’ (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014, p. 135). 
Measurement of goal achievement is difficult as definitions of what 
should be measured are contested. Both academic and practitioner 
literature promote the measurement of outputs, outcomes and impact. 
However definitions are variable and not used consistently. Zimmerman 
and Stevens (2006) report that 75% of non-profits in South Carolina use 
outcome measures but define this loosely including any measure of 
performance, while implying it relates to the achievement of organisational 
strategies. Pritchard et al. (2012)  in their practitioner study of 1000 UK 
voluntary sector organisations accept that they define impact broadly 
without being able to assess the depth or breadth of  understanding of 
their respondents. Outputs are defined as the direct product of an activity 
(Carman, 2010; Poister, 2003; Kendall & Knapp, 2000) and are countable 
units (Harlock, 2013) such as the number of beneficiaries using a service. 
However, simply measuring outputs can lead to wrong actions, such as 
inappropriate cost cutting (Buckmaster, 1999). Harlock (2013) defines 
outcomes as the ‘end results’ of the service. Sawhill and Williams (2001) 
provide a pertinent example, describing how Nature Conservancy had 
measured outputs, ‘buck and acres’ or the cost of land acquired, but 
moved to measuring outcomes by assessing the extent of biodiversity 
conservation. Outcome measurement has been one of the most important 
changes affecting public sector management in the UK with a move away 
from input and output measurement, responding to government pressures 
under the Blair government (Wimbush, 2011).  This affects voluntary 
organisations, particularly in the health sector with outcomes-based 
commissioning of their services (Harlock, 2013). While the definition of 
impact is contested, lasting change is often a characteristic feature.  




Harlock (2013) defines impact as the longer term difference made by an 
organisation through its programmes, thus subtly different to outcomes as 
a result of a particular service.  Ebrahim and Rangan (2014) distinguish 
between outcome and impact by arguing that the former is the lasting 
changes to individuals whereas the later implies lasting change to a 
community.    
As pressure to report impact and outcome rather than output 
(Wimbush, 2011; Harlock, 2013; Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014) has increased, 
measuring goal attainment of a single organisation has become more 
complicated.  Attribution of impact to particular organisations which are 
often part of complex networks, sharing a common outcome, is 
problematic with some suggesting a multi-agency model of performance 
measurement (Atkinson & Maxwell, 2007).  Ebrahim and Rangan (2014) 
argue that outcome and impact should only be measured at a higher level, 
possibly by funders, and only those activities and outputs that are 
controlled by a single organisation should be measured by them. 
 
3.4.2 Decision-making: effective use of resources 
  Lecy et al. (2012) identify managerial effectiveness, as the financial 
control and governance of the organisation or managing the resources to 
ensure survival; Forbes’ second criteria of organisational effectiveness. This 
can include the financial management of a voluntary organisation, such as 
budgeting, but also management of internal processes such as strategic 
planning, quality and process improvement (Sheehan Jr, 1996). While 
academic literature on management accounting practices in the voluntary 
sector is scarce, textbooks and practitioner literature set out best practices 
of internal processes, such as  strategic planning, budgeting and costing 
methods (Anthony & Young, 2003; Poister, 2003). LeRoux and Wright 
(2010), in their study of several hundred US social service organisations, 
conclude that performance measures enhance non-profit managers’ 




strategic decision-making (while acknowledging other factors such as 
governance, funder diversity and the quality of educational background of 
the executive directors).  
 
3.4.3 Legitimacy and accountability: enhancing reputation 
As well as performance measurement information being used for 
the internal purposes of monitoring performance against goals and making 
decisions about resource allocations, it also has an external role. By 
reporting on performance, the organisation’s legitimacy is enhanced. Lecy 
et al. (2012) describe this in terms of protecting the brand or reputation of 
a non-profit organisation with Barman (2007) arguing that demonstrating 
legitimacy is essential for fundraising. Bagnoli and Megali (2011) in their 
conceptual model of performance of social enterprises include institutional 
legitimacy alongside economic and financial performance in a three part 
model. Institutional legitimacy, in their view, includes adherence to 
regulation as well as the accomplishment of mission. Several voluntary 
sector researchers have drawn upon the work of Di Maggio and Powell 
(1983) in their observations of legitimacy.  In discussing why organisations 
have become more similar, they developed a typology of three kinds of 
isomorphic pressures: coercive; mimetic; and normative. Tucker and Parker 
(2013) find examples of each in their study of Australian non-profit 
organisations as they seek both internal and external legitimacy. Funders, 
particularly those connected with the government, exert coercive pressure 
by demanding particular forms of performance reporting.  Non-profit 
organisations also adopt common practices such as mimetic isomorphism, 
as they are perceived to be best practice.  They also give examples of 
normative pressures whereby managers adopt reporting based on their 
professional experience, particularly from the private sector. Greiling 
(2010), in observing the reasons for the adoption of the BSC in German 
non-profit organisations, suggests that it may be an example of mimetic 




isomorphism. First, it signals to stakeholders that the management are 
using up-to-date tools and second, it adds to the legitimacy of funders who 
can then justify to their own stakeholders that their funds were used 
efficiently. 
Performance measurement information not only enhances the 
legitimacy of voluntary organisations but provides the means to hold them 
to account. Their characteristics, such as their purpose, the role of finance, 
governance and multiple stakeholders, all present difficulties in considering 
to whom and for what these organisations are accountable. Edwards and 
Hulme (1995, p. 9) in their authoritative work on performance and 
accountability in NGOs and grassroots organisations suggested that 
‘accountability is generally interpreted as the means by which individuals 
and organisations report to a recognised authority, or authorities, and are 
held responsible for their actions’. However, accountability is not merely to 
those in authority over organisations. Crawford et al. (2009, p. 192) 
concluded that ‘charity managers and trustees see accountability as more 
extensive than simply in financial terms and identify a wide range of 
accountability relationships with a variety of stakeholders’. ‘Since there are 
few absolute performance measures in NGO evaluation and no single 
bottom line, negotiation among stakeholders is the essence of 
accountability in this area’ (Edwards & Hulme, 1995, p. 12). Ebrahim (2003) 
has argued that accountability is relational, showing the complicated sets 
of relationships between voluntary sector stakeholders. He also argues that 
it includes both internal as well as external accountabilities, finding the 
private sector principal-agent model too simplistic for non-profits. More 
recently, commentators have distinguished between ‘upward’ 
accountabilities to funders and trustees, and ‘downward’ accountabilities 
to the beneficiaries, employees and volunteers. Benjamin (2012) considers 
how accountability to beneficiaries with their ‘ambiguous standing’ in non-
profits can be improved in reporting outcome measures. Christensen and 
Ebrahim (2006) have added a third category, by distinguishing between 




beneficiaries and the ‘lateral’ accountability to staff, volunteers and 
community partners. They observe tensions in trying to satisfy all three 
levels of accountability in a case study of an organisation helping 
immigrants and refugees, arguing that pressure to account upwards 
threatens mission. They recommend that strong lateral accountability 
enhances both upward and downward accountability. Campbell (2002) 
describes the ‘paradox of political accountability’ in attempting to meet the 
needs of both a broad social aim and specific programme achievements. As 
well as formal accountability structures, there can be informal 
accountability practices with several authors referring to a felt or moral 
responsibility (Ebrahim, 2003; Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Polonsky & 
Grau, 2011) . 
Edwards and Hulme (1995) argue that performance and accountability are 
inextricably linked. With an explosion in global numbers of NGOs and 
grassroots organisations in the 1980s and 1990s, they warn of two types of 
potential corruption: their integrity is threatened by both financial scandal 
and deviation from their mission for social transformation. Their central 
argument (p.6) is that there are two essential parts to NGO accountability: 
‘Performing effectively and accounting transparency are essential 
components of responsible practice on which the legitimacy of 
development intervention ultimately depends’. To avoid these two threats 
to corruption, they argue (p.5) that the only way that these can be avoided 
is ‘to develop systems for performance monitoring, accountability and 
strategic planning.’ Effectively, this equates to three of Henri’s four (2006) 
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3.5 External UK charity reporting 
As UK voluntary hospices are required to report to the Charity 
Commission, their statutory reports provide information on how they 
measure their performance, including mission fulfilment. Of the four uses 
identified by Henri, this should at a minimum meet the requirements of 
legitimacy, broadened here to include accountability. There has been 
extensive research into the external reporting of performance within UK 
charities, including in what ways and to whom are they accountable. Citing 
the work of Brody (2001) and Taylor and Rosair (2000), Connolly and 
Dhanani (2009) and Crawford at al. (2009) they use the distinction between 
fiduciary and managerial accountability; the latter being, described as 
performance accountability by Connolly et al.  (2015). They divide 




performance accountability into two further categories. The first is 
financial management, designed to ensure the efficient use of financial 
resources. The second is operational accountability, allowing an 
organisation to demonstrate its impact on wider society, or goal 
attainment. The statutory reports of UK voluntary hospices should 
therefore be a good source of performance information from both a 
financial and operational perspective, at least in as far as it it presented to 
an external audience. 
Statutory requirements, or what is perceived as relevant 
information for users by the regulator, has changed over the last three 
decades. Connolly et al. (2015) identify key developments in the evolution 
of UK charity accounting between 1988 and 2005. Recommended practice 
was replaced by mandatory requirements and preparer discretion has been 
reduced. For example, the 1995 SORP introduced a more prescriptive 
approach, replacing the Income Statement with the SOFA (the Statement 
of Financial Activities) and imposing the distinction between restricted and 
unrestricted income. Whereas the 1988 SORP was predominantly based on 
commercial accounting principles (such as the principal-agent theory), 
charities now have requirements more tailored to their specific needs. By 
introducing narrative reporting in the Trustees’ Annual Report (TAR) and 
Summary Information Returns (SIRs) in the 2005 SORP, emphasis is put on 
the reporting of operational performance as well as financial results. The 
requirement for SIRs was later withdrawn due to duplication in the 2015 
SORP. 
3.5.1 Relevance of UK charity reporting 
UK statutory reports should provide a useful source of information 
on performance measures used by voluntary hospices, especially as more 
emphasis has been put on operational performance by the regulator. 
However, research carried out into how UK charity reporting meets the 
needs of its stakeholders questions how relevant this information is. As 




early as 1990, Hyndman commented on the ‘relevance gap’ between what 
was disclosed and what the users actually wanted (Hyndman, 1990; 
Hyndman, 1991). In 1990, he identified the key users as the contributors 
and surveyed the 163 largest fund-raising charities in the UK, using 14 
types of information mostly used in an a priori model. He argued that, as 
contributors, they were not entitled to information other than publically 
available financial reports. Yet most of the information sought by the 
contributors was non-financial. Even though they provided resources, their 
motivation was not economic gain. They were more interested in 
objectives and future plans that were unlikely to be expressed in financial 
terms. The information types most often found (such as the three audited 
statements, operating statement, balance sheets and funds flow) were 
considered the least important by the contributors. Conversely, non-
financial information was considered to be most useful, such as goals, 
efficiency and outputs. While appreciating the difficulties of providing 
performance-related information, he concluded that ‘contributors would 
be better served by simplified, rather than audited financial statements’ 
(Hyndman, 1991, p. 306).   
Having identified a ‘relevance gap’ in the 1990s, little improvement 
has been seen over the last three decades. Connolly and Hyndman (2003) 
used the same 14 categories of information to demonstrate limited 
improvements to performance reporting in the annual report following two 
revisions to the SORP in 1995 and 2000. More attention was given to public 
sector performance measurement terminology; efficiency (outputs: inputs) 
and effectiveness (outputs: objectives), with comparisons being drawn 
with the higher quality of performance information reported in that sector. 
They found that there were a significant number of charities which 
reported no information on effectiveness (71%) and efficiency (91%). While 
this gap has closed considerably, Connolly and Hyndman (2013b) conclude 
that the relevance of Annual Reports can still be questioned. Measures of 
efficiency have only improved from 2% in 1990 to 22% in Annual Reports 




and 25% in Annual Reviews by 2008. Moreover, the specific measure of % 
administration costs show no change over this time (Connolly & Hyndman, 
2013b). 
Attempts to change the reporting requirements to better meet 
stakeholders needs has had mixed success. Narrative reporting 
requirements were implemented in SORP 2005. This put more emphasis on 
the TAR and introduced a SIR for larger charities. Connolly and Dhanani 
(2009) conclude that the Annual Report, including financial statements, 
play a limited role in discharging all aspects of accountability. Moreover, 
the importance of its role was reducing over time. They analyse the 
narrative reporting patterns of the largest UK charities in terms of 
fiduciary, financial and operational managerial performance, including 
higher quality performance measures of efficiency and effectiveness. Only 
49% of charities surveyed include efficiency and effectiveness measures in 
their Annual Report. Statutory reports provide a good starting point for 
research into hospice performance measures but further information is 
needed to understand how they manage their performance. 
 
3.5.2 Alternative UK external reporting 
External reporting of performance is not limited to the TARs and 
SIRs reported to the Charity Commission. Connolly and Dhanani’s (2009) 
research confirms that accountability is being discharged in ways other 
than just the annual report. Interviews with charity representatives 
suggests that the key stakeholders are considered to be not the funders or 
contributors, as presumed in earlier research, but other types of 
stakeholder, such as the public, government and beneficiaries. Their needs 
are being addressed through other mechanisms, such as through the 
annual review and websites. It is argued that different external audiences 
require different types of accountability information, with the Annual 
Report being seen by interviewees as a ‘grey’ document fulfilling a 




statutory role and being needed by big funders and senior management. 
The annual review, on the other hand, could ‘tell the charities’ story’ in a 
more user-friendly way and addressed the needs of their wider audiences 
more appropriately. However, this had arguably resulted in weakened 
performance accountability. There is concern that annual reviews are being 
used to present selective information; accountability is being superseded 
by a publicity agenda in reporting only good stories. Moreover, they 
comment on a reluctance to demonstrate results, such as societal change 
or to provide forward-looking information, rather than just activities. 
Websites are ubiquitous but, in their view, do not discharge accountability 
effectively, with only two-thirds uploading their annual report and 
predominantly providing descriptions of activities rather than on 
performance. Adopting a different model, Dhanani (2009) uses four 
categories of accountability, charitable intent, activity, performance and 
future intent, to analyse the variety and volume of disclosures of large 
charities on the GuideStar UK website. She draws similar conclusions with 
charities providing descriptive information but being unwilling to disclose 
higher order performance measures. 
External reporting, both through statutory and other reports, 
provides insight into how performance is measured within voluntary 
organisations. However, weak external performance reporting has been 
seen as indicative of poor internal reporting too. Throughout this research 
there has been conjecture on why charities are unwilling to disclose high-
quality performance measures. In 1991, Hyndman discussed the possible 
reasons for the reluctance to disclose such information including concerns 
over misinterpretation, fear of negative reactions or the high cost of 
providing information. Initially, he discounted the possibility of the lack of 
adequate internal systems to provide such information as, at least some of 
the information (such as goals and objectives) should have been readily 
available. Connolly and Hyndman (2003) argue that in an increasingly 
competitive environment, there is every incentive to demonstrate good 




performance. They conjecture that reluctance to disclose is possibly 
indicative of a weak internal regime. ‘It could be argued that those charities 
with better governance regimes are more likely to develop extensive 
internal systems to target, measure and report performance, particularly 
performance related to effectiveness and efficiency. It could be the case 
that charities with better governance may have more complete 
foundations on which to base the external reporting of performance and 
therefore more likely to provide such information in their annual reports’  
(Connolly & Hyndman, 2004, p. 149). Interestingly, Connolly and Dhanani 
(2009) comment on SORP 2005 requiring charities to disclose performance 
information only if their internal systems collect it. Given the lack of 
external performance reporting, they conclude that there is likely to be an 
absence of internal systems.   They acknowledge that was beyond their 
remit to investigate internal performance reporting and later call for case 
studies into performance measurement and management.  
 
3.5.3 UK Charity objectives and achievements 
Charity reporting research has thus concluded that there is a lack of 
meaningful operational performance reporting within statutory returns. 
However, the 2005 SORP (Charity Commmission, 2005) did not specify to 
any great extent what operational performance detail was required. While 
fifty pages of the SORP specify the technical accounting detail, there is only 
just over one page given to stipulating how objectives, achievements and 
performance should be included in the TAR. Guidance on specific measures 
is limited to: 
’The report is likely to provide both qualitative and quantitative 
information that helps to explain achievement and performance. It 
will often be helpful to provide indicators, milestones and 
benchmarks against which the achievement of objectives is assessed 
by the charity’ (Charity Commmission, 2005, p. 9). 




Given the lack of specificity in the SORP guidance and difficulties of 
measurement, it is perhaps not surprising that precise, externally set 
measures such as efficiency and effectiveness have not been widely 
reported. There is, however, a call for holding charities to account for 
performance against the aims, strategies and objectives that they have set 
themselves by the Charity Commission. The SORP guidance states that: 
‘the report (TAR) should help the reader understand the aims and 
objectives set by the charity and the strategies and activities 
undertaken to achieve them’ (Charity Commmission, 2005, p. 8)  
Connolly et al. (2013a, p. 51), in their interviews with stakeholders, 
conclude that ‘the primary impression gained from the interviews is that 
accountability is believed to be closely associated with demonstrating that 
the monies received have been spent in accordance with the aims and 
objectives of the charity.’ Moreover, the accountability framework used by 
Connolly and Dhanani (2009) has been extended to include ‘strategic 
accountability’, where disclosure includes their vision and mission; actions 
and activities as well as results and impact (Dhanani & Connolly, 2012). The 
revised SORP (FRS102) for large charities (Charity Commission, 2015) which 
came into effect from January 2015, is more explicit in requiring larger 




Table 3.2 SORP (FRS102) (Charity Commission, 2015) 
“Good reporting provides a coherent explanation of the charity’s 
strategies for achieving its aims and objectives and explains how the 
activities it undertook contributed to their achievement. In particular, 
the report of larger charities must provide an explanation of: 






Research into UK charity accounting has been dominated by 
external reporting, concluding that weak external reporting implies that 
internal performance reporting must be poor too.  However, vague 
statutory requirements on reporting against stated objectives may also 
explain this. As both these suggestions are only inference and conjecture, 
there is clearly a lack of research into internal performance reporting 
within the UK charity sector. Indeed, Connolly, et al.(2015, p. 176) argue 
‘given the importance placed by a range of stakeholders on performance 
information, further studies relating to what is meant by performance, how 
it might be measured and reported and what emphasis stakeholders place 
on it would seem appropriate’. They recommend that detailed case studies 
are carried out focusing on impact in specific contexts. This research seeks 
to do this by investigating the internal performance measurement in the 
hospice sector. 
 
3.6 Voluntary sector performance measurement models 
 To some extent, this call for more research into performance 
measurement has been met by the research into the growth of 
-its aims, including details of the issues it seeks to tackle and the changes 
or differences it seeks to make through its activities; 
-how the achievement of its aims will further its legal purposes;  
-its strategies for achieving its stated aims and objectives;  
-the criteria or measures it uses to assess success in the reporting period; 
and 
-the significant activities undertaken (including its main programmes, 
projects or services provided), explaining how they contribute to the 
achievement of its stated aims and objectives” 
(Charity Commission, 2015, section 1.35-1.36).. 
SORP (FRS102) (Charity Commission, 2015) 




performance measurement practices in other academic disciplines within 
the voluntary sector. Ebrahim and Rangan (2010, p. 33) comment on the 
‘explosion of methodologies and tools for assessing social performance and 
impact’ in the voluntary sector. Indeed, a review of websites reveals long 
shopping lists of tools available, such as a hundred recommended tools by 
New Economics Foundation (2012) and 150 found in the US by Lynch-
Cerullo and Cooney (2011). There is also a growing academic literature on 
how performance in the voluntary sector is evaluated but this is diverse, 
fragmented and across a wide range of disciplines (Moxham, 2014). 
Indeed, in two literature reviews of voluntary sector performance, 
published within a year of each other (Cordery & Sinclair, 2013; Moxham, 
2014), there are few common sources. These offer two typologies for 
voluntary sector performance measurement systems. Cordery and Sinclair 
(2013), with an accounting perspective, recommend four categories; 
economic/financial; programme theory; strategic and participatory 
approaches. Moxham (2014), with an operational background, suggests 
two broad groups; reputational; and multi-dimensional, with three sub-
groups in each. Broadly, performance measurement models can be put on 
a continuum from the purely quantitative, such as financial results, to the 
purely qualitative assessment of performance such as the opinion of 
experts (eg peer review) and beneficiaries (eg anecdotal stories). Nicholls 
(2009) uses a ‘spectrum of disclosure logics’ to position different 
performance measurement methods between positivist, quantitative and 
interpretive, qualitative ends. Here, voluntary sector performance 
measurement models are mapped against the themes identified in the 
management control literature in Chapter 2; financial; diverse; aligned; 
integrated; and comprehensive performance measurement. 
 
3.6.1 Financial and economic performance measurement 
As in all sectors, voluntary organisations report financial 
performance through statutory reports and internal management 




accounting systems. Carman (2007) found that 97% of non-profit 
organisations report expenditure, well exceeding every other type of 
performance measure but to be expected given legal requirements. Ratio 
analysis of financial measures is carried out in both the private and 
voluntary sectors. In the private sector, performance is predominantly 
analysed through profitability, liquidity and gearing ratios. Financial 
measures can be derived from charity statutory accounts and incorporate 
conversion ratios such as administration costs as a percentage of total 
expenditure or fundraising costs compared to revenue generated 
(Connolly, et al., 2013b; Van Der Heijden, 2013). Ritchie and Kolodinsky 
(2003, p. 368) argue that, even in just considering financial performance, 
there is a ‘confusing array’ of measures and suggest consensus is needed to 
provide comparable financial information. By using factor analysis, they 
find six financial performance measures which represent three 
performance related categories; fundraising efficiency; public support; and 
fiscal performance. They advocate this method as a cost-effective starting 
point, even suggesting that one composite measure could be derived from 
the three indicators. They also recognise the shortcomings of dependence 
on purely financial information, such as cutting costs to meet short-term 
goals at the expense of longer term mission-critical services. Connolly et al. 
(2013b) show how financial measures are vulnerable to misinterpretation. 
There is paucity of discussion in the literature on costing systems within 
voluntary organisations, with brief reference to unit costs by McEwen et al. 
(2010) and costing systems by Bagnoli and Megali  (2011). Nevertheless, 
LeRoux and Wright (2010) find that unit costs and efficiency measures 
contribute the most to strategic decisions made by executive directors. 
Other methods of voluntary sector performance express measures 
in monetary terms. Cordery and Sinclair (2013) cite several economic 
methods of performance measurement including cost-benefit analysis, 
outcome-rating scale and social audit, as economic-financial models. One 
high profile method is the Social Return on Investment (SROI) model. 




Derived from cost-benefit analysis, it calculates the ratio of costs to 
benefits in monetary terms so creating ‘currency of social value’ (Arvidson, 
et al., 2010). Nicholls (2009) positions it at the positivist, quantitative end 
of his ‘spectrum of disclosure logics’.   Advocates of SROI claim it to be 
holistic and comprehensive, as it combines economic value with social 
impact. Initially developed by the Roberts Enterprise Foundation in the US, 
it has been introduced by the New Economics Foundation in the UK, 
gaining government recognition in 2009. Its key distinction, at least in the 
UK, is its emphasis on stakeholder involvement. Underpinning the model 
are proxies for social benefits, giving a financial value to intangibles. Its 
limitations are well acknowledged, with disputes about the validity of 
quantifying social value and reducing social impact to a single monetary 
figure, thereby masking its underlying judgements (Cordery & Sinclair, 
2013). As well as the philosophy being contested, there are methodological 
difficulties. It is sensitive to assumptions based on stakeholder judgements, 
contentious in its quantification of ‘deadweight’ and costly to administer. 
There is also evidence of ‘ratio inflation’ as organisations seek to outbid 
their ‘competitors’ with improved social returns (Arvidson, et al., 2010). 
Consequently, Luke et al. (2013) contend that it has primarily symbolic use 
amongst social enterprises. 
Voluntary sector organisations face one specific issue not 
necessarily addressed by non-profits generally:  the calculation of 
volunteer value.  ‘Without volunteers’ active participation, society would 
lose a vital resource’ (Cordery, et al., 2013, p. 47). This includes connecting 
charities with their communities, enabling them to deliver services not 
otherwise possible, developing volunteers’ skills and providing trustees to 
act on boards. As financial statements traditionally do not include items for 
which there is no clear market value, the substantial contribution made by 
volunteers is not included in charity financial statements.  Quarter et al. 
(2003) argue that, while income statements are logical for ‘for-profit’ 
organisations with shareholders, they are not ideal for non-profits.  They 




propose an extended added-value statement (EAVS) which looks beyond 
the surplus generated and includes any added-value distributed to all its 
stakeholders.  This reports social inputs such as volunteer contribution and 
social outputs such as the skills learnt by volunteers through participation. 
While the valuation of volunteer contribution is not reported in financial 
statements, they monetise its value in their EAVS by taking volunteer 
hours, calculating total hours as full-time equivalent employees and 
applying an appropriate market rate. Benefits gained by volunteers are 
valued, such as at the equivalent cost of training. Such valuations can also 
be included their variant on SROI, the Community Social Return on 
Investment model (Richmond, et al., 2003).  
The valuation of volunteers however is still controversial.  On the 
one hand, it is important to ‘highlight an otherwise invisible sizeable labour 
force’ (Cordery, et al., 2013, p. 48).  In their qualitative research, Cordery et 
al. (2013) find five factors driving the need to communicate volunteer 
value: painting a more complete picture; building a charity’s reputation; 
recognising volunteers’ contribution; internally managing resources; and 
meeting ‘standards.’ On the other hand, valuation methods are considered 
unreliable with no market value. Cordery et al. (2013) find three factors 
acting as barriers to valuation: adding the lack of organisational 
commitment to valuation to previously identified issues of  resource 
constraints and methodology (who gets counted and what they are worth).  
They argue that the increasing professionalisation of charities, such as 
recording volunteer time for health and safety reasons and improved 
volunteer management, supports the case for better reporting.  They 
recommend a soft approach reporting volunteer value ‘as a gift of 
volunteers’ time and to show a more complete picture of these charities 
capabilities’ (Cordery, et al., 2013, p. 54). 
  
3.6.2 Diverse performance measurement 




In Chapter 2, it is argued that non-financial measures are needed to 
supplement financial measures to ensure diverse performance 
measurement. In the voluntary sector, these are typically outputs or 
measures of activities and measures of quality (Cairns, et al., 2005). 
Pritchard et al. (2012) report that 84% of UK charities report outputs 
compared to under 60% reporting outcomes, consistent with Carman’s 
(2007) findings in community-based organisations in the US. LeRoux and 
Wright (2010) find that outcomes and effectiveness measures followed by 
output/workload measures contributed significantly to strategic decision-
making. As Lecy et al. (2012, p. 438) conclude, the effectiveness of a non-
profit organisation is ‘clearly a complex issue to capture’ with a variety of 
interpretations depending on the perspective of each stakeholder, from 
managers to board, from financial viability to the fulfilment of mission. 
Moxham’s (2014, p. 710) typology includes multi-dimensional models 
which ‘reflect the view point that there is not one best way to measure 
performance.’ She includes three sub-categories within this: programme 
evaluation, outcome monitoring, and the BSC. The first involves the 
monitoring of programme level results and activities through a variety of 
sources, and is frequently used. Sowa et al. (2004) go as far as to propose a 
multi-dimensional framework capturing objective and perceptual measures 
of both capacity (process and structure) and outcomes for both 
management and programme effectiveness in one multi-level structural 
equation model. 
 
3.6.3 Aligned performance measurement 
A key characteristic of effective performance measurement is 
considered to be the alignment of performance measures to an 
organisational strategy and objectives. Zimmerman and Stevens (2006) find 
a clear link between clarity of objectives and delivery of results.  Carman 
(2007) report that 84% of New York community-based organisations 
assessed whether they meet their goals. At least two of Moxham’s multi-




dimensional models demonstrate alignment as well as diversity. Outcome 
monitoring identifies the intended outcomes or goals and then measures 
what impact an organisation makes on its beneficiaries   (Benjamin, 2012; 
Lowe, 2013; MacIndoe & Barman, 2013; Ebrahim & Rangan, 2010). 
McEwen et al. (2010) show how outcomes were measured at Barnardo’s at 
different organisational levels of service users, long-term outcomes and 
overall organisational mission. Moxham (2014) also cites the BSC, 
categorised by Cordery and Sinclair (2013) as a strategic approach (Hough, 
et al., 2015; Manville, 2007; Speckbacher, 2003). Kaplan (2001, p. 360) 
though hardly impartial as a co-author of the BSC, argues that the it can be 
easily adapted for use in the non-profit sector and illustrates its successful 
implementation in four US case studies. He advises that ‘non-profit 
agencies should consider placing an overarching mission objective at the 
top of their scorecard.’ He concludes that ‘the balanced scorecard has 
enabled non-profit organisations to bridge the gap between vague mission 
and strategy statements and day-to-day operational actions.’ He argues 
that it allowed the focus to shift from programme to outcomes, aligning all 
resources, staff, finances, initiatives, to accomplish organisational 
objectives. Kaplan (2001) also suggests that customers should be divided 
into two categories: donor and beneficiary. Voelker et al. (2001) put all 
stakeholders within the customer perspective. Recently, the success of the 
BSC in the UK charitable sector has been studied in a longitudinal case 
study into social housing (Manville & Broad, 2013). This is however only 
one example and research into UK voluntary sector BSC implementations is 
very limited (Moxham & Boaden, 2007). Greiling (2010) also found limited 
adoption of the BSC in Germany and Carman (2007) in the US with only 3% 
of New York community-based organisations using it. 
There are a few other examples of strategic approaches in 
voluntary sector literature. Sawhill and Williamson (2001, p. 385) argue for 
a family of nine measures which link mission, vision, goals, strategies and 
programmes of the organisation. They propose concrete and tangible goals 




that are specific, challenging and aligned to mission. ‘It would be a serious 
error to imagine that a non-profit can develop effective measures in the 
absence of strategic alignment’. Epstein and Buhovac (2010) have taken an 
input/impact model and put it in the context of the mission, strategy and 
resources available to the organisation. By drawing linkage maps, they 
identify logical cause-and-effect relationships between inputs and outputs, 
outputs and outcomes.  
 
3.6.4 Integrated performance measurement 
The voluntary sector has several examples of integrated, causal 
models to assess performance. If fully implemented, the BSC identifies the 
causal links between its perspectives. However, there is little evidence of 
the BSC operating in this way in the voluntary sector (Greiling, 2010). 
Cordery and Sinclair (2013) cite programme approaches as ‘cybernetic 
logic’ models including the theory of change (Macpherson, 2001; 
Buckmaster, 1999; Poister, 2003; Campbell, 2002). Based on public sector 
models, logic models are designed to measure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of voluntary sector interventions by comparing outputs, 
outcome and impacts (Buckmaster, 1999; Kendall & Knapp, 2000; Poister, 
2003). Efficiency assesses outputs in relation to inputs, where outputs are 
the final product of the programme process. Effectiveness measures the 
outputs against the desired outcomes. Kendal and Knapp (2000) extend the 
public sector model to incorporate voluntary sector concerns such as 
equity, advocacy and innovation. While the logic model is commonly cited 
in literature, Pritchard et al. (2012) found that 80% of UK charities do not 
actually use any planning model, with only 7% using theory of change and 
5% the logic model. Its lack of popularity may be explained by its 
shortcomings.  Gasper (2000) criticises the logic model for a lack of 
theoretical underpinning. He identified four failings: the illusion of logic, 




over simplification, omission of vital bits of information and that is often 
imposed by funders.  
 
3.6.5 Comprehensive performance measurement 
The limitations of cybernetic models are exposed in the 
management control literature. Organic methods of control, such as social 
and cultural control, are seen as complementing mechanistic results-based 
models of performance measurement. This connects well to more 
qualitative models, described by Cordery and Sinclair’s (2013) as 
participatory and by Moxham (2014) as reputational. Cordery and Sinclair 
(2013) categorise narrative reporting of stories, outcome mapping and 
‘most significant change’ within participatory approaches. Given the lack of 
agreement in finding performance measurement models that adequately 
reflect the values of the third sector, Greatbanks et al. (2010) argue that 
reporting stories is a method of demonstrating impact that is empathetic to 
the values of the voluntary sector.  Moxham’s (2014) reputational 
approaches include peer review and benchmarking. Purcell and Hawtin 
(2010, p. 358) observe three cases of peer review, where programmes are 
evaluated by those ‘of equivalent status.’ Participants are ‘broadly upbeat’ 
(p.36) with feedback being valued as peers could both be more objective by 
standing back from the operation but were also mindful of the 
circumstances. While Conley Tyler (2005, p. 220) find very little evidence of 
the use of benchmarking in Austrian non-profits, she argues that there is 
great potential for its use, as there are ‘particular benefits for human 
capital processes, which dominate voluntary sector organisations’.  
 
 
3.7 Healthcare sector balanced scorecards 




Although Greiling (2010) and Moxham and Boaden (2007) suggest 
that there are few examples of the BSC being used in the voluntary sector, 
there has been extensive research into BSCs in the healthcare sector 
worldwide. This would suggest that there is no technical reason why the 
BSC could not be as successful in voluntary sector settings, particularly in 
healthcare. Zelman et al. (2003, p. 1) argue that ‘in healthcare, the 
balanced scorecard is well into its growth phase.’ They show how the BSC 
could be used at different levels of the industry, from single hospitals to 
national systems, and across many types of organisation, with diverse 
missions, products and clinical settings. Gurd and Gao (2007), in their 
literature review of published BSC case studies in the health sector globally, 
consider the distinction between public and voluntary sector less relevant 
than the type of healthcare organisation or location. They investigate what 
perspectives and measures are actually used in BSC healthcare scorecards. 
They find that most organisations modified the original four perspectives 
to their specific needs, such as adding ‘people’ or ‘community’, although 
they are critical that patients were rarely the top perspective. Gurd and 
Gao  (2007) also assess the development of healthcare BSCs against the 
three generation of scorecards (Speckbacher, et al., 2003; Lawrie & 
Cobbold, 2004), finding that the majority are second generation, linking 
cause-and-effect relationships between perspectives. Although Greiling’s 
(2010) research qualifies the extent of technically advanced BSC 
implementations in Germany, the BSC appears to be an appropriate 
measurement system for voluntary healthcare organisations including 
hospices. 
 Many benefits are claimed by those who have adopted the BSC in 
healthcare organisations.  Inamdar et al. (2002) carried out interviews with 
nine executives of US healthcare providers and show how they respond to 
external pressures, such as the need for cost reduction, increased 
regulation, and the availability of information technology, by implementing 
the BSC. The benefits stated are consistent with generic literature, 




including gaining consensus on strategy, providing a framework for 
decision-making, aligning initiatives and linking resources allocation to 
strategy. However, it may be unsurprising that these claims use typical BSC 
terminology as one of the authors, Kaplan, was the designer of the original 
scorecard. Direct benefits are cited, not only in financial performance but 
also in operational measures, such as in health, quality and market share 
(Gumbus, et al., 2003). Other case studies emphasise the benefits arising 
from the process of implementation, such as the increased co-operation 
between clinicians and administrators (Aidemark & Funck, 2009) and the 
development of a common language (Gumbus, et al., 2003). The BSC has 
created the opportunity for healthcare organisations to discuss their 
objectives. ‘Customizing the scorecard often sets the stage for strategic 
conversation to begin’ (Voelker, et al., 2001, p. 17). Managers are 
encouraged to consider wider perspectives, looking beyond external 
clinical and financial measures to new measures of internal performance 
(Curtwright, et al., 2000). By linking results to operating activities and then 
communicating them clearly, managers are able to align goals and ‘capture 
the synergy and commitment of diverse employees’ (Gumbus, et al., 2003, 
p. 54). Aidemark and Funke (2009) reject the top-down approach intended 
in the original design of the BSC and show the benefits of decentralised 
management of the BSC with employees engaged at all levels. The 
flexibility of the BSC is seen as one of its benefits (Voelker, et al., 2001), 
although Aidemark and Funck (2009, p. 254) endorse Norreklit’s cynical 
comments that it is so flexible it becomes the ‘creation of the 
implementers.’ 
Research into BSC adoption in the healthcare industry could be self-
selecting; only good stories get reported and vary across different 
geographical and sector contexts. Even within successful implementations, 
challenges are acknowledged. They are time consuming to implement, 
demand senior management commitment to be effective, and exacerbate 
staff fears of being measured, especially if linked to incentives (Aidemark & 




Funck, 2009; Inamdar, et al., 2002; Voelker, et al., 2001; Gumbus, et al., 
2003). Many experience data collection difficulties, such as timeliness, 
validity and duplication (Inamdar, et al., 2002; Pink, et al., 2001). Oliveria 
(2001) argues that a data warehouse of clinical, operational and financial 
data is needed. Pieper (2005) suggest that the simplicity of the BSC is 
deceptive, with the complexity beneath it often leading to the creation of 
new integrated IT systems. Indeed, Curtwight and Stolp-Smith (2000) show 
how BSC implementation leads to the development of an institutional-wide 
clinical practice data set at the Mayo Clinic. Some criticism is made of the 
use of the BSC. More emphasis is put on the diagnostic rather than the 
strategic use of the BSC with the mission having a low priority, and learning 
and innovation perspective not being fully utilised (Greiling, 2010; Gurd & 
Gao, 2007; Kocakülâh & Austill, 2007). Despite being the hallmark of the 
BSC, cause-and-effect relationships may not be effective in practice 
(Greiling, 2010). Other challenges are specific to the voluntary sector. 
Kocakülâh and Austill (2007) suggest that adoption of the BSC in the 
healthcare sector has been slower than for-profit organisations because of 
the divergent stakeholder groups involved. Pieper (2005) even 
recommends developing different BSCs for different audiences. 
 
3.8 Challenges in voluntary sector performance measurement  
It is acknowledged that voluntary sector performance measurement 
systems are ‘challenging and complicated’ (Herman & Renz, 2008). Some of 
this is due to general implementation problems of performance 
measurement systems as described above for the BSC. However, others 
are due to the inherent problems of the voluntary sector, such as lack of a 
single monetary goal and diverse stakeholder interests. Lynch-Cerullo and 
Cooney (2011) acknowledge that some voluntary sector organisations have 
missions that facilitate easier measurement than others, with Carnochan et 
al. (2014) commenting on how difficult it is to track client progress in many 




human service organisations. Being mission-driven, staff experience 
tensions between caring for clients and the demands of reporting 
(Manville, 2007). 
Research reveals more extensive problems in the practical working 
of voluntary sector performance measurement. Moxham (2010) argues 
that such systems can be more of a hindrance than a help to charitable 
organisations. She shares views held by others, such as Carman (2010)and 
Buckmaster (1999), that that the lack of a generally accepted model within 
the sector exacerbates problems. Without accepted terminology or 
standardised procedures, progress in such a diverse sector is inhibited. 
Current methods are criticised for being resource intensive and directing 
funds away from the mission. Ebrahim and Rangan (2014) find that 46% of 
respondents produce reports at expense of their programmes. While 
funders drive much of the information requirements (Carnochan, et al., 
2014; Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014), they are also not prepared to provide the 
funding (Carman, 2007). This can result in box ticking rather than producing 
meaningful information (Moxham & Boaden, 2007) or promoting ritualistic 
processes (Connolly & Hyndman, 2003).  
Others comment of implementation problems, such as a culture 
resistant to accepting new styles of reporting (Wimbush, 2011; Carnochan, 
et al., 2014) and the lack of infrastructure to support new approaches 
(Wimbush, 2011; Micheli & Kennerley, 2005). Many comment on the lack 
of skills of staff, particularly in IT (Carnochan, et al., 2014; Harlock, 2013). 
The reliability and validity of information produced is questioned 
(Buckmaster, 1999; Connolly & Hyndman, 2003) and data can be 
manipulated. Micheli and Kennerely (2005) suggest that the lack of an 
integrated framework marginalises information which cannot be 
quantified. False objectivity is conveyed if only what is measurable is 
reported. It is easy to measure what is measurable and ignore more 
subjective qualitative measures. Gasper (2000) calls for those 
implementing performance systems to consider carefully the purposes for 




which they are being used. His research suggests that they became less 
useful as they move through different phases of programme management 
from planning, to monitoring and evaluation.  
Some recommend narrowing down performance measurement to 
manageable levels; limited number of measures for specific objectives that 
are time-bounded and relevant (LeRoux & Wright, 2010). Ebrahim and 
Rangan (2014) suggest measures should be within the scope and scale of 
the organisation and under their direct control. Outputs may therefore be 
more appropriate than outcomes in small organisations. Others broaden 
performance measurement to promoting a change of attitude and creating 
models which reflect the whole community and wider partnerships 
(Atkinson & Maxwell, 2007).   
 
3.9 Comparison with management control theory: a gap in voluntary 
sector literature on and performance measurement 
 This literature review therefore demonstrates how there are 
common themes within the management control and voluntary sector 
performance measurement literature (see Table 3.2 and Appendix 1). Both 
seek to control their financial and economic performance through budgets, 
costing and cost-benefits analyses. Both incorporate non-financial 
information within their diverse performance measurement systems.  
There is evidence of performance measurement systems which align 
performance measures with strategy within both sets of literature. 
Although the voluntary sector typologies do not identify the integrated 
nature of the BSC explicitly, there are several examples of causal models.  
Comprehensive approaches to performance management are recognised 
in both literatures, such as reputational and participative approaches in the 
voluntary literature; and social controls in the management control 
literature.   




 However, Table 3.2 which compares the literature of management 
control to that of voluntary sector performance, reveals a gap in the 
voluntary sector literature. This suggests that the concept of ‘control as a 
package’ is yet to be recognised.  This is not to suggest that these controls 
are not operating within voluntary organisations.  The characteristics of the 
voluntary sector – being mission-driven, with multiple stakeholders and 
complicated governance structures – all hint at more complex control 
systems operating within this sector. However, the voluntary sector 
literature has not employed such concepts in its perceptions of how 
performance measurement becomes effective performance management. 
This literature review suggests that this is a fruitful avenue of research. 
  




Table 3.3: Management control theory and voluntary sector performance 
measurement models 
Theme MCS 















Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) 


















BSC strategy map 
Programme theory 
Logic model 




Clan, personnel, cultural 
control 
Participatory/narrative 





Peer review impact 
Control as a 
package 
Simons’ LOC, Malmi and 
Brown 
  
Source: Author’s interpretation of the literature 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
This review of voluntary sector performance measurement 
literature demonstrates the need for further research, such as the call by 
Connolly et al.(2015) for detailed case studies. A comparison of the generic 
performance management literature to that of performance measurement 
in the voluntary sector also reveals a gap.  There are many similarities: 
voluntary sector performance measurement systems are diverse, aligned 
to strategy, integrated and comprehensive. However, these literature 
reviews also suggests that management control as a ‘package’ (Malmi & 
Brown, 2008) is yet to be considered. Applying this concept to the 
voluntary sector may shed new light on how performance is managed 
within it. 





This literature review demonstrates the importance of such 
research. The voluntary sector, both globally and in the UK, is 
economically, politically and socially significant. Faced with challenges of 
changing relationships with the public sector and more competition to 
raise funds, pressures to account for performance are increasing. It also 
helps to frame the research sub-questions such as what is good 
performance, how it is measured and who uses it (Connolly, et al., 2015). 
The discussion on organisational effectiveness invites us to consider how 
good performance is delivered and the purposes of performance 
measurement information. Three themes emerge from the literature: goal 
attainment; management of resources; and maintaining reputation. These 
resonate with three of Henri’s four (2006) uses of performance 
measurement information: monitoring performance against goals; 
appropriate use of resources through decision-making; and enhancing 
reputation through demonstrating legitimacy and accountability. Together, 
these help to unpick how performance measures are used to manage 
performance in the voluntary sector. These will inform the questions in the 
interview protocol. Generic performance management literature can bring 
a broader perspective to voluntary sector performance measurement. 
However, this literature review invites us to consider the difference 
between the sectors. 
 
  




Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis considers how performance is managed in voluntary 
hospices in the UK, including the role performance measures play and how 
they are complemented by alternative methods of control. As a qualified 
management accountant with 15 years in the private sector but who has 
given financial expertise and time as a volunteer to several voluntary 
organisations, the researcher is interested in how the two sectors compare 
in their performance management. The issues that need to be addressed 
have been identified by carrying out literature reviews of both 
management control theory and voluntary sector performance 
measurement. This chapter sets out the research design. First, it clarifies 
the sub-questions that have been identified to answer the overall research 
aim. Second, the philosophical stance and the methodology of this 
research is explained. Third, the research approach is described with 
details of the research methods used. Finally, it shows how the thematic 
analysis was undertaken with a view to the quality of findings, its 
limitations and ethical considerations.  
 
4.2 Research aims and sub-questions 
4.2.1 Research aims 
 To understand how performance is managed in the voluntary 
sector, literature reviews were undertaken in both management control 
theory and voluntary sector performance measurement. Management 
control theory suggests that performance management can be exercised at 
different levels: by reporting metrics; by building performance 
measurement systems; taking action as a result of performance reports; 
and by placing performance measurement in a more complex network of 
controls. Performance measurement systems are expected to display 
certain characteristics such as being diverse, aligned and integrated. 
Recent management control theory suggests that comprehensive 




performance management requires more than mechanistic use of 
performance measures, as these only play a part within a holistic and 
complex ‘package’ of controls.  By comparing the voluntary sector 
performance measurement literature to management control theory, gaps 
in prior research have been identified. First, little research has been carried 
out into the internal performance management of voluntary sector 
organisations. While there has been much consideration of external 
statutory reporting of UK charities, there is limited research into their 
internal performance measurement. Connolly et al. (2015) recommend 
that this would be fruitful area of research and suggest that case studies 
would be an appropriate research method. Secondly, the concept of a 
package of controls is yet to be explored within the voluntary sector. By 
using case studies to do this, light may be shed on the limitations of the 
generic performance management frameworks within this and possibly 
other sectors. 
 
4.2.2 Research sub-questions 
To understand how performance is managed within voluntary 
hospices, a number of sub-questions need to be addressed.  Connolly et al. 
(2015) in their review of UK charity accounting discuss areas for further 
research. They call for further studies to determine what is meant by 
‘performance’, how it might be measured and reported and how it is 
viewed by stakeholders. Different perceptions of what constitutes good 
performance and how it is best delivered needs to be established. By 
investigating what performance measures are used, conclusions can be 
drawn about how effective they are in enabling good performance.  This 
requires an analysis of the different purposes for which performance 
measurement information is used and which stakeholders are influential in 
determining the information requirements. Answers to these questions will 
then shed light on the role that performance measures play in the 
performance management of hospices and how they are complemented by 
other methods of control. These questions are summarised as follows: 






1) How do voluntary hospices perceive ‘good’ performance?  
2) How can good performance be best delivered? 
3) How is performance measured in voluntary hospices? 
4) Who and what drives this performance measurement information? 
5) For what purposes is hospice performance measurement 
information used? 
6) How does performance measurement information complement 
other control mechanisms in the performance management of a 
voluntary hospice? 
 
4.3 Philosophical approach 
There are a number of potential research approaches into how 
performance is managed by voluntary hospices that use both or either 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies. While these are not 
dichotomous (Johnson & Duberley, 2000, p. 59), they represent some 
fundamental differences in the epistemological and ontological positions 
adopted within research philosophy. Epistemology concerns the source of 
acceptable knowledge or how we come to know what we know and what 
constitutes ‘warranted’ or ‘unwarranted’ knowledge (Johnson & Duberley, 
2000).  Ontology is what is considered to be real or the study of existence. 
Bryman (2012) describes it in the context of social science research as the 
nature of social phenomenon or whether the social world is seen as 
something external to social actors or as something created by those 
actors. As Ryan et al. (2002) ask: is reality constructed or discovered? Very 
broadly, a quantitative methodology is associated with an empirical 
epistemology, adopts realism as its ontology, has a deductive approach and 
seeks objectivity. A qualitative methodology on the other hand is 
associated with a rational epistemology, adopts idealism as its ontology, 
has an inductive approach and accepts subjectivity.  




The assumptions that the researcher holds regarding the nature of 
the phenomenon’s reality (ontology) affects the way in which knowledge is 
gained about the phenomenon (epistemology) and this in turn affects the 
process through which research is conducted (methodology). ‘No one can 
stand outside the epistemological process’ and ‘there is no aphilosophical 
space available’ (Johnson & Duberley, 2000, pp. 8,9). Therefore, the 
conscious reflexivity of the researcher is vital, whatever approach is taken 
(Johnson & Duberley, 2000, p. 4) . Two major research philosophical 
approaches, positivism and interpretivism, are considered below. 
Refinements of these two broad schools, post-positivism and post-
modernism are discussed. Commentators such as Johnson and Duberley 
(2000), Creswell (2009) and Bryman (2012) warn of over simplification and 
there are many variations and contradictions within such analysis.  
 
4.3.1 Positivism  
Positivism adopts a realist ontological and empirical epistemological 
position seeking universal laws that are external and independent of 
human perceptions. ‘The aim of the research should be to identify causal 
explanations and fundamental laws that explain regularities in human and 
social behaviour’ (Johnson & Duberley, 2000, p. 39). At its most extreme, 
the logical positivists, argue that truth is only grounded in what we 
perceive through our five senses (Ryan, et al., 2002). It is derived from the 
‘correspondence theory of truth’ developed by Hume in the 18th century 
whereby empirical evidence is used to compare theory with an 
independent reality (Johnson & Duberley, 2000). Deterministic, it looks for 
causal explanations that can be tested and rejects any metaphysical 
interpretation of the world. Adopting an objective ontology, positivism is 
therefore value-free with a researcher taking a detached stance (Bryman, 
2012). It is concerned with internal and external validity, reliability, 
generalisability and operationalisation (Johnson & Duberley, 2000). In 
social science, positivism often, but not necessarily, employs quantitative 
and deductive methods attempting to replicate natural scientific methods 




within a social science context. It is reductionist in that it condenses ideas 
to small discrete areas to test with clearly defined variables and 
hypotheses (Creswell, 2009). Thus, a researcher begins with a theory, 
deduces a hypothesis, collects data and analyses findings which confirm or 
disprove the hypothesis.   
Post-positivism has emerged in response to criticisms, although this 
should not be considered a unitary school of thought (Robson, 2011). This 
accepts that scientists are not neutral, that it is impossible to distinguish 
the language of observation from theory and that science should deal with 
more than observable phenomena (Robson, 2011). Acknowledging the 
fallibility of scientific research, post-positivism is still a deterministic and 
reductionist philosophy seeking to explain causal relationships (Creswell, 
2009). It is still open to criticism as it considers social interactions to be the 
same as physical elements, thereby ‘reducing human behaviour to the 
product of external forces of the environment’ (Johnson & Duberley, 2000, 
p. 40) often with ‘misplaced precision’ (Johnson & Duberley, 2000, p. 53).  
 
4.3.2 Intrepretivism 
In contrast to the realism of positivism, an interpretivist approach 
rejects the neutrality of the natural scientist. It is sympathetic with an 
idealist ontology in that reality is created through social interaction. 
Bryman (2012)  describes its ontology, in the context of social science, as 
constructionism (or constructivism) which ‘invites the researcher to 
consider the ways in which social reality is an ongoing accomplishment of 
social actors rather than something external to them’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 
34).  Interpretivists do not accept that there are universal laws and instead 
envisage social practice as being socially constructed, thus adopting a 
subjective approach. Individuals attempt to make sense of their 
experiences so there are multiple interpretations with rich and complex 
understandings (Bryman, 2012). An alternative school of thought within 
interpretivism is ‘symbolic interaction’ whereby ‘the individual is 




continually interpreting the symbolic meaning of his or her environment 
(which includes the action of others) and acts on the basis of imputed 
meaning’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 31).The researcher presents a view that cannot 
be considered definitive.  It is accepted that both the researcher and the 
researched will hold values (Robson, 2011) and make sense of the world 
based on their historic and social background (Creswell, 2009). While trying 
to interpret the world from the point of view of their participants, they 
recognise that their own background shapes their interpretation (Creswell, 
2009). There are no prescribed research methods (Robson, 2011) although 
typically these include qualitative approaches including ethnography, 
grounded theory, phenomenological and narrative methods (Creswell, 
2009). An inductive research method is likely; rather than starting with 
theory, the research develops a theory or pattern of meaning (Creswell, 
2009). An extreme form of the interpretivist approach is post-modernism, 
which has been described as ‘relativism unleashed’ (Johnson & Duberley, 
2000, p. 91). Rejecting the achievements of the Enlightenment (or 
modernism) and ‘challenging the idea of progress through reason (Robson, 
2011, p. 16), symbolic interactionism discards any claim to truth and is 
‘characterised by randomness, anarchy and fragmentation’ (Johnson & 
Duberley, 2000, p. 92).  
 
4.3.3 Methodologies in accounting and management control research  
Accounting research has reflected these ontological debates, with 
challenges to Positive Accounting Theory being mounted by 
Interdisciplinary and Critical Perspectives on Accounting in the 1970s 
(Laughlin, 1995; Broadbent & Laughlin, 2013). This encourages a variety of 
approaches, seeing accounting research through lenses other than the 
functional and positivist approaches of economics. Described as ‘an 
ongoing battle for methodological recognition’, Parker (2012) claims that 
progress has been made by qualitative researchers, particularly in 




management accounting research. Burchell et al. (1980, p. 6) argued in 
their seminal article that accounting is ‘no longer seen as a mere assembly 
of calculative routines, it now functions as a cohesive and influential 
mechanism for economic and social management’. Attention should be 
payed not to the craft or practice of accounting but to its role in 
organisations and society. Accounting control systems are an example of 
how accounting is embedded in social dynamics.  They can be a product of 
political processes within organisations and hence, the roles of accounting 
are intertwined within the contexts in which they operate. Thus, 
accounting becomes ‘an organisational and social phenomenon, there to 
be used for a variety of ends by a range of actors’ (p.22). For example, Dent 
(1991) shows how this operated in practice in a longitudinal case study of a 
railway company, whereby a new culture was established by the changing 
role of accounting systems.  
Research into management accounting systems, later broadened to 
include management control systems, has had a ‘long tradition’ of 
employing contingency theory using survey-based methods (Chenhall, 
2003). Otley (2016) cites his definition of 1980 as: ‘a contingency theory 
must identify specific aspects of an accounting system which are associated 
with certain defined circumstances and demonstrate an appropriate 
matching.’  Functionalist positivist approaches have been dominant in 
management control research to establish the appropriate ‘fit’ between 
control systems and their context, identifying possible independent 
variables (Otley, 2016). External variables have included three aspects of 
technology (complexity, task uncertainty and interdependence), 
environmental uncertainty and competitive hostility, as well as culture, 
(which is predominantly considered as national differences). Internal 
variables have included the size of the organisation, structures (eg 
decentralisation), strategies (seen from a commercial and competitive 
perspective) as well as reward systems, and employees’ participation 
among many other aspects. A range of dependent variables have been 
considered of which the most common are performance, effectiveness and 




job satisfaction (Otley, 2016; Chenhall, 2003). The purpose is to produce a 
list of desired characteristics of management control systems for different 
situations (Otley, 2016). 
 Advocates of contingency theory, however, now recognise its 
limitations despite being ‘one of the success stories of management 
accounting research’ (Otley, 2016, p. 55).  Reflecting on 35 years of 
management control research that has adopted a contingency approach, 
Otley describes it as being ‘tantalisingly inconclusive’ (Otley, 2016, p. 55). 
He argues that all management accounting research is contingent, or 
dependent on its context, and suggests functionalist approaches have 
limited its scope. Chenhall (2005) suggests that there is no contingency 
theory as such, just many different theories which explain the different 
conditions in which management control systems operate. He criticises 
contingency theory as pursuing single themes and unconnected elements 
of control systems, often with poorly defined constructs and lacking critical 
mass.  Even the notion of organisational performance is not unambiguously 
defined. In particular, he argues that by only looking at formal systems and 
ignoring clan and informal controls ‘there is the potential for serious 
misspecification’ (p.131). He therefore criticises contingency-based 
research which ‘has relied on traditional functionalist theories and has not 
applied more interpretive and critical views.’  Otley (2016) suggests that 
‘we are unlikely to ever be able to produce knowledge of a type generated 
by the physical sciences as our subject matter does not have the stability 
and uniformity of physical matter nor is it amenable to controlled 
experimentation’ (p.55).  He therefore expresses surprise that qualitative 








4.3.4 Research methods linked with epistemologies and ontologies 
It is useful to draw some contrasts between the research methods 
associated with different epistemologies and ontologies. Ryan et al. (2002) 
criticise Burrell and Morgan (1979) for ‘collapsing’ this to a simple 
subjective /objective divide but this provides useful clarification. This can 
be seen in the top half of the Table 4.1 below denoted with * and  then 
extended to include research methods typically associated with the two 
broad philosophical approaches of positivism and intrepretivism  (Ryan, et 
al., 2002). 
 
Table 4.1 : Research philosophy adapted from *Ryan et al. (2002, p.39; 
taken from Burrell and Morgan, 1979) 




Epistemology* Interpretation Observation 
Human nature* Free will Determinism 
Methodology* Hermeneutics Scientific method 
‘Collapsed to’* Subjective Objective 
Research approach Inductive Deductive 




Role of researcher Insider Outsider 
  
Nevertheless, this can be considered too simplistic. Ahrens and Chapman 
(2006), in their concern about the conflation of methods and 
methodologies, argue that qualitative studies can have functionalist 
(positivist) leanings while both methodologies can use similar methods 
such as interviews and document analysis. Management control systems 
need to be studied within their social contexts, or the ‘situated 




functionality’ described by Ahrens and Chapman (2007).  As these authors 
illustrate, this does not mean that contingency approaches need to adopt 
positivist research methods. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 25) argue 
that inductive and deductive research mirror each other, suggesting that  
case studies are ‘one of the best (if not the best) of the bridges from rich 
qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive research’. Langley (1999, p. 
694) presents seven strategies for theorising from process data on a 
continuum with a quantification strategy at one end, a narrative strategy at 
the other but with five more strategies between them. ’Rigid adherence to 
purely deductive or purely inductive strategies seems unnecessarily 
stultifying’. 
 
4.4 Research strategy 
Given the choice of philosophical approaches, this research has 
broadly adopts an inductive approach, looking to build rather than test 
theory, for three reasons. First, as we saw in Chapter 3, there has been 
very little research into management control systems within the voluntary 
sector. Tucker (2010)  claims that management accounting has made a 
limited contribution to the debate over improved organisational non-profit 
performance. As such, a broad and exploratory research approach is 
needed to begin to understand how control systems operate in a new 
context.  Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) argue that inductive case studies 
provide a good opportunity for theory-building where there is no existing 
theory, such as voluntary sector performance management. A  theory-
testing approach is likely to limit the understanding at this early stage of 
research in the voluntary sector.  
 Second, management control research has been dominated by 
contingency approaches in the last three decades (Parker, 2012; Otley, 
2016). Given the criticisms of its piecemeal approach in identifying a 
limited number of variables, (Otley, 2016), this research seeks to extend 




existing theory inductively, rather than testing it deductively. This thesis 
argues that a comprehensive approach is needed within management 
control, by considering it as a package of many different types of control.  
By considering this within the new context of voluntary sector 
organisations, management control theory will be extended. Otley 
specifically comments on the lack of studies into management control 
systems that take a holistic view of whole systems. He concludes that 
‘more insight will probably be gained, especially in what are early days in 
studying complete control systems in their entirety by field studies of a 
small number of organisations in some depth and preferably over time’ 
(Otley, 2016, p. 55).  
Third, this research endorses the view that the research methods 
must consider multiple perspectives, as performance management systems 
are part of complex processes that influence and are influenced by the 
context in which they operate. Qualitative data is likely ‘to offer insight into 
complex social processes that quantitative data cannot easily reveal’ 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007 p 26).  It is highly suitable for research into 
the voluntary sector where missions describe values rather than pounds; 
where ‘what is important cannot always be counted’ (Parker, 2012, p. 55). 
It seeks ‘a holistic understanding and critique of lived experiences, social 
settings and behaviours’ (Parker, 2012, p. 55). This research is trying to 
understand not simply what performance measures are used, but how they 
impact on the case organisations and their stakeholders and what 
alternative forms of control are employed.  It concerns the interactions of 
social actors and control systems as well as their relationships with each 
other.  ‘Rich, contextualised understandings and critique of management 
and accounting processes and structures are what we are about’ (Parker, 
2012, p. 55). It sets out to appreciate multiple perspectives and gain insight 
into intangibles, such as belief and values, and thus ‘unpack the informal, 
implicit embedded motivations and behaviours that lie beneath the surface 
of formal accounting and control systems’ (Parker, 2012, p. 60).   




However, as Langley (1999) argues, ‘sense-making’ of 
organisational processes can close the gap between data and theory and 
may often iterate between them. Rather than beginning with no theory, 
this research extends and combines theory from both management control 
and voluntary sector literatures.  Langley (1999 p 694) pictures this as the 
challenge of ‘moving from shapeless data spaghetti toward some kind of 
theoretical understanding that does not betray and richness, dynamism 
and complexity of the data’.  Of her seven strategies, visual mapping 
strategy has some resonance with how this research is undertaken.  While 
it does not plot events, decisions and activities in a causal map, it does 
begin with a picture as an intermediary step between raw data and 
abstract conceptualisation. This is an ‘organising strategy’ (Langley, 1999) 
where data is presented in a systematic way. Prior theory informs the 
collection of data but that qualitative data is used to extend theory. It is 
intended to strike a balance between accuracy (staying close to the data 
and acknowledging the complexity of rich data) and simplicity (developing 
theoretical generalizations.) 
 
4.5 Middle-range thinking 
 To achieve this balance, this research is specifically adopts the 
middle-range thinking of Laughlin (1995). It is set in the context of prior 
theory, at least at a general level of management control. Two frameworks 
(Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Simons, 1995) provide a theoretical backdrop. 
However, such theories need extending within the new context of the 
voluntary sector. It is therefore appropriate to take a middle-range 
approach whereby the ‘flesh’ of voluntary sector performance 
measurement can be put on the management control ‘skeleton’. Otley 
(2016) has recently specifically recommended both Broadbent and 
Laughlin’s middle-range thinking and Simons’ levers of control within 
management control research. This is compatible with Eisenhardt and 




Graebner’s (2007) argument that multiple case studies convey both 
emergent (including extended) theory and the empirical evidence which 
supports it.  
Middle-range thinking is advocated by Broadbent and Laughlin 
(Laughlin, 1995; Broadbent & Laughlin, 2013; Laughlin, 2004)  as an 
appropriate method of researching accounting control.  Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2013) set it in the context of ontological debate, arguing that this 
is located between Comtean and Kantian/Fichtean positions. Comteans 
hold a positivist ontology, assuming that a complete, all-encompassing 
theory can be found. The Kantian/Fichtean position, on the other hand, 
rejects such prior theory and derives theory only from empirical 
investigation, such as in grounded theory (Laughlin, 1995; Broadbent & 
Laughlin, 2013). Laughlin (2004, p. 270) argues that there are ‘conceptual 
patterns, but even though meaningful they will always be partial and 
incomplete’, therefore rejecting the possibility of grand theories but 
equally wishing to have more than the ungeneralisable description of some 
interpretivist research.  For example, he argues that ‘empirical (variable) 
data is always important’ (Laughlin, 2004, p. 270). Middle-range thinking 
recognises ‘a material reality distinct from our interpretations while at the 
same time does not dismiss the inevitable perceptive bias in models of 
understanding’ (Laughlin, 1995, p. 81). It also recognises that 
generalisations about reality are possible, even though not guaranteed to 
exist. He therefore describes these as skeletal theories but nevertheless 
argues that empirical detail is important to make them meaningful.  He 
continues the metaphor suggesting that the skeleton is stable but 
incomplete so that the empirical flesh can be put on the bones to make the 
whole being (Laughlin, 1995). The framework is therefore not to test 
theory but to provide a language ‘to enable discursive processes to develop 
understandings of the social world’ (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2014, p. 258). 
Methodology likewise sets skeletal rules that ‘provides an outline of the 
process but cannot determine the methods in detail’ (Broadbent & 




Laughlin, 1997, p. 625). It rejects prescriptive methods but accepts that 
some generalisation may be possible. Thus, ‘in middle-range thinking there 
is a reflexive relationship between the theory and the empirics’ (Broadbent 
& Laughlin, 2013, p. 56). They argue that documents and interviews rather 
than questionnaires (Comtean) or observation (Kantian/Fictean) are 
appropriate within middle-range thinking (Laughlin, 2004; Broadbent & 





Table 4.2: Middle-range thinking (Laughlin, 2004) 
 Complete Skeletal None 
Prior theory All defining 
theory 
Skeletal theory Ignore 
theory 




Minimise Structured Complete 
Methodological Positivist/realist Critical/discursive Interpretivist 
Data/narrative 





Questionnaires                         
                         
Interviews        











This research however stops short of adopting the full Habermasian 
approach described by Broadbent and Laughlin (1997) and used in their 
own research into GP and local education authorities. Only two of the 
three discursive stages have been taken. In the first stage researchers, as 
the ‘prime actors,’  use semi-structured interviews to gain an  
understanding  of the social and  historical context  but are guided by a  
theoretical framework using  Ferreira and  Otley’s PMCS  and  Simons’ LOC 
frameworks.  During the second stage, all participants gave their views in a 
discursive process to gain insights into the empirical situation (Broadbent & 
Laughlin, 1997, p. 628) using the theoretical frameworks to provide a 
language and shape the discussion. In the final stage, but not part of this 
research, participants can adopt strategies where they feel they are 
appropriate to effect real change. This research gained some insight into 
final ‘stage of enlightenment’ (Broadbent & Laughlin, 1997, p. 643)  
‘whereby actors develop their own understandings and solutions and 
reflect on their own activities and practices’.  Feedback was given to the 
finance director of one case who asked for help with the development of 
performance measures and negotiation with commissioners. There are 
therefore some methodological limitations. It is hoped that it can ‘promote 
understanding and change in accounting systems in organizational contexts 
and thus facilitate their design’ (Broadbent & Laughlin, 1997, p. 640) but 
this has not been fully achieved through the emancipatory third stage of 
the Habermasian process.   
 
4.6 Research methods and research process 
Voluntary hospices are chosen as a sub-sector of the UK voluntary 
sector as they are a clearly defined group and share many characteristics of 
the sector as a whole, as discussed in Chapter 1.  A definitive list of English 
and Welsh hospices is provided by their umbrella organisation, Hospice UK 
(formerly Help the Hospices). Hospices are simultaneously facing funding 
pressures, increased demands for their services and changing relationships 




with the public sector (HospiceUK, 2017). Hospices share many 
performance measurement issues with the voluntary sector as a whole, 
such as amorphous missions, shared outcomes and multiple stakeholders.  
The research for this thesis has two phases. The first phase of the 
study establishes an overview of the sub-sector as there has been very 
little academic research into accounting within hospices. This answers the 
first three sub-questions using data for all 148 hospices in England and 
Wales with an income of over £1m. First, by considering the aims of the 
hospices, what is perceived to be good performance can be identified. 
Second, hospice strategies reveal how they go about delivering such 
success.  Third, by understanding how they measure success, the specific 
performance measures used across the sub-sector can be analysed. The 
second phase seeks to understand how the performance measures are 
used in practice and in what ways they contribute to managing 
performance in the hospices.  This addresses the final three sub-questions: 
for what purposes is the performance measurement information used; 
who and what drives it; and how does this contribute to the overall 
management of the hospice. As this requires a depth of understanding, five 
hospice cases are studied in detail.   
 
4.6.1 Hospice performance measurement as a sub-sector 
Two alternative research approaches were considered to gain an 
overview of the hospice subsector and answer the first three sub-
questions.  A survey could be sent to key stakeholders of English hospices 
or alternatively, an analysis could be carried out on their statutory returns 
to the Charity Commission. In this thesis, (as justified below), the latter was 
chosen as the most likely to generate a reliable and valid synopsis of 
hospice performance measurement information.  Analysis of statutory 
returns to the Charity Commission can be completed using the SIRs which 
were required for all English and Welsh charities with an income of over £1 




million up to 2014. The SIRs include several questions regarding the 
charities aims, strategies and mission; their annual objectives and 
achievements; how they measure performance and their plans for the 
future (see Appendix 2). Analysis of the voluntary hospice SIRs has several 
advantages over completing a survey, easily meeting three of Scott’s four 
criteria of authenticity, credibility, and representativeness (cited by Flick, 
(2009). As SIRs were required by the regulator, they are authentic and 
credible with an average of five hours being taken to complete them by the 
average charity (Charity Commission, 2007), considerably longer than 
might be expected from a speculative request for survey responses.  They 
are a complete sample because they were a statutory requirement until 
recently and are accessible on the Charity Commission website. Silverman 
(2010) advocates using ‘naturally occurring data’ or publically available 
information as it can throw up things not previously considered by the 
researcher. These considerations outweigh the disadvantage of not being 
able to ask further questions. Scott’s fourth criterion is meaningfulness 
(Flick, 2009), and by using SIRs with predetermined questions, this may be 
more limited than using a survey designed for this specific research. 
However, further questions are addressed within the second phase of the 
research. A list of all hospices in the UK, prepared by Help the Hospices 
(2010) to analyse hospice expenditure and income by major category for 
the previous five years, was used to find hospice details.   A further 
advantage of using the SIRs for the initial analysis is that they follow a very 
similar format to the Ferreira and Otley (2009) PMCS. As shown in Chapter 
2, the framework demonstrates how mission needs to be aligned with 
strategy and key success factors aligned with performance measures 
through SPMSs. Answers to six of eight SIR questions (including a charity’s 
aims, strategies, performance measures and achievements) map with a 
good degree of coherence to the Ferreira-Otley’s (2009) PMCS framework 
(see Table 4.3 below).  




Thematic analysis of the SIRs of all UK voluntary hospices with an 
income over £1m in 2012 was carried out. The SIRs and TARs of these 
hospices were downloaded from the Charity Commission website for 2012 
and 2013, totalling 148 hospices. Thematic coding was derived from the 
hospices’ own perspectives on their aims, strategies, measures and 
performance. 
Table 4.3: Mapping of Ferreira and Otley PMCS (2009) to SIR questions 
Otley (1999) Ferreira and Otley 
(2009) 
SIR questions 
 Vision Question 1 - What are your 
charity's aims?  
 Key success factors  
Strategies/plans Strategies/plans Question 3a - The charity's 
strategy What are 
the key elements of 
your charity's 
medium to long-
term strategy?  
Processes/activities Organisation structure Question 8 - The charity's 
governance  
How does your charity 









Question 3b How does your 
charity measure the 
success of the 
strategy? 
Targets Targets Question 4 - What were 
your charity’s main 
annual objectives 




Performance evaluation Question 3b How does your 
charity measure the success 
of the strategy? 
Reward systems Reward systems  




Source: Author’s own analysis 




By coding individual SIR questions, thematic analysis could then be 
carried out across the questions. Themes include service 
provision/palliative care; values; finance; relationships with partners; 
families; skills of staff; volunteers; commitment to research and education; 
and types of performance measures used.  First, this looks for alignment 
between aims (question 1), strategies (question 3a), and objectives and 
achievements (question 4). This results in a data set of 5,476 coded items. 
Comparisons are also drawn between how hospices consider they 
measured their strategies (question 3b) and how they report their 
achievements in 2013 (question 4). Finally, the hospices’ annual plans 
(question 7) declared in their SIRs of 2012 are compared to what objectives 
and achievements they reported (question 4) in the following year, 2013. 
Berg (2007) advises not to reduce such an approach to a quantitative 
process by counting the frequency of data, so while themes were 
compared across questions to find the numbers of  hospices, a blend of 
approaches are used to establish an overview of the sector. The TARs of 
2013 were also compared to the SIRs of 2013 to determine how aims, 
strategies, objectives and achievements are reported in both documents 
and whether this varied by the size of hospice.  This categorises whether 
each hospice has reported similar or different aims, strategies, objectives 
and achievements in their TAR and whether the TAR had more, less or the 
same level of detail as the SIR. This could also be used to assess the claim 
of duplication between the SIRs and TARs made by Lord Hodgson (2012). 
 
4.6.2 Case studies of hospice performance management 
Phase 2 of the research compares the findings from the SIRs of the 
148 hospices in England and Wales to actual practices within five individual 
hospices by carrying out case studies.  It is designed to answer all six sub-
questions, including the purposes and drivers of performance 
measurement information. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) argue that 




case studies provide a highly suitable method for theory building with their 
rich empirical descriptions derived from a variety of data sources. ‘The 
theory is emergent in the sense that it is situated in and developed by 
recognizing patterns of relationships among constructs within and across 
cases and their underlying logical arguments’ Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007 p 25).  Case studies are widely considered the most appropriate 
research method to address the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin, 2009) and 
in particular, both Broadbent & Laughlin (1997) and Otley (2016) 
recommend the use of case studies for understanding management 
control. Cooper and Morgan (2008, p. 161) comment on its particular 
relevance to the accounting field as ‘case study research is extremely 
useful in raising questions, highlighting issues and developing and testing 
theory, and providing guidance in solving problems’. They advocate 
‘phronesis’ or practical wisdom in applying technical knowledge with a 
specific purpose in mind, such as how to use measures to manage a 
hospice. Cases enable the study of performance management, as a 
complex social phenomenon, with interactions between different 
stakeholders and the context in which they operate.  Eisenhardt and 
Graebner (2007) argue that cases studies emphasise the rich, real world 
context unlike laboratory studies which isolate the phenomena from their 
context. The case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real life events.’ Yin (2009, p. 40) suggests 
that they are most appropriate where there is a contemporary, as opposed 
to a historic, setting and where the researcher cannot control the 
behaviour, such as in an experiment. Both cases and surveys fulfil these 
criteria but a case study allows for the richness of the phenomenon to be 
studied in its real-life context, unlike a survey.   ‘The major strength of case 
study data collection is the opportunity to use many different sources of 
evidence’ (Yin, 2009, p. 114). Moreover, using multiple cases evidence can 
also be more compelling, offering across cases as well as within case 
comparison (Yin, 2009).  




Moreover, there have been specific calls for more case research in 
both management control and in the voluntary sector. Otley (2016) argues 
for a holistic view of management control systems gained through field 
studies. Connolly at al. (2015, p. 176) in their discussion about further 
research into UK charity reporting acknowledge that useful research has 
been done on the broad area of performance measurement citing Cordery 
and Sinclair (2013). However, ‘detailed case studies focusing on the impact 
in specific contexts would aid understanding and have potential to support 
charities in delivering their core mission.’ Analyses of the first five sub-
questions contribute to understanding the role of performance measures 
in managing hospices and what other controls operate. Rich insight is 
gained by understanding the perspective of different stakeholders within 
hospices.  Therefore, twenty-five semi-structured interviews were carried 
out with members of the senior management teams and trustees. Both 
internal and external documents were analysed in all five hospices. 
The significant advantages were weighed up against the 
disadvantages of using case studies. Yin (2009) identifies several concerns, 
of which ‘perhaps the greatest concern has been over the lack of rigour of 
case study research’ (Yin, 2009, p. 14). Another criticism is generalisability 
which is addressed, along with reliability, at the end of this methodology.  
Access can be difficult as the demands of case study research are higher on 
participants than either a survey or structured interviews. Indeed, two 
hospices chose to withdraw even though access had been granted due to 
the sensitivity of issues they faced. Yin (2009) also describes it as ‘one of 
hardest types of research’ as it demands that the researcher is a good 
listener, can create good questions, is flexible but not vague and has a 
good grasp of the issues at stake. As little prior research has been carried 
out into case studies of hospices, these disadvantages are outweighed by 
the depth of insight such studies bring in complex situations, such as 
managing a hospice.  




4.6.3 Case selection 
Five hospices were selected by purposive sampling.  They have 
been called after famous nurses (Barton, Cavell, Guinness, Nightingale and 
Seacole) in this study to preserve their anonymity. It is a strategic selection 
but is neither ‘convenience’ sampling nor ‘probability’ sampling, so will 
only allow for theoretical generalisation rather than generalisation to a 
population (Bryman, 2012). As Ritchie and Lewis (2003, p. 78) say, ‘the 
sample units are chosen because they have particular features or 
characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and understanding of 
the central themes and puzzles the researcher wishes to study.’  As the 
cases are used to develop not test theory, they are never intended to be 
representative (Eisenhardt and Graebner,2007). However, as Hammersley 
and Atkinson, (2007, p. 30) acknowledge: ‘the role of pragmatic 
considerations must not be underestimated in the choice of setting’ (such 
as travel costs). In practice, the first hospice was approached by the thesis 
supervisor, two more hospices cases were found through personal 
contacts, and the final two responded to a request made via the Charity 
Financial Directors’ Group to their members.   However, they fulfil the 
criteria of having a range of size (measured by revenue, number of 
employees and volunteers) and different proportions of sources of funding 
(from statutory income, donations and trading revenue). The hospices have 
recently experienced different degrees of financial stability measured by 
surpluses and reserves. In addition, each hospice has a different history 
and socio-geographical setting. See Table 4.4 with further comparative 
details given in Chapter 5. This allows for an embedded case study design 
(Yin, 2009) whereby the five cases are part of a broader context of analysis, 
that of hospices generally.  Multiple cases allow for replication logic (Yin, 
2009) which can show either similar or contrasting results. They also 
‘create more robust theory because the propositions are more deeply 
grounded in varied empirical evidence’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner,2007 
p27), along with broader exploration of research questions and theoretical 
elaboration. They argue that adding three cases to a single offers ‘four 




times the analytic power.’ Thus, a skeletal framework developed from the 
literature can be ‘fleshed out’ with insights from within the case hospices. 
Table 4.4:  Case selection 
Hospice 
cases  
Barton Cavell Guinness Nightingale Seacole 
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Case selection source: Charity Commission financial statements 
 
4.6.4 Semi-structured interviews 
 
‘The qualitative research interview attempts to understand the 
world of the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of their 
experiences and uncover the lived world prior to scientific explanation’ 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008, p. 1). This is considered an appropriate method 
of understanding how performance is managed from the different 
perspectives of those who actually manage the hospices.  A set of 
interviews from the first hospice, Barton, was carried out between January 




and May 2014 with the other case hospices being visited between January 
to July 2015. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the most effective 
form of interviews, steering ‘between the free spontaneity of a non-
method approach to interviewing and the rigid structures of an all-method 
approach’ (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008, p. 16). Interview questions were 
guided by both the findings of the SIR/TAR analysis and the literatures of 
performance management and voluntary sector performance 
measurement.  In particular, the interview protocol was loosely designed 
round Ferreira and Otley’s PMCS (2009) framework in Chapter 2, giving 
structure whilst  allowing discretion for the interviewer to develop 
questions and probe deeper while the interviewee still has freedom to 
elaborate on his/her understanding (see Appendix 3). An initial interview 
protocol was tested with the hospice, Barton, and then was refined and 
used in the four other cases. One particular area was redefined: the 
meaning of one of the uses of management information, attention seeking, 
was clarified in subsequent interviews. A delicate balance was struck 
between being guided by the interview protocol and allowing new insights 
to emerge from the interviewees as a ‘guided conversation’ (Yin, 2009, p. 
106). A standardised interview would have allowed no deviation from the 
set questions, in terms of content, order, clarification or language while an 
unstructured interview would give respondents total freedom of direction 
(Berg, 2007), risking key questions not being addressed.  
Morris (2009) argues that a semi-structured interview is closely 
associated with a constructivist ontological position, exploring subjective 
meaning.  Therefore, the researcher has to acknowledge that she is 
inevitably part of the process of creating meaning. Kvale and Brinkman 
(2008) use the picture of two faces, which create a vase to illustrate how 
new meaning is generated by the social interaction of interviewer and 
interviewee. This idea is developed further as they draw the contrast 
between a miner digging for uncontaminated knowledge that already 
exists and the traveller who is creating the knowledge through the 
conversations on his journey. They advocate a position of ‘deliberate 




naivete’ or ‘presuppositionlessness.’ The interviewer needs to be curious, 
sensitive and open to unexpected phenomena, involved but maintaining 
‘professional distance’ (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008). Fontana and Fay (1994) 
argue that the researcher must balance the needs of gaining trust while 
not influencing interviewees. Care was taken to ask open, non-leading 
questions with active listening to allow depth through probing initial 
answers more deeply. While all questions within the interview protocol 
were covered, the depth and probing varied between the different 
participants. 
 As the interviewees were senior managers or trustees, who can be 
considered to be ‘expert’ interviewees, they are less likely to be influenced 
by the social interaction of a semi-structured interview. The asymmetry of 
power between the interviewee and interviewer can tip the other way, 
with respondents taking control of the agenda for their own ‘rhetorical’ 
ends, using publication to put across particular views. They can also jump 
between expert and personal roles and involve the researcher in other 
conflicts within the field (Flick, 2009). The power asymmetry was balanced 
through the knowledge of the researcher – relevant in this case where the 
research is bringing fifteen years of professional experience to a new 
setting. A specific dilemma related to this research when dealing with 
experts is how far to clarify the theoretical underpinnings of the research. 
The Ferreira and Otley framework was implicitly discussed as it framed 
many of the questions but Simons’ LOC was not referred to, even by 
implication. Berg (2007) in his dramaturgical view of interviews, illustrates 
the roles a researcher needs to play: as an actor trying not to give away 
unintended judgements; as a director remaining ‘outside’ the 
performance; but also as a choreographer maintaining control over the 
whole process. Another concern with ‘expert’ interviews is the limited time 
interviewees may be able to offer. Here the interview protocol helped to 
keep the interview focused.  
The interviews took place in the ‘natural setting’ (Creswell, 2009) of 
the interviewees – always on the site of the hospice and invariably in their 




own offices. The interviews were arranged by the primary contact 
(gatekeeper) with the hospice (or his/her secretary). In two cases this was 
the CEO, in a further two the finance director and in one case, the care 
director.  The researcher requested that there was at least one trustee, the 
CEO and a senior manager representing each of the finance, care and 
business functions. This was achieved with the exception of two care 
directors who were about to leave their jobs. The trustees in these cases 
however came from a medical discipline. A participant information sheet 
and consent form were emailed to every participant ahead of the meeting 
see Appendix 4). This explained the purpose of the research, the 
researcher’s background, the ethical approval and what was expected of 
them as participants. (Ethical considerations are addressed later).  All but 
one interview lasted between one and two hours each (see Appendix 5). All 
were recorded by audio and transcribed later with notes being taken at 
every interview. Feedback was given to the finance director and her 
information systems manager at one hospice after all the interviews and 
the findings had been completed. This not only enabled both the 
interviewees to benefit from the research but also sense-check the findings 
with experts. 
 
4.6.5 Documentary analysis 
A wide range of documents were analysed for each hospice, 
including internal and external reports (see Appendix 6). External 
documents include statutory returns to the Charity Commission, such as 
TARs, SIRS and financial statements as well as those requested by funders, 
in particular clinical reports for the CCGs. The case hospices have also 
chosen to make public performance information such as impact reports 
and annual reviews as well as general information on their websites 
including Care Quality Commission (CQC) inspection reports. Internal 
documents are wide ranging including strategies, operational plans, 
financial and operational reporting. Other documents implicitly reveal how 




performance is managed, without reporting performance measures 
explicitly such as organisation charts (which define roles and 
responsibilities) and strategy plans (which determine acceptable 
operational behaviours). A comparison of external and internal documents 
generated insights into how the hospice chose to present its performance 
to different audiences. As Yin (2009) states, the researcher is a ‘vicarious 
observer’ and therefore it is important to understand why certain 
documents were written and the audience for whom they were intended. 
 
4.7 Analysis of case study data  
The mass of unwieldy and messy data generated by interviews and 
documents in any case study presents difficulties of reduction; ‘a mix of 
creativity and systematic searching, a blend of inspiration and diligent 
detection’ (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 199). Robson (2011, p. 466) also 
makes clear that there is ‘no clear and universally accepted set of 
conventions for analysis’, unlike quantitative research. Yin (2009) stresses 
the need for an analytic strategy before data is analysed. He comments 
that case study analysis tools are the least developed and analysis the most 
difficult aspect of this methodology. Of the strategies he offers, relying on 
theoretical propositions with a well-thought out strategy in line with the 
original research design are the most suitable here (rather than additional 
quantitative analysis or mere ‘descriptive’ framework).  This is consistent 
with middle-range thinking, whereby a skeletal theory is fleshed out by 
empirical findings (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2013). Thematic analysis in this 
research draws upon, but is not limited to, the frameworks of Ferreira and 
Otley (2009) (PMCS) and Simons’ (LOC) (1995) as well as voluntary sector 
performance measurement models. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) give 
practical advice in theory-building from multiple cases by starting with 
emergent theory and then pattern-matching the empirical evidence to 
each proposition within the theory.  
 




  The case study material is analysed in line with Ritchie and Lewis’ 
(2003) thematic framework, first identifying substantive ideas from the 
literature and sorting the raw data by coding in NVivo. Codes (nodes) were 
grouped into hierarchies and are a mixture of processes (such as strategic 
planning), personal experiences and motivations, events (such as meetings) 
and relationships. These were then grouped and refined into themes to 
achieve emergent explanations. A dilemma facing the qualitative 
researcher in interpretation is the balance between remaining ‘true’ to the 
raw data while creating abstract theories and explanations. Ritchie and 
Lewis (2003) illustrate this clearly with their ‘analytic hierarchy’, moving up 
and down from the mass of unwieldy data to descriptive accounts, 
incorporating the original words of participants and finally to an 
explanatory account in which linkages are formed to ‘make sense’  and 
create theories. A further issue is how far concepts are manifest, expressed 
explicitly by the interviewees, or latent being only revealed through the 
interpretation of the researcher. This process was iterative, within and 
across case studies, but ensuring the context in which data was collected is 
not lost to give ‘shape’ to data ‘without doing violence to them’ (Ritchie & 
Lewis (2003),  citing Richards and Richards p252). 
 After the first study, themes were identified from the six initial 
semi-structured interviews and input as nodes on NVivo. This was written 
up as a descriptive case study. A further nineteen interviews were then 
carried out at four more hospices.  The original codes (or themes) were 
used and a further 11 codes added. The first study was therefore revisited 
(although not re-coded on NVivo). The first four sub-questions were 
identified separately on NVivo enabling cross-case and cross-function 
comparisons and were summarised in tables in word documents.   This 
reflects Yin’s concern to have coding based on the original research 
questions. However, to answer the more substantial question of how 
measures are used to manage the hospices, NVivo codes (see Appendix 7) 
were grouped together by emergent theme, reflecting the broad headings 
of the LOC framework being used as ‘sensitizing concepts’ (Bryman (2012, 




p. 388), citing Blumer). These were then analysed further using word 
documents, thus taking an inductive approach.  It was less structured than 
Yin’s coding in line with predetermined theories and a number of 
challenges were encountered.  There were many duplications (as NVivo 
allows the coding to two or more nodes) as well as overlaps between 
themes and processes. There were therefore several iterations – first 
coding, second grouping by lever and third identifying links and overlaps 
with other levers. While the LOC enabled categorisation of most codes, 
some did not fit neatly into Simon’s framework. All citations were then 
colour-coded on the full interview transcripts to ensure completeness and 
relevance within its context. The interviews were reread again following 
the writing-up of the findings to provide a contextual and comprehensive 
check. Memos were written at every stage of the process – immediately 
after interviews, during coding and throughout the data analysis. 
 
4.8 Ethical considerations 
There are significant ethical considerations within this research, 
given the highly sensitive nature of hospices. Ethical approval was sought 
and granted by the University of Bristol Ethics Committee in January 2014. 
All participants were given a participant information sheet (see Appendix 
4), explaining the nature and purpose of the research and their role within 
it. They received a copy of the interview protocol ahead of their meeting. 
Their written consent was given for recording the interviews on audio-tape 
and for the transcription of the tapes. They were given the opportunity to 
withdraw at any stage of the research.  To preserve their confidentiality, 
code names have been used for all hospices and their staff referred to by 
generic job titles to ensure anonymity.  The analysis ensures that the 
identity of any hospice cannot be inferred. All internal documentation, 
such as strategies, plans, budgets, key performance data and donor reports 
have been stored securely. While formal procedures have been observed, 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) also emphasize that ethical 




considerations are not merely about fulfilling certain routines. A continual 
balance must be struck between the importance of the research and 
potential harm to participants. Working within hospices can be highly 
sensitive and emotional situations can be potentially damaging.  Relations 
between management and trustees, donors and even the general public 
concern how the external information is presented. Revealing internal 
information and processes may have detrimental effects on a hospice’s 
reputation.  Continual reflexivity is essential, not only in how the 
researcher’s own presuppositions affect how the data is interpreted but in 
consideration of the impact of those conclusions on participants. Risks and 
benefits have been considered throughout, in line with Murphy and 
Dingwalls’ four principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy and 
justice (cited by Flick, (2009). 
 
4.9 Quality: generalisability, validity, reliability  
Generalisability is a significant issue for the quality of case study 
research as discussed previously. However, representative generalisability 
(a quantitative approach) is not the only method; theoretical and 
inferential generalisability are more appropriate (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). 
Explanations within one hospice setting can be used to explain patterns of 
behaviour in another, either by considering its fit with existing theory or 
inferring its transferability.  By having five comparative cases, theoretical 
and inferential generalisations can be made across hospices and possibly 
the wider voluntary sector. Questions of validity and reliability are 
addressed by two sets of thinking: first, reliance on procedures and criteria 
to judge quality of the research or the abilities of the researcher; and 
second, the integrity of the researcher. Both were employed in this 
research. While Yin (2009) suggests that ‘construct’ (process) validity is 
weak in case studies as set procedures are ill-defined, he stresses the need 
for using multiple sources, establishing a ‘chain of evidence.’ By using semi-
structured interviews and documentation analysis, such a chain of 




evidence was established. ‘External’ validity relies on using multiple 
methods through triangulation. With the replication logic of multiple cases 
as well as multiple sources, reliability is enhanced. In this research, case 
study findings are also set in the context of the overview provided by the 
review of the hospice SIRs and TARs.  ‘Internal’ validity ensures appropriate 
causal relationships are achieved through checking consistency of 
methodologies in each case study.  Ahrens and Chapman (2006) take issue 
with Yin’s approach, arguing that his triangulation is problematic and 
merely a metaphor. Nevertheless, in their arguments for plausibility (rather 
than reliability), they accept using multiple methods as one means to 
enhance it.   In addition to ensuring good practice, Morse et al. (2002) call 
for a return to rigour in qualitative research, not relying on external 
standards and checks at the end of the research but placing responsibility 
on the researcher for verification strategies throughout the research.  
Reflexivity of the researcher remains key, acknowledging her 
epistemological position. ‘An ethical approach acknowledges this 
(perspectival nature) and provides the audience with explicit statements 
about where the author is coming from’ (Altheide & Johnson, 1994, p. 
495), including the relationship of the observer to the observed such as 
observer bias and relationships, the context and the role of the reader.  
 
4.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out why an inductive methodology is 
appropriate to research the question of how voluntary hospices use 
performance measures to manage their operations. It sets out how the 
sub-questions address the overall research questions and how the research 
strategy and methods propose to answer them. To understand the 
complexity of performance management, a rich and contextualised analysis 
is needed, drawing on the different perspectives of key stakeholders. Thus, 
it needs a nuanced approach to gain a depth of understanding. This 
research is being carried out in the context of management control theory 
and voluntary sector performance measurement literature. By adopting 




middle-range thinking, a skeletal framework is developed and then fleshed 
out using the findings from voluntary hospices. Thematic analysis is carried 
out on the statutory returns of English and Welsh hospices to establish an 
overview of this sub-sector. Case studies then consider the more complex 
questions of how hospices use measures to manage their performance. 
This provides the qualitative data to ‘flesh’ out the skeletal framework to 
build a new performance management framework for the voluntary sector. 
  




Chapter 5: Developing a skeletal framework 
5.1 Introduction 
English and Welsh voluntary hospices were chosen as a sub-sector 
of charities to investigate how measures are used to manage performance 
as they share many characteristics to the charity sector as a whole. To 
establish an overview of the sub-sector, the first phase of the research 
analyses the SIRs and TARs, part of the statutory returns, of 148 English 
and Welsh hospices. The mapping of the SIR questions to Ferreira and 
Otley’s PMCS (see table 4.3) demonstrates a common approach to 
understanding mission, objectives, achievements and performance 
measures.  The framework emphasises how mission needs to be aligned 
with strategy, and key success factors with performance measures, 
extending a model devised by Otley in 1999.  Moreover, strategic 
advantage is gained through integrating goals, strategy and operations 
through strategic performance measurement systems (SPMSs.) The SIRs 
are therefore analysed by using the characteristics of performance 
measurement systems discussed in chapter 2: diversity, alignment and 
integration. 
 In chapter 3, UK charities are criticised for not reporting higher 
performance measures of efficiency and effectiveness in their statutory 
reports to the Charity Commission. Public sector models have been used to 
assess how far measures of efficiency and effectiveness have been 
reported to the Charity Commission. Using this prior research, comparisons 
can be drawn between how hospices report their performance in their SIRs 
and TARs to the charity sector as a whole. This research also considers how 
charity performance may be viewed from a management control 
perspective.  It questions whether efficiency is a meaningful method of 
assessing a hospices’, or indeed any charity’s, performance. By employing 
Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) Performance Management and Control System 
(PMCS), effectiveness can be assessed by considering strategic alignment 




or the fulfilment of strategy through the achievement of objectives and 
measurement of performance. 
 
Combining this analysis with the literature from management 
control, voluntary sector performance measurement and accounting 
research methodologies enables the development of a skeletal framework 
which informs the second phase of the research. Adopting middle-range 
thinking (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2013), this skeletal framework can provide 
the language to make sense of voluntary sector performance management.  
This chapter then introduces five case hospices, used as units of analysis 
within the embedded case study. These provide the qualitative data, 
putting the ‘flesh’ on the skeleton, from which a full framework for the 
performance management of hospices can be drawn. 
 
5.2 Hospice performance measurement: findings from SIRs and TARs  
To understand performance measurement in UK voluntary hospices 
as a sub-sector, the statutory returns for hospices in England and Wales are 
analysed. As described in Chapter 4, SIRs were required by the Charity 
Commission up to 2014 for all English and Welsh charities with an income 
of over £1 million. Despite criticisms of the SIRs that they duplicate 
information provided in the TAR (Hodgson, 2012), they were selected as 
the most useful source of information to analyse hospice aims, strategies, 
objectives and achievements, and measurements.  This accounts for 148 of 
the 172 voluntary hospices identified by Help the Hospices (2010) in their 
analysis of hospice accounts. The TAR provides less useful comparisons as it 
does not include standardised questions but leaves interpretation open to 
the charity on what to report, guided only by loosely defined principles in 
the 2005 SORP (Charity Commmission, 2005). The SIRs ask hospices 
specifically how they measure the success of their strategy (Question 3b) 
and how their achievements compare to prior plans (Question 4), neither 




of which are required in the TAR. These are used to address the first three 
sub-questions of the research: what is considered to be good hospice 
performance (aims); how is it best delivered (strategies); and how is it 
measured.   Hospices interpret the latter question in two ways: what 
processes are used and which performance measures are reported. These 
are consistent with Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) questions 1 (mission and 
vision), 4 (strategies and plans) and 5 (key performance measures) targets 
and performance evaluation. 
Thematic codes emerging from the SIR questions, were input into 
NVivo to facilitate analysis (see Appendix 7). Management control theory, 
discussed in Chapter 2, advocates different approaches to performance 
measurement, including collecting diverse measures, aligning them to 
strategy and integrating them in causal models. UK Charity reporting 
literature, discussed in Chapter 3, considers measuring efficiency and 
effectiveness to be a hallmark of good quality performance measurement. 
These can be measured using the logic model, an integrated causal model 
cited in the voluntary sector literature. The SIRs were therefore used to 
assess the reporting of efficiency and effectiveness by hospices in England 
and Wales.  
 
5.2.1 Diverse performance measurement 
An important criteria for successful performance measurement 
identified in Chapter 2 is diversity, or the inclusion of both financial and 
non-financial measures. This is clearly evident in the statutory returns of 
voluntary hospices in England and Wales. As well as their financial 
statements, hospices report various non-financial achievements in their 
SIRs and TARs. Table 5.1 sets out the different types of performance 
measures cited by the hospices. 49 hospices say in their SIRs that they 
measure their strategy by using financial measures and 42 measure it 
through some kind of activity (or ‘output’ but none use this term). Outputs 




in their SIRs include numbers of patients, admissions, referrals, numbers of 
families, number of bed nights and participation in staff training. The 
review of hospice TARs support the conclusions drawn by Connolly and 
Hyndman’s (2013b) research reporting that 85% of the TARs of the top 100 
fundraising charities in the UK had some kind of activity measure. Of the 
148 hospice TARs, 70 included patient numbers, 49 attendances, 39 visits, 
38 admissions and 37 referrals.  Numbers of volunteers are reported in 53 
cases, with a further 23 giving the numbers of hours and 33 the value 
attributed to the work carried out by them, usually valued at the minimum 
wage. This is also consistent with a NPC report showing that over 80% of 
UK voluntary organisations surveyed used output measures (Pritchard, et 
al., 2012).  Measuring outcomes is less obvious with 27 commenting on the 
place of care/death and 15 on assisting non-cancer patients. One hospice 
explicitly acknowledges the difficulties they face: Thames(2012) explains 
that they are ‘trying to define what success looks like.’  Indeed, in their 
aims (SIR Question 1), the hospices express the intangible values on which 
the hospice movement was founded.   They wish to ‘enable people to die 
with dignity and in comfort’ (Shakespere,2012) and to ‘achieve a good 
death.’  At a time when life is limited, they endeavour to help their patients 
‘live life to the full’ (St Andrew,2012). During the child or young person’s 
journey through life to death, they are ‘creating positive experiences along 
the way which become good memories for the future’ (Richard House). 
Yet, the most conspicuous method of assessing their performance is 
through the eyes of their stakeholders. Patient, carer and family feedback 
is the most often cited mechanism to measure success, with 74references 
(in Question 3a). Other feedback is important too, such as from staff and 
volunteers. 28 hospices cite using performance indicators including 5 which 
indicate that they have a BSC. Only 9 consider their Annual Report or 
Annual Review as a method of demonstrating their success, in line with the 
conclusions drawn by Hyndman and Connolly over the last two decades 
(Connolly et al,2013b).   





Table 5.1: Numbers of references to themes in SIR question 3: how do 
hospices measure their strategy? 
 









Governance arrangements 74 
Internal plans 57 
Internal quality 34 
External standards 25 
Relational User feedback (outcomes) 74 
Partnership 47 
Source: author’s findings from SIR analysis  
Many hospices refer to performance management processes rather than 
performance measurement in answer to Question 3b (see Table 5.1).  
Around half see governance structures, particularly the board of trustees, 
as the mechanism by which strategies are measured, with 57 referring to 
internal planning processes and 34 to internal quality (clinical) 
assessments. A third explicitly refer to financial processes, such as 
managing budgets, providing management accounts to ensure long-term 
financial stability and maintenance of sufficient reserves. Others use 
comparisons to externals standards, citing external regulations, positive 
inspection reports, or recognition by outside bodies such as awards. 
Diversity of reporting performance is therefore clearly evident in the 
hospices’ statutory returns. 
 
5.2.2 Aligned performance measures: effectiveness 
Effectiveness, as defined by the voluntary sector logic model, 
should compare outputs to outcome. However, there is no evidence of any 
hospice reporting direct relationships between outputs and outcomes in 




the SIRs, none even use the terminology ‘output’. There are just 4 
references to effectiveness and 8 to outcomes. Achievements have been 
considered poor indicators of performance when judged in the context of 
the logic model (Connolly & Hyndman, 2003). However, management 
control theory would suggest that comparing achievement against plan is a 
credible indicator of effectiveness. Anthony and Govindarajan (2007 p150) 
contend that in any sector, ‘since objectives and outputs are difficult to 
quantify, effectiveness tends to be expressed in subjective, non-analytical 
terms.’  The Ferreira and Otley PMCS framework was shown to map closely 
with the SIR questions in Chapter 4. A comparison of achievements to their 
stated aims and strategies, or alignment, can be considered as a measure 
of hospice effectiveness. Analysis was carried out across the hospice SIR 
questions, comparing aims, strategies, objectives and achievements by 
each hospice (Question1 to Question 3a: aims to strategy; Question 3a to 
Question 4: strategy to objectives and achievements). Using Nvivo, 
emergent themes were identified within each SIR question and then 
compared across the range of questions. Aims are predominantly 
concerned with service provision, families and values or ‘ends’ (Question 
1). While service provision remains the top concern within hospice 
strategies (Question 3a), this is followed by finance and partnerships, 
particularly with the public sector or the ‘means’ to deliver a good service.   
At an overall level, there seems to be a high degree of coherence between 
strategies, objectives and achievements, with the same themes being 
dominant.  There is also remarkable consistency between the less frequent 
themes of staff, volunteers and education (see Figure 5.1 below).  The SIR 
questions are represented by different circles with the outer ring being Q4 
and the inner ring being Q1. For example, service provision (mid-blue) is  
33% of the themes included in hospice objectives/achievements, 29% of 
themes within strategy and 35% of themes within aims. 
 
 











A mixed picture is revealed when themes are traced through at an 
individual hospice level. When current year achievements of individual 
hospices are compared to objectives, there are high levels of alignment. 
These are included as answers to one question (Question 4) and laid out in 
a table format by specific objectives and achievement. The vast majority of 
hospices express some kind of service delivery in their aims, strategies, 
objectives and achievements. However, there are very limited matches 
across all other themes. When occurrences of finance, partnerships, staff, 
volunteers and education are matched across aims (Question 1), strategy 
(Question 3a) and Objectives/Achievements (Question 4), there is much 























Figure 5.2: Number of thematic matches at individual hospice 
level 




Some hospices do achieve a coherent pattern of alignment across 
the three questions relating to aims, strategies and 
objectives/achievements but these represent only 22% of possible 
alignment opportunities. The majority of hospices express their aims in 
terms of service provision and then elaborate on this in their strategies, 
objectives and achievements.  Most aims are expressed in very general 
terms but a review of service provision strategies against their stated 
objectives and achievements suggests that around a third of hospices have 
aligned these in a consistent manner. Where objectives are specific, these 
are typically described in terms of activities such as establishing new 
services, building new facilities or extending capacity. Some are more 
aspirational such as patients dying in a place of their choice, widening 
access or promoting peace of mind. Where a tangible outcome is given, it is 
usually expressed as a milestone. Once service provision is excluded, there 
is much less alignment across the remaining themes of finance, 
partnerships, staff, volunteers and education.  The cases in Appendix 8 
represent the most clearly defined examples rather than typical patterns 
and, even allowing for the vague definitions, only 5% are thematically 
aligned across aims, strategies, objectives and achievements. More 
hospices match their aims and strategy but these still only represent 9.5% 
of possible opportunities while around 14% match their strategies to 
objectives and achievements. Measures have also been included here to 
show how the hospices set out to measure their strategies but these 
examples are rare and very few express it as a comparative number (eg 









SIRs also require charities to present their future plans.  Question 7 
asks: how will the overall performance last year affect your charity's 
medium to long-term strategy? What are your charity's main objectives for 
next year? By comparing the objectives declared in one year with those 
reported in the previous year in Question 7, the consistency of the strategic 
direction of the hospices can be analysed. Question 4 asks charities to list 
both the objectives and achievements in a table format so performance 
can be easily assessed by the reader. However, these are not necessarily 
the same as those they reported in Question 7 in the previous year. Thus, 
the objectives declared in Question 4 of the 2013 SIRs are compared to the 
objectives set out in Question 7 of the 2012 SIRs for all 148 hospices.  
While 68 (46 %) have an exact or very similar match of all objectives, a 
further 31 had at least one objective which matched exactly or was very 
similar. It is acknowledged that plans change (although this was never 
explained as such) so using the same or very similar wording for at least 
one objective suggests that the hospices are at least trying to report 
against their declared objectives. Overall, two thirds of hospices would 
appear to be doing so.  
 
5.2.3 Integrated performance measurement: efficiency 
In the voluntary hospice SIRs, there are no measures of efficiency as 
defined by Hyndman in his original research of 1990 and only twenty-three 
hospices make a reference to efficiency anywhere in the SIRs and then 
without elaboration or application in any specific way. While none were 
defined exactly in the terms of the logic model (inputs to outputs), there 
were efficiency measures such as length of stay (34 examples), occupancy 
% (33 examples), prompt responses to requests for help (4 examples) and 
staff turnover (2 examples). This is not to suggest that hospices are not 
concerned to manage their resources responsibly. While there is limited 
mention of any financial considerations in the hospices’ aims (Question 1), 




nearly three-quarters of voluntary hospices did have some kind of financial 
strategy (Question 3a). This is mostly expressed in general terms such as 
ensuring financial stability and the need to diversify funding sources, 
particularly referring to the public sector and maintaining robust financial 
control.  This demonstrates that finance is considered to be an important 
facilitator of their mission; a means to an end rather than an end in itself 
(Kaplan, 2001). Fourteen hospices use the term ‘efficiency’ within their 
financial strategies  but only one refers to a detailed measure of cost per 
patient day (Trinityflyde). Moreover, any efficiency calculation is likely to 
be heavily distorted by not including one of their most valuable ‘inputs’: 
the volunteers whose contribution was valued at an estimated £112m in 
2006 throughout all UK voluntary hospices (HospiceUK, 2017).   
 5.2.4 Comparison of Trustees’ Annual Reports (TAR) and Summary 
Information Returns (SIR) 
Lord Hodgson (2012) has criticised SIRs for duplicating information 
provided in the TARs and a comparison of information provided in the 
hospice SIRs and TARs would support his conclusions to a certain extent. 
Analysis is carried out into how aims, strategies/future plans, objectives for 
the following year and achievements are reported in both sets of 
documents for 2013. The aims stated in SIR and TAR aims are usually very 
similar (66%) although a significant number of TARs expanded on it with 
mission, philosophy and/or values.  A proportion of TARs (41%) have more 
details of future plans and strategies than in the SIRs.  However, it is 
surprising that there were many cases where quite different information is 
reported in SIR and TAR. Table 5.2 shows that hospice strategies were 
different in 13% of cases with only 19% being similar in both their SIR and 
TAR. The majority (56%) of hospices are able to give a more comprehensive 
account of their achievements in the TAR, although a significant proportion 
chose to give different information in TAR and SIR (24%). 
 




Table 5.2: Comparison of Trustees’ Annual Report and Summary 
 Information Returns 
Source: Author’s findings from TAR and SIR analysis 
 
However, there is one significant issue addressed in the SIR but not 
the TAR. While the TAR only has one rather vague question about future 
plans, the SIR asks for more specific information and breaks it into two 
questions, distinguishing between strategic direction and plans for the 
following year.  In the TARs, 69% of 148 hospices do not report detailed 
objectives for the previous year, thus not allowing any view to be taken on 
how they have performed against those objectives. As these were required 
in the SIR, they were set out for every hospice, albeit with degrees of 
specificity.  The more recent SORP (Charity Commission, 2015) for larger 
charities lays out requirements for the reporting of objectives and 
achievement in more detail than SORP 2005 (Charity Commmission, 2005) 
but does not require that specific objectives determined in one year should 













Aims 66 3 20 10 2  




9 4 16 1 69 1 
Achievements 3 24 56 9 9  




5.3 A voluntary sector skeletal framework for hospice case studies 
Figure 5.3: A skeletal framework for voluntary sector performance 
management 
 Source: author’s interpretation of the literature of management control 
and voluntary sector performance measurement  
The analysis of the SIRs and TARs provide an overview of the 
performance measures used by voluntary hospices and addresses the first 
three sub-questions of the research (what is considered to be good 
performance, how is it delivered and measured.) However, insights into the 
overarching question of how hospice performance is actually managed are 
limited. As Chapter 4 explains, five case studies were selected to 
understand overall performance management including the purposes for 
which performance measurement information is used, and who and what 
drives that information. The first three sub-questions are also addressed in 
the case study analysis, allowing a comparison of individual hospices to the 
hospice sub-sector. In accordance with middle-range thinking, the case 
studies are informed by prior theory but enable theory-building. A skeletal 




framework puts the performance management framework of Simons’ 
Levers of Control (set out in Chapter 2) in the context of voluntary sector 
characteristics (described in chapter 3). Modifications to the SLOC 
recommended by Tessier and Otley are loosely added, along with the 
communicative and instrumental rationalities described by Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2009).  Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) PMCS is used to inform the 
interview protocol, providing qualitative data from which the skeletal 
framework can be ‘fleshed out’. Table 5.3 shows how management control 
theory has informed the second phase of the research.  From this, a 
framework to manage the performance of the voluntary sector can be 
derived. 
Table 5.3: Research questions and performance management frameworks 
Research sub-question Frameworks Chapter 
1. How do voluntary hospices perceive 
‘good’ performance?  
Ferreira and Otley (2009): Vision 
and Mission 
Ch 6 
2. How can good performance be best 
delivered? 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) Critical 
success factors, strategies 
Ch 6 
3. How is performance measured in 
voluntary hospices? 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) Key 
performance measured 
Ch 7 
4. Who and what drives this 
performance measurement 
information? 
Connolly et al. (2015) Ch 6 
5. For what purposes is hospice 
performance measurement 
information used? 
Henri  (2006) 
Burchell et al (1980) 
Ch 6 
6. How does performance 
measurement information 
complement other control 
mechanisms in the performance 
management of a voluntary hospice? 
Simons’ Levers of Control (1995) 
Broadbent & Laughlin (2009) 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) Q9-12 
Ch 8 








5.4 Hospice case comparisons 
To answer the final three sub-questions of the research and 
understand how performance is managed rather than just measured, five 
voluntary hospices were selected as cases. These are used to put the ‘flesh’ 
onto the skeletal framework outlined above to gain richer insight into how 
hospice performance is managed. The cases have been chosen as they 
display different characteristics pertinent to the subsector as a whole.  
All but one of the case hospices are in the mid-range of total annual 
income (£5-7.5m) and provide similar services for adult patients and their 
families.  The exception is one large hospice with separate hospice units 
and a head office. This hospice only has under 10% of patients diagnosed 
with cancer and has over 20 commissioner relationships. Despite the 
similarities of size and service provision, the remaining four hospices have 
different income profiles. Two have a high proportion of public funding 
(around 40%) while one is lower at around 20%, and the fourth is near to 
the national average of 30%.  There are contrasting patterns of financial 
stability. Only one has both a healthy surplus and reserves; two have a 
small surplus and adequate reserves; one has no surplus but reasonable 
reserves; and the final one has both no surplus and low reserves.  
Differences are also evident in the boards of trustees: there are three 
stable boards of governors and two with a relatively high turnover in the 
past three years.  Management teams are also dissimilar in that four 
hospices have mainly established directors whereas has one has 
experienced much recent change.  The volunteer support varies 
considerably (although this is difficult to quantify accurately) as does their 
geographical settings with two having a high proportion of black and 
minority ethnic (BME) patients.  Contact was made with three hospices 
through personal connections whereas two responded to an invitation, 
made through the Charity Finance Directors Group. 
 




5.4.1 Barton:  stable and assured 
At the time of the interviews, Barton was the most financially stable 
of the five case hospices with a surplus of over £1m and reserves 
amounting to 60% of operating expenditure in 2013.  NHS contributions 
amounted to third of revenue with trading and other incomes making up a 
balanced portfolio. Over fifteen shops provided a further third of total 
revenue and fundraising contributed the final third of total revenue. Their 
senior management team and board had experienced little turnover in the 
previous three years. Participating in the Cass Business School review, they 
were considered an example of good governance. They are supported by 
more than 1,000 volunteers representing an equivalent cost of almost £1m 
across all aspects of the hospices operations, from shop assistants to 
patient support, fundraising to family support.  They are committed to 
education and are providing support beyond cancer. Contact was made 
through the supervisor of this thesis. 
  
5.4.2 Cavell: financially uncertain but stable management 
Cavell was struggling financially at the time of the interviews. 
Having made a small deficit in 2012/2013, it has returned to an operating 
surplus in the following year. It had the lowest proportion of public funding 
of all the hospices at under 20% and was aware of pressures on the NHS to 
make more cuts. It was conscious of local charity competition and had the 
lowest proportion of legacy income.  Nevertheless, it had the most onerous 
reserves policy of 1.5 times annual expenditure. They were seeking 
accreditation from an external body at the time of the interviews. It had a 
well-established team of both senior managers and trustees with good 
board relationships. Having been through the Cass review, they have 
restructured their reporting and sub-committees.  It was founded on 
Christian principles but is open to those of all races and religions. It offers a 
typical and diverse range of hospice services which provide physical, 




psychological and spiritual support to patients, families and carers. Cavell 
was approached through a contact of the researcher. 
 
5.4.3 Guinness: aspiring management team in challenging financial 
circumstances 
The largest case, with over £10m revenue and 30% from statutory 
sources, has purpose-built hospices with a separate head office.  Their 
funding was a more complicated mix of grants and contracts with over 20 
different commissioning organisations. The information requirements and 
proportions of funding were also very different.  The management team 
was relatively stable with both CEO and care director being in post for over 
10 years. The Finance and HR directors were the most recent appointments 
at the time of the interviews. They were conscious of their vulnerable 
financial sustainability, being used to running at breakeven point.  The 
trustees have also been stable with 11 of 18 in post for four years. As a 
proportion of expenditure, their reserves were significantly lower than the 
other hospices. However, they were committed to an ambitious strategy 
and an explicit goal of meeting the needs of an absolute number of 
patients and their families over a seven-year period. They run over 50 
shops and have a combined volunteer support of over 1,500 people.  It has 
a high proportion of BME patients and covers a wide geographical area. 
They responded to the request in the Charity Finance Directors’ Group for 
hospices interested in performance measurement. 
 
5.4.4 Nightingale: a new management team dedicated to change 
At the time of the interviews, Nightingale was a hospice in a state of 
change with one director describing it as ‘undernourished’ in its recent 
history.  The CEO was implementing a ‘modernisation’ programme within 
the hospice ‘to turn the business inside out’ and with aspirations and 
ambitions to double the numbers of patients. This would require a 




renewed programme within the community. Interviewees commented on 
the CEO’s energy, the change of pace and her inspiring leadership. Both the 
board and senior management team had been involved in rethinking the 
vision and were working through a new strategy at the time of the 
interviews. There has been a number of changes within the senior 
management team. Some trustees had been in post for twenty years, or as 
another interviewee put it ‘from a different era’. All heads of department 
were in the process of determining appropriate performance measures, 
some of which had been implemented.  Its high 40% of public funding was 
due more to under-performance on fundraising in other areas (eg trusts 
and grants). The finance director responded to the request in the Charity 
Finance Directors’ Group for hospices interested in performance 
measurement.  
 
5.4.5 Seacole: financially vulnerable with high % of public funding 
Seacole had a high proportion of public funding at 40% and had, at 
the time of the interviews, been challenged financially with an unexpected 
drop in legacy income. They had embarked on a cost-containment 
programme. It had a high proportion of BME patients, is situated in a 
predominantly urban area and has one of the lowest proportions of 
volunteer to staff ratios. It is also the only hospice that cited specific 
‘competition’ from another hospice in the area, with attempts at 
performance comparisons being made by its commissioners. While mainly 
receiving income from one block contract, it did have three other public 
funding arrangements, including spot-pricing for particular services. The 
CEO was actively seeking a balanced portfolio of public funding.   Seacole 
had a strong religious history with one interview commented on the 
religious influence, but only to the extent that the CEO was concerned to 
ensure the hospice is open to everyone, irrespective of their faith.  This 
hospice was approached via a contact of the researcher. 





The Summary Information Returns (SIRs) present this information in 
a way that aims, strategies, performance measures and achievements of 
hospices can be compared easily; both collectively as a sub-sector and 
within individual hospices.  As Ferreira and Otley’s PMCS framework 
(2009), a method of researching SPMSs, maps well to SIR questions, this 
was used to analyse the SIRs of 148 hospices to identify the extent of 
alignment of aims, strategies, objectives measures and achievements.  It 
found that overall there was a good degree of coherence in the themes put 
forward by the hospices. However, at an individual hospice level, there was 
little strategic alignment. A comparison of the SIRs and Trustee Annual 
Reports(TARs) demonstrates that, while charities have to report their 
achievements against specific annual objectives in the SIR, no detailed 
objectives for the following year are specified in nearly 70% of the TARs.  
Following Lord Hodgson’s (2012) report into the Charities’ Act of 2006, the 
SIR is no longer required. While the new Charities SORP (FRS 102) (Charity 
Commission, 2015) lays out reporting of objectives and achievements in 
more detail than SORP 2005, it does not specify that a charity should report 
its achievements against the specific annual objectives declared previously 
by the charity. This research suggests that any future regulation should 
encourage charities to declare specific annual objectives as well as longer 
term future plans and then report against them in their TARs in the 
following year.  
 To inform the second phase of the research, a skeletal framework 
for understanding how voluntary sector performance is managed is derived 
from a number of sources. It is informed by the literatures of both 
management control, particularly Simons’ LOC, and voluntary sector 
performance measurement. Both sets of literature acknowledge the need 
for diverse, aligned and integrated performance measurement systems. 
Management control literature advocates performance management 
through comprehensive packages of controls, but this is yet to be 




recognised in the voluntary sector literature.  The skeletal framework 
combines this comprehensive approach with the characteristics of the 
voluntary sector. To gain insight into how hospice performance is 
managed, five case hospices are used to put ‘flesh’ on the ‘skeleton’ of 
voluntary sector performance management thus building a framework for 
voluntary sector performance management. 
  




Chapter 6: Reporting good hospice performance  
6.1 Introduction 
Evidence from external hospice statutory reporting would appear to 
support the conclusions of Connolly and Hyndman (2004; 2013a) that 
performance measurement in voluntary organisations is weak. They argue 
that poor quality external reporting infers weak internal performance 
measurement and have subsequently called for more research into what is 
meant by performance, how it is measured and what emphasis 
stakeholders put on it (Connolly, et al., 2015). This chapter addresses these 
questions as part of the second phase of this research. To understand what 
role performance measures play in the internal management of hospices, 
first what is considered to be good performance in a voluntary hospice 
needs to be identified. Second, it examines how good performance can 
best be delivered. These are combined to address Connolly et al.’s (2015) 
opening question about what is meant by performance. Third, it considers 
who and what drives performance management information and finally, 
investigates the purposes for which performance measurement 
information used.  The latter two questions address what emphasis 
stakeholders place on performance measurement while the actual 
performance measures used will be analysed in chapter 7. Five cases 
studies of voluntary hospices were carried out, enabling insight into how 
their internal reporting is used to manage their operations. As we have 
seen in Chapter 4, Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) PMCS provides a framework 
for research into performance measurement and management systems, 
albeit largely applied in the private sector. This has informed the interview 
protocol (see Appendix 3). Semi-structured interviews have been carried 
out in five hospices with twenty-five CEOs, senior managers and trustees. 
As interviewees came from a range of functional backgrounds, different 
internal stakeholder perspectives are revealed.  
 




6.2  Good performance:  a good death? 
 ‘There are lots of component parts’ (CEO,Cavell). 
 ‘It can be divided up into a number of components’ (CEO,Nightingale). 
Many acknowledge that good performance in a hospice is not a 
straight forward concept. A study of one hospice by the NPC’s (Joy & 
Sandford, 2012) has defined good performance as a ‘good death’, giving 
three possible outcomes: quality of life; place of death; and coping skills.   
It is interesting that of all twenty-five interviewees, only one CEO and one 
care director (from the same hospice) chose to express good performance 
in terms of ‘a good death’.  There is extensive recognition of one of the 
outcomes identified by the NPC (quality of life) but surprisingly little 
acknowledgement of the other two (coping skills and place of death). The 
findings will consider the evidence to support each of these outcomes but 
then consider other concepts of good performance described by the 
interviewees including other outcomes, activities or outputs and the 
achievement of objectives. 
 
6.2.1 New Philanthropic Capital (NPC) outcomes: quality of life, coping 
skills and place of death 
Improving the quality of life of patients is considered fundamental 
to the good performance of a hospice with the majority of interviewees 
mentioning it in some way. 
‘Patients first. That is absolutely critical to what we do’ (CEO, 
Barton).   
‘Our final outcomes is to ensure for that one person that they’ve had 
a dignified life and…that they have passed through the hospice, 
been cared for and looked after as a human being,...they’ve been in 
the decision-making process’ (Trustee, Seacole).  




One trustee explained the differences between a hospital and a hospice by 
citing the example of a knee operation. A patient goes into hospital for an 
operation and expects to come out better able to walk. In contrast, the 
outcomes for a hospice patient are not usually about recovery but quality 
of life at a difficult time. The patients’ experience is the key to 
understanding good performance. ‘Measuring success is the people whose 
lives have been impacted upon’ (Trustee, Seacole). This includes the 
emotional, psychological and spiritual care of the patient. In line with the 
holistic philosophy of the hospice movement discussed in Chapter 5, many 
interviewees commented on the broader aspirations of hospice care. 
‘I think that being able to provide the care for our patients which 
meets their needs and often that is about managing their 
symptoms, both physical and emotional’ (CEO,Cavell).   
Hospices provide a range of services and in some cases, patients 
can express their own views. However, in many cases there will be 
difficulties in ascertaining this and often it is the families who have to speak 
on the beneficiaries’ behalf, as the CEO of Barton implies. 
‘They all leave saying that it could not be any better. Whether it is 
the patient going to wherever the patient has gone, whatever your 
belief is, or the family saying thank you. It couldn’t be better’( CEO, 
Barton).  
Such perceptions of success as patient experience are not limited to the 
clinical staff but were held by all members of the senior management 
teams, including finance and business staff.  
Of the two other outcomes identified by the NPC (Joy & Sandford, 
2012), coping skills and place of death, there are significantly fewer 
comments. Only two interviewees referred to coping skills: ‘It’s about 
knowing that families who are at crisis point now…have got resilience, 
they’re empowered to actually make some of the decisions, to cope with 




the day-to-day life that they were struggling to cope with’ (Care, Guinness). 
Only one interviewee comments on the place of death as an outcome 
specifically in response to the question of what constitutes good 
performance and even that is complicated.  
‘A key indicator for us isn’t just the preferred place of care, preferred 
place of death but also about other wishes that might be 
predominant at that time as well...actually what might come higher 
is symptom control, pain control’ (Business, Seacole).  
The CEO at Nightingale referred to place of death in a later part of the 
interview.‘ So I would say the outcomes that we're working with at the 
moment are things like the achievement of preferred place of death’ (CEO, 
Nightingale). 
 
6.2.2 Other outcomes 
Outcomes, other than those cited in the NPC report, are identified. 
The CEO at Nightingale mentions offering support to a mix of patients, 
including non-cancer patients. The care director at Barton comments on 
the indirect benefits of good hospice performance reducing pressures on 
GPs. If families have been supported through bereavement, they are less 
likely to be at risk of psychological dysfunction after death and thus make 
fewer demands on GPs and other services. The business director at 
Guinness comments on the reduced hospital admissions due to the 
provision of hospice services. 
‘If you have a good death and you are supported through that, it is 
probable that bereavement will be less traumatic. Therefore you 
feel supported. Therefore there is going to be less demand on your 
GP and less risk of psychological dysfunction after death so there is 
an added value to that’ (Care, Barton).  




Good outcomes are not limited to the patient but extended to their family, 
carers and friends. ‘There’s almost as much psychosocial support, as my 
care colleagues would call it, for the family, as there is care for the (patient) 
going on. So it’s the quality of the whole range, isn’t it, that we provide’ 
(Finance, Guinness). As the CEO of the children’s hospice expressed it in the 
context of facing the death of a child, it is about ‘making the unbearable, 
bearable’ for parents. His colleague commented on siblings as ‘silent 
mourners’, so outcomes can be expressed in terms of  families, as well as 
patients being more able to cope.  
‘An example of an outcome might be that through receiving XXX 
services in that year, that family is more resilient to cope…the family 
stays together; they attend A&E less often; they’re happier; the 
siblings have a higher well-being. And, for me, good performance 
management is about achieving those outcomes’ (Business, 
Guinness).  
 
6.2.3 Outputs: volume, quality and efficiency of service provision  
‘So good performance, it's about quality. It's about delivering the 
highest possible quality of care in the way that (patients) and their 
families want’ (CEO, Guinness). 
Half of the respondents express good performance in terms of the 
provision of services, ie: activities or outputs. The CEO of Nightingale 
distinguishes between two aspects of good care: activity (what/how many 
services are provided) and the quality of those services. The CEO at Cavell 
provides a typical response to the question of what is good hospice 
performance: ‘Good performance is safe, effective end-of-life care’ (CEO, 
Cavell).  Three interviewees are pragmatic, commenting on meeting the 
minimum requirements set by the regulatory body – the CQC. Failure to 
meet these would result in revoking of their license. ‘I mean I think the core 




of it for me is how we perform from a clinical point of view. I think all the 
other things are peripheral. I think the focus should be very much on the 
outcome of a CQC visit. They measure you on your ability to give care to 
people that are coming to the hospice’ (Business, Nightingale). Being 
measured against certain essential standards of quality and safety were 
described a ‘baseline of good performance’ by the care director at Barton 
but she added that this is not ‘the be-all-and-end-all.’ 
Other interviewees see good performance in terms of efficient 
clinical management processes. The care director at Cavell defines good 
performance as providing a ‘fairly transparent and responsive’ service. The 
CEO at Nightingale cites occupancy and length of stay as hallmarks of a 
well-run operation. She asserts that there is a responsibility to those who 
had given donations that every bed should be used, given the number of 
people in the community desperate for them. However, this is not simply 
about being efficient but about being appropriate. ‘That our length of stay 
is appropriate in that we are turning people around relatively quickly and 
getting them home again or into a care home, or they're here to die and 
they're here for a period that is appropriate for them and their family's 
need’ (CEO, Nightingale). Arguably this is a matter of judgement, rather 
than a measure of efficiency. The business director at Cavell poses the 
question: ‘Are we providing the right services at the right levels?’ 
 
6.2.4 Other hallmarks of good performance: staff satisfaction, financial 
sustainability and community reputation 
 Interviewees express the good performance of a hospice by looking 
at the factors which contribute to a good patient experience.  ’It’s very 
much about our employees and staff satisfaction…The strength of our 
board of governors plays a very important part of our success’ (Business, 
Barton). It is not simply having the right staff but treating them the right 
way. Two interviewees made reference to staff satisfaction. 




‘Good performance is whereby you have a satisfied population. By 
that I mean in terms of patients and in terms of whatever the 
experience they have had after the event. But (for) staff it is 
emotionally onerous working in a hospice; (it’s) really important 
that staff feel well supported, they can exercise their views and that 
their views are listened to‘(Trustee, Barton). 
Of the twenty-three interviewees who answered directly to the 
question ‘what is good performance in hospice’, nine specifically 
mentioned financial considerations.  One finance director said: ‘we need to 
reach our bottom line in terms of surplus or deficit. That’s a simplistic 
answer.’ He went on to comment: ‘So I suppose I’ve given the answer you 
would expect me to me to say and probably what 80% of financial directors 
would say.’  Indeed, all finance directors who answered directly did include 
finance. However, it is clear that it is not about ‘maximixing surplus’ (the 
non-profit equivalent of profit) but securing adequate funds for their 
purposes. The Business at Nightingale expressed it succinctly: ’the more 
money we have, the more successful we can be as a hospice.’ Unlike a for 
profit–organisation, in which a higher level of customers will improve the 
financial performance, the more patients there are, the greater the 
financial exposure becomes. ‘It’s about being able to deliver the services 
that are needed by the local community. If we had double the money 
coming in, then we could achieve that’ (Business, Nightingale). 
Finance and business directors recognise that financial stability is a 
means to an end, not an end in itself.  The business director at Nightingale 
went to the extent of saying ‘that the core of it is how we perform from a 
clinical point of view. I think all other things are peripheral.’ The financial 
and business interviewees all put finances in its clinical context. One said 
he was interested in bed utilisation from a clinical, not a financial 
perspective.  Another commented that by generating a surplus, they could 
improve their clinical performance: 




‘If we have a surplus for one year, which is not necessarily success,  
but if we have a surplus one year, it will be how quickly can we work 
this into what we do  to improve clinically’ (Finance, Barton).  
This is supported by the one trustee who includes financial performance as 
only a part of a series of factors that contribute to good performance. 
‘The year has finished and we have ended up with a surplus of this 
or a deficit of that, but it’s better than budget. And there was a 
recognition to say that actually it is not a reflection of what we’re 
about, because we’re not about achieving surpluses or deficit’ 
(Trustee, Guinness). 
Financial success therefore concerns the responsible management 
of funds.  ‘We have got to be able to assure that we are delivering high 
quality care to people who need it and that we are not wasting the money 
that people give us and we have the ability to develop our service where we 
see future need…the basic thing is that...nothing would come as a surprise 
and that is because of performance management’ (CEO, Barton). Successful 
financial performance is, therefore, managing the trade-offs between 
achieving a high quality service provision but with tight cost management. 
‘Clearly good performance is being able to provide a quality service within 
agreed budgets’ (Finance, Cavell).  One CEO commented on how they are 
now cancelling fundraising events if the SMT thinks that the cost–benefit is 
not justified. 
 While financial and business staff might be expected to explain 
financial performance as part of what makes a hospice successful, other 
staff choose not to identify this. Only one CEO mentioned finance in direct 
response to the question of good performance and only two trustees 
included financial performance. No care director cites finance in direct 
answer to the question of good performance. However, they recognise the 
need the need for financial stability elsewhere in the interviews. A care 
director even said that she would have to justify her salary to her CEO by 




the hospice improving its financial position. While non-financial staff 
appreciate the necessity of good financial management, there are clearly 
tensions. 
‘There’s different discussions at the moment because performance 
is being measured and, increasingly needing to be measured by 
our numbers. And that’s really difficult because the accountants 
that are on our board want to see performance...For me, good 
performance management is about really good outcomes for 
children and for families. It’s about making a difference in the 
quality of their life’ (Care, Guinness).  
The business director at Barton applauds the high quality service 
provision but questions ‘at what cost should we be achieving those levels of 
results and would we achieve the same level of results if we monitored 
those results?’  Where the emotional stakes are so high, clearly tensions 
are evident as a contrasting perspective is given by a finance director:  
‘xx died that weekend but the news hadn’t caught up with me and 
they (her staff) were gutted, they were just so upset. So it is about 
being genuine, very genuine. And I guess that’s one of the 
challenges that I have, is I really don’t want to cut across any of 
that because that’s what makes it so special, but in order to be 
able to do more of that just a little bit more structure to what 
we’re doing in terms of resource management could have such a 
big benefit’ (Finance, Guinness). 
Success was considered by three interviewees to include the 
hospices’ reputation and ‘people’s perceptions in the community’ (Business, 
Barton).  This was described as ‘subliminal’ by the care director ‘because 
there is a sense by the public and the patients out there that xxx will always 
provide a high standard of care.’ A more comprehensive view would 
suggest that a good community reputation is essential for financial survival.  
The business director at Cavell sees good performance as supporting those 




who provide the funds. ‘So I think when you get those three things right, 
we’re onto a winner. Excellent clinical services, excellent supporter care, 
those two combined hopefully you see your financial results’ (Business, 
Cavell). A business director perceives success as having a good ‘influencing 
strategy’ raising awareness within the community and building 
collaborative relationships with other hospices and organisations.  
 
6.2.5 Achievement of objectives 
‘Good performance would be one where we continue to meet all our 
quality goals...in line with the targeted growth in those numbers 
that we’re providing our service to. So if we can achieve both of 
those, then one would say that’s good’ (Trustee, Guinness). 
The finance director at Barton stated that to understand success, 
you needed to understand the strategy of the organisation; an 
interpretation consistent with the Ferreira –Otley framework (2009). ‘In 
order to know what good performance is...I need to know what the 
strategic objectives are’ (Finance, Barton). At Guinness, they have gone 
further in implementing this, by seeing good performance in terms of 
achievement against a fundamental and externally driven target.  Through 
studies, they have estimated the likely need for their services for many 
years ahead and are monitoring progress against this long-term strategy on 
a monthly basis.  
 
6.2.6 Good performance in a hospice 
As the voluntary sector literature would suggest, good performance 
is intangible, is difficult to define and has multiple objectives (Sawhill & 
Williamson, 2001). This draws a contrast with a perception of simplicity in 
the private sector with its single bottom-line (Kaplan, 2001; Speckbacher, 
2003). This is clearly endorsed by what hospice interviewees say. ‘It’s a 




really difficult question’ (Business, Guinness). It involves satisfying the 
needs of several stakeholder groups, such as patients and their families, as 
well as employees, trustees, funders and other health care providers. The 
overriding outcome suggested by the NPC and suggested by two 
interviewees is the provision of a ‘good death’ but involves many other 
aspects of good performance. The trustee at Cavell gives a comprehensive 
definition, starting with finance, including patients and finishing with staff:  
‘Good performance in a hospice? There's not a one-liner for that… 
finance is important because without that, you don't have the 
organisation. Quality's important because you want to give a good 
quality service. You need people to have perceived that, which is the 
customer survey bit. And is the staff good as well? Are the staff 
happy or content or not?’ (Trustee,Cavell). 
 This illustrates how the distinction between outputs and outcomes 
are blurred or even interchangeable in the perception of the interviewees. 
Outcomes are contrasted to outputs in the logic model. ‘Outputs represent 
what a programme actually does whereas the outcomes are the results it 
produces (Poister, 2003, p. 38). Table 6.1 classifies the direct responses to 
the question what is good performance in a hospice. Over half of 
respondents include some kind of outcome, even if only two interviewees 
(both from the same hospice) used the term explicitly and spontaneously. 
Outputs, on the other hand, are related to service provision. If respondents 
reply in terms of types or volumes of service, it is clearly an activity or 
output. Twelve interviewees reply in terms of quality of service, strictly an 
output as part of the programme rather than a result of a service (Poister, 
2003). Nevertheless, the distinction between quality of service and quality 
of patient experience is not clear but used interchangeably, as the 








Table 6.1:  Good performance in a hospice 
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There is also considerable overlap between what is good 
performance and how it is best delivered. This will be explored more in the 
next section by looking at how interviewees responded directly to the 
second sub-question of the research. Eleven respondents include aspects 
of delivery (or ‘means’) as part of what is good performance in hospices (or 
‘ends’). The means to achieve the overall outcomes is intertwined, even 
muddled, with the end purpose. Financial viability, committed staff and 
good community relations are all considered as part of the good 
performance of a hospice. The literature would suggest that performance 
and delivery are clearly distinguishable (Kaplan, 2001); this research would 
suggest that it is less clear in the perceptions of hospice management.  
 Outcomes are predominantly described in terms of the impact on 
an individual patient or their families.  Only in a few cases are they seen as 
the hospices broader impact on wider society or put in its strategic context.  
One CEO acknowledges a responsibility to ensure beds are utilised 
efficiently so that as many patients as possible can benefit.   One trustee 
expressed the good performance in terms of the hospice’s strategic aim of 
meeting the estimated need of all the patients in the community. The aims 
of hospices throughout England and Wales, specifically required in the SIR 
and often cited in the TAR, are predominantly expressed in terms of service 
provision or outputs, not outcomes. The alternative view, suggested by the 
finance director at Barton, that success should be considered against the 
objective that the hospices determine themselves, will be taken up in the 










6.3 Delivery of good performance in a hospice 
Given that many interviewees see staff satisfaction and sound 
financial management as the hallmarks of a successful hospice, it is not 
surprising that these are also cited when asked how is good performance 
delivered.  Delivery of good performance delivered is also considered to be 
complicated. ‘How do you achieve that performance? There are many 
strands’ (CEO, Barton).  Responses do not always directly answer the 
question, with some interviewees answering by how they know if good 
performance is delivered, discussing measures rather than methods of 
delivery. ‘I know how it is measured rather than how it is delivered’ 
(Business, Barton). The majority of direct responses concern informal 
relationships within the hospice:  between staff and their patients, 
colleagues, senior management team and the board. Formal processes, 
including good governance, reporting structures and performance 
measurement are also a recurrent theme. Responses are summarised in 
Table 6.2. 
 
6.3.1 Right staff: personality, expertise and motivation 
A perception that good performance is fundamentally delivered by 
the right staff is shared by all hospices and across all functions.  ‘All of that 
that I’ve just spoken about isn’t possible without the right people’ (Business, 
Cavell).  The so-called ‘right staff’ includes many facets.  Respondents 
comment on staff who ‘have the heart.’ (CEO, Guinness); ‘When I say the 
right staff, it is not just the training pure and simple but there is their 
personality’ (CEO, Barton).  If staff are unlikely to suit the demands of 
working in a hospice environment, they are unlikely to stay. At Barton, staff 
start on a three month temporary contract to ensure they are comfortable 
with the environment. Many choose to leave after that period of their own 
accord.  The CEO of Guinness says that ‘the first thing is to make sure that 




they know what they are coming into…so they’ve absolutely no doubt 
about the kind of organisation.’ 
Other respondents comment on staff having the right expertise. ‘It 
is the healthy trust and use of peoples’ expertise and knowledge’ (CEO, 
Cavell). His senior management at Cavell agree: ‘And then also part of that, 
another layer, I would say, is having the right calibre of people in the 
organisation. People are critical (Business, Cavell). This includes specific 
expertise but also the right attitudes to caring for patients, ensuring they 
are ‘treated with dignity and compassion and love and care with humour at 
the most difficult time of life ‘ (CEO, Barton). 
 Moreover, delivery of good performance concerns individuals 
operating effectively within a team.  ‘The feeling of a really good 
team...right players in place’ (CEO, Cavell). Two respondents from Barton 
used music analogies – being ‘in tune with the orchestra’ (CEO) and ‘singing 
from same hymn sheet’ (Business). At Guinness, the business director 
emphases the importance of building relationships with the care team. At 
Cavell, the CEO speaks of ‘cross-fertilisation’ between nurses and doctors. 
The trustee at Barton believes that the delivery of good performance is 
about staff sharing the mission. ‘I think because the staff share the vision, 
they are integrated into that mission and vision’ (Trustee, Barton).  
Staff motivation is clearly an important factor, with the business 
director at Cavell identifying this as one of three aspects needed to achieve 
the results required (the others being knowledge and education).  The 
trustee of Cavell relates the delivery of good performance to the good 
reputation of the hospice ‘because people want to be here’.  In two 
hospices (Cavell and Nightingale), respondents comment on the high levels 
of motivation, with members of staff going beyond what is expected of 
them. Respondents cite staff getting involved in fund-raising activities 
outside their working hours as an indicator of their commitment and 
ultimately the delivery of good performance. ‘I think an evidence really of 




informal things which go on which encourage good performance is the 
number of our staff who take part in fund-raising activities on a voluntary 
basis’ (Finance, Cavell). On the other hand, the trustee at Seacole 
commented on the negative impact a significant drop in legacy income had 
on staff morale. 
 
6.3.2 Recruitment, induction and training 
A commitment to the recruitment, training and induction of 
appropriate individuals therefore becomes a key means of delivering good 
performance. The CEO of Barton says ‘recruitment is terribly important. We 
take recruiting very seriously.’  This is followed by induction:  ‘Between 
those two things; recruitment and induction, there is a process that's 
almost subliminal, whereby they get to see what it is that they're going to 
be doing in an environment that they can see for themselves and 
understand, because they will come from a background where that's 
possible. And in which they know what will be expected of them’ (CEO, 
Guinness).  The CEO at Barton goes as far as to say that it is ‘immoral to put 
someone in a position for which they are not trained.’  Staff are also 
encouraged by prospects of progressing within the organisation. 
‘Demonstrating upward mobility of your staff is important’ (Care, Cavell).  
 
6.3.3 Leadership  
Staff might be seen to be critical to the delivery of good 
performance but the leadership that supports them plays a key role too. 
‘So good performance is delivered by them…my job is to let you do your job’ 
(CEO, Barton).  Leadership is often identified as a key driver of good 
performance but in three cases, this is explicitly of a coaching style. ‘I think 
a lot of it is about coaching people. It’s not about enforcing; it’s about 
coaching, developing, nurturing talent and creating an environment where 




it’s OK to sometimes get it wrong’  (Business, Cavell). The CEO and care 
director at Barton both speak of their commitment to ‘collective 
leadership.’ At Cavell, the CEO agrees: ‘For me ultimately what I think you 
are asking is, it is all about the leadership and leadership at lots of different 
levels within the organisation.’ The CEO at Seacole endorses this: ‘having 
good examples of leadership at every level of the organisation and I 
suppose it is about having the culture that encourages people to thrive 
rather than survive.’ Trusting, open and respectful relationships between 
senior colleagues and staff are seen as a method of promoting good 
performance. At Nightingale, the business director stresses the importance 
of being visible to the hospice staff and providing a good role model ‘in 
every sense.’  The business director at Cavell believes this means 
demonstrating good behaviours: ‘I don’t like to ask people to do anything 
that I wouldn’t do myself.’  A happy workforce results in staff contributing 
more than is expected of them. ‘When you have got a team that are happy 
in the job, then they give more, and so that in itself helps to achieve the 
performance that you’re looking for’ (Finance, Cavell).  
 
6.3.4 Autonomy and communication 
‘So for me, informally it's about people coming to work, about 
feeling like they can complain or moan about things to me and to 
their directors, to each other. It's about people making suggestions 
and coming up with ideas and being engaged, coming to drop-in 
sessions, because we have a lot of informal drop-ins as well’ (CEO, 
Nightingale). 
Consistent with the spirit of hospices fiercely defending their 
independence, several respondents cite autonomy being given to 
individuals as an important aspect of delivering good performance. 
Autonomy brings responsibility. ‘Good performance for me is really about 
people being empowered to do their role and working at a certain level of 




stretch without being unsafe or over pressurised. I think that having a 
culture where everybody feels they have got a part to play and their 
contribution is valued’ (CEO, Seacole). The care director at Barton cites the 
freedom she gives to her heads of department and their ‘ownership in 
taking it forward. There is no greater joy for me than to see those heads of 
department really taking those things forward’ (Care, Barton).   Good 
informal communication amongst staff is essential at all levels. The CEO at 
Cavell sees good performance delivery as having good people at senior 
management level ‘with good communication, open transparency’; a view 
echoed by others. ‘I think communication is the key part of it.’ (Business, 
Nightingale). The business director at Barton cites staff being able to talk to 
any member of the senior management team, irrespective of who is their 
line manager. In such an emotionally demanding environment, it is vital 
that staff can talk, knowing that someone will listen. 
  
6.3.5 Management processes 
Formal management processes, including reporting structures, 
policies and procedures are also mentioned by respondents as a means of 
delivering good performance but to a much lesser degree. Two 
respondents cite the reporting of performance: ‘I guess it (delivery) is down 
to the management, so whether they are monitoring it and then...picking 
up things when things don’t go to plan and taking actions to do something 
about it and to ensure that performance is improved or kept at that state in 
the future’ (Trustee, Nightingale).  The Accountant at Barton sees success 
being ensured by monitoring KPIs. The trustee at Seacole sees a ‘good 
management structure’ with a strong executive team reporting to the CEO. 
The care director at Barton sees the successful delivery of 
performance resulting from management team meetings and appraisals 
linked to the hospice’s overall strategy.  The finance director at Cavell 
emphasises the importance of good formal communications throughout 




the hospice, including ‘state-of-the-nation’ communication meetings with 
staff.  The trustee at Guinness sees good performance delivery as the 
combination of meetings and reporting: ‘I think through the reporting 
processes both in terms of structured meetings and information provided 
for those meetings.’ 
One hospice, Cavell, in particular had invested enormous amounts 
of money and time in developing rigorous procedures and policies 
throughout the organisation. Gaining accreditation from an external body 
is seen as the means of ensuring a better future for the hospice, both in 
terms of performance and being able to demonstrate their credibility to 
the outside world. The finance director at Nightingale sees good 
performance delivery as performing well in external audits: ‘I think it‘s nice 
to have a third party’s external view on things.’ 
 
6.3.6 Delivery of good hospice performance: relationships and processes 
The interplay between formal processes and informal relationships 
contributes to the successful delivery of hospice performance. When asked 
to consider how good performance is delivered, of twenty-one clear 
responses, eleven interviewees refer only to relationships (see table6.2). ‘I 
think that relationships you have with staff are really important. It is the 
leadership and day-to-day behaviours and emotional intelligence (Care, 
Barton). In contrast, there are four who only mention management 
processes while a further six include both. 
‘I think there is always a commitment to always wanting to do the 
best thing for the patient and to be responsive to them. That is the 
underlying principle I think and they are supported to do so. I guess 
my role is to give the kind of structures and support for them to 
deliver that’ (Care, Barton).  




 To some degree, this reflects the perspective of the respondents. 
The CEOs and trustees present a balanced picture. Of the CEO’s one is 
mixed, three are relational and one commented purely on the monitoring 
of performance. Of the trustees two speak predominantly about 
relationships and two about processes. However, no finance director 
purely comments on relationships while all but one of the business 
directors only do so. The observations below sum up the inter-relationships 
between people and processes in good performance delivery; reflecting 
the continuum proposed by Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) from 
communicative to instrumental rationalities. The CEO of Guinness 
describes a ‘spirit of governance’: an interesting combination of 
relationships within a process. 
‘She just is so good at what she does because she's got time as well 
as the heart to deliver that…There is no need for the spirit of 
governance...to permeate downwards because it's already there’ 
(CEO, Guinness).  
Table 6.2: Delivery of good hospice performance  
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Seacole CEO Finance  
Total 11 4 6 
Source: author’s findings from case analysis 
 
 




6.4 Who and what drives hospice performance information?  
The CEO of Barton identifies two keys drivers of performance 
information: one internal and the other external. 
‘Our performance is driven by the patients but the performance 
measurement is driven by two: one is our (board) and the other is 
the reporting we have to do to our commissioners.’  
Indeed, the two bodies he identifies are acknowledged by the other 
hospices, although there are other significant drivers too. The question of 
who and what drives performance reporting was addressed as a general 
question to each interviewee although some chose to answer it in the 
context of their specific areas (such as clinical reporting or financial 
reporting). Internal drivers are either the board of trustees or the senior 
management team with mixed responses as to the relative importance of 
each. External drivers are regulatory bodies, most notably the CQC for 
clinical standards and the Charity Commission for financial reporting. Other 
external influences are from funders, both NHS commissioners and other 
non-NHS donors. However, as the case studies progressed, it became clear 
that other broader factors were indirectly driving improved performance 
reporting. A comparison of internal and external drivers is given in Table 
6.3. 
 
6.4.1 Internal drivers 
In all cases, performance information is considered to be primarily 
driven by internal rather than external influences, summed up by the 
finance director at Nightingale. ‘Certainly for me it's being driven internally. 
I mean I think that's the right place for it to come from. And our internal 
processes should have the right measures in them irrespective of what third 
parties want’ (Finance, Nightingale). At two hospices, (Guinness and 
Barton), the board is seen as the most proactive in driving performance 




information by their CEOs. The Barton finance director describes the board 
as ‘pulling’ financial information, whereas he was ‘pushing’ information 
towards the heads of department. At Guinness, the care director 
comments that the ‘more information they receive, the more they need 
again.’ However, other respondents at Barton qualify the role of the board 
in being the prime driver of internal performance measurement 
information. The Barton trustee, fundraising and care director all 
emphasised the role of the senior management team, rather than the 
board. ‘It is largely driven by SMT but if we ask for anything in addition, 
they would provide that’ (Trustee, Barton). ‘They trust what we give them 
but they do challenge and that is exactly how they should be’ (Care, 
Barton).   
Views are more consistent at Cavell with three directors agreeing 
that the senior management team drives the performance information. 
The CEO, referring to accreditation processes including performance 
information, says ‘we have imposed it on ourselves’ and his finance director 
agrees:’ I think it is me that drives the financial information with the 
support of the CEO and Finance Committee’ but she acknowledges that is ‘a 
team effort.’ At Nightingale, a change of senior management team has 
resulted in a new impetus, reviewing their performance measurement 
information. Initiated by the CEO, the directors have ‘absolutely bought 
into it….working very hard within their departments to drive it’ (CEO, 
Nightingale). The recently appointed finance director is driving changes 
within financial reporting: ‘I think certainly from the world we came from 
(private sector), by comparison it's a very undeveloped situation. And I think 
the fact that we've got board KPIs now that are really the touch point of the 
hospice, I think that's a good thing…KPIs can be a very positive way of 
finding out...we're on the right track’ (Finance, Nightingale). At Seacole, 
‘new managers with higher expectations’ and ‘a change in appetite’ 
(Finance, Seacole) are seen to be driving changes despite issues of some 
staff acting as ‘blockers.’ 




Internal information is therefore a product of the relationship 
between the board and the senior management team. It can be more 
heavily influenced by either party, depending on how proactive the 
trustees are. The most evident influence of change is a newly appointed 
senior management team, such as at Seacole and Nightingale. ‘ I think it is 
about wanting to make sure our trustees are assured…that they have no 
surprises’ (CEO, Seacole). 
 
6.4.2 External drivers 
While internal drivers are considered to be dominant in driving 
performance measurement information, external factors are clearly 
important too. Clinical information is required from every hospice receiving 
external funding from NHS which exerts influence as a regulator (CQC) or 
as a funder (commissioners, usually CCGs). 
 ‘There’s three drivers going on at the moment, really. There’s the 
regulatory body, which is the CQC; there’s the commissioners and 
then there’s the board, obviously, for their governance 
responsibility. In terms of my time...I would say CQC, because 
without CQC we would be closed’ (Care, Guinness). 
However, these external clinical information requirements are very 
dependent on the type of relationship each hospice has with their local 
commissioners. In three cases, there is a constructive, interactive 
relationship, with information requirements being determined by 
negotiation to suit both sides of the partnership. In the case of Barton, the 
care director speaks of the evolution of information over several years. ‘It 
is better to tell them what we do or else they will be in control of your 
destiny. So the report we have, has been shaped over several years’ (Care, 
Barton).  She describes it as giving the Commissioners a ‘subliminal’ 
message. ‘Look we know what we are doing, we will report to you but you 




do not need to instruct us to do anything different.’  The Barton trustee 
believes the hospice management would produce the information 
regardless of what the CQC might request and saw these reports to the 
NHS as ‘an opportunity to demonstrate that they are meeting their 
standards anyway’ (Trustee, Barton). At Cavell, the CEO is anticipating a 
‘more of a negotiated process’ with their NHS commissioners who want 
them ‘to demonstrate our good performance rather than tick a box around 
something that is more to do with hospitals than hospices.’ At the time of 
the interview, the care director was very critical of the information 
requested by the Commissioners as it did not reflect the issues facing the 
hospice, as it was determined by standard NHS information more 
appropriate for acute hospitals. Guinness provides details of quality 
improvement projects that they were doing anyway: ‘It’s an already 
existing piece of work that we were going to develop. Because we’re always 
developing and doing innovative practice. Rather than make one up, we’ll 
use an existing one’ (Care, Guinness). 
While some hospices have influence over the information provided, 
at Guinness, the demands of the commissioners are much more exacting: 
‘For me the driver is external ‘ (Business). It is dealing with information 
requests from over 20 different commissioners, few of which are 
standardised while the board are also requiring a different style of clinical 
information. The business director is aware of her limited bargaining power 
and consequently feels that the pressures to provided performance 
information are external. ‘One problem I have is that, as a charitable 
organisation, when it comes to negotiating with CCGs, I don’t have any real 
consequences.’  She says it relies on their moral responsibility and the fact 
that they do not want a scandal. 
In contrast, there is less pressure to provide performance 
information to non-NHS donors.  The Accountant at Barton explains that 
philanthropic givers ‘tend not to make any demands on us’ although he 
goes onto explain that donors require more information when the hospice 




re-applies for funding rather than regular monthly reporting. Three cases 
made similar observations: that community donors/philanthropic givers do 
not ask for information but that does not reduce the need to provide 
information. The business director at Nightingale speaks of the 
Communications Strategy to engage people in a more interesting way 
bringing the hospice to life, through patient stories. ‘There isn’t a demand 
per se from, shall we say the donor community for information, but if we 
want to maximise our effectiveness there. Then, I think we have to be 
proactive in giving them the information’ (Trustee, Guinness). The finance 
director at Barton adds that they need to anticipate the need for 
information as philanthropic givers are reluctant to ask as you don’t kick a 
hospice do you?’ 
Undoubtedly, there are both internal and external pressures driving 
performance measurement information but in four cases, both clinical and 
financial information is primarily driven internally (see Table 6.3). The 
senior management team rather than the board are the more proactive in 
determining information requirements. In the fourth case, Guinness, there 
was tension between internal and external drivers, ‘a combination of both’ 
(Finance) and the board are proactive in demanding information. The 
trustee at Guinness describes it as ‘a number of pushes from different 
sources.’ 
‘It (drivers of information) varies:  clinical CCG, healthcare 
governance. I think the fact that we have a board of trustees means 
that we need to have an AGM, we need to engage in the 
community. So there are external factors, and then there's the 
usual internal mechanisms which I think replicate or are certainly 
getting towards replicating the normal protocol within any 
business’ (Business, Nightingale). 
There is clearly some evidence of the levels of funding influencing 
the drivers of performance information, at least for NHS funding. (This will 




be discussed further in Chapter 8). At Cavell, the care director ‘pays lip 
service’ to the ‘tiny bit of money’, compared to the business director at 
Guinness feeling the external pressures. While Guinness was unlike the 
other cases in facing demands for non-standardised information from 
many NHS funders, this is more typical of charities as a whole. Hospices are 
not beset with requests for different types of information from their non-
NHS funders and all, except Guinness, were dealing with a limited numbers 
of commissioning bodies who were open to discussion on what is 
appropriate information. 
   
6.4.3 Broader and indirect external factors 
From the cases studied, there would appear to be strong but 
influential indirect factors, driving the need for performance information. A 
change of key personnel, particularly of the CEO, results in new strategies, 
communications and ultimately reporting needs. ‘When I came here two 
years ago, it's fair to say that there was quite an extensive programme of 
change that was needed’ (CEO, Nightingale). The impact of this change is 
commented on by three colleagues and the trustee. According to the 
business director, ‘it’s been a total acceleration of thinking’ since the new 
CEO was appointed. ‘What I've seen is a shift in positive energy.’ He 
concludes that ‘I do think the leadership thing is an intrinsic part of that 
driver of performance measurement’ (Business, Nightingale). A change of 
CEO resulted in ‘professionalising the organisation, bringing in a strong 
senior management team who work together to achieve what we've set out 
to do’ (Busines, Nightingale). There have been similar process of change at 
Seacole, Cavell and Guinness although not as recently as at Nightingale. At 
Barton, the CEO credits the achievements of the previous sixteen years to 
the vision of his predecessor.  
A change of personnel on the board brings new drivers, requesting 
different performance information.  ‘I think the trustees have cranked it up 




a bit’ (Care, Guinness) since new trustees were appointed. The 
appointment of new board members with more commercial backgrounds 
is also indirectly influencing the demand for more information.   ‘We’ve got 
a different team on the board and they’re pretty much business commercial 
and they’ve got a very different perspective of what they want to see’ 
(Care, Guinness). She goes onto to explain that the board are asking for 
more information on the growth in numbers of patients, in contrast to the 
commissioners who are looking for information on quality. At Barton, the 
board are becoming more proactive; a change which is attributed by the 
CEO to the Charity Commission expecting more of trustees. On the other 
hand at Nightingale, they exert less pressure of change: ’I think they're 
quite capable as individuals but they come perhaps from a different era and 
we do need to evolve that situation’(Finance, Nightingale). 
While the majority of respondents explicitly assert that the demand 
for performance measurement information is internally driven, some 
acknowledge implicit and indirect pressures which influence the need for 
more information. The trustee at Seacole commented on the ‘bean counter 
society’ and his CEO sees increasing competition from the public sector. 
The external health environment is ‘a changing landscape’ (Business, 
Nightingale) with ‘the increasing demand for our services for end-of-life 
care is a big hot topic at the moment’ (Trustee, Nightingale). This brings 
new pressures for reporting, particularly from the NHS commissioners. ‘I 
think the CCG are finding their feet and making sense of it’ business 
director, Nightingale). The business director sees hospices responding in 
different ways: ‘good hospices will be able to fight their corner better than 
those that are not forearmed and forewarned.’ It is clearly linked to having 
good information: ‘those people who understand those parts of information 
begin to see the way forward quicker.’ The business director at Guinness 
anticipated that the commissioners will be making more demands: ‘the 
financial pressures are on and they are looking at that information much 
more closely.’ She also commented that hospices are indirectly affected by 




the political pressures under which the NHS is operating, citing the possible 
introduction of personal budgets.    
At both Guinness and Nightingale, they acknowledge that they are 
operating in a more competitive environment. ‘Increased competition has 
definitely been a factor. I mean I think people always like to love their local 
hospice but I think that has changed’ (Business, Nightingale).  Increasing 
financial pressures bring contrasting influences on the drive for more 
information. On the one hand, the finance director at Guinness identifies 
not only the direct demand for information from the commissioners but 
also the indirect pressures from their financial position: ‘Without doubt the 
care team do need to produce somehow a great mountain of activity 
information for the commissioners on a quarterly basis very often, so it is 
part of that. Then you’ve got me coming along trying to identify the 
numbers to manage the business…We really do need to understand these 
things because I don’t think our world is that certain financially’ (Finance, 
Guinness).  Limited financial resources, combined with a challenging 
strategy, result in the need for more information.  The trustee at Guinness 
explains how as a hospice they hold lower reserves than their counterparts 
but they also have an ambitious growth strategy. ‘So we are driven by the 
need to increase and improve our performance reporting and monitoring 
because we were looking to make challenging advances, so the 
circumstances do dictate.’ On the other hand, the business director at 
Guinness explains how the lack of resources limits the information that can 
be produced:  
    ‘And it (reporting against outcomes) will be driven by the NHS and 
then disseminated out through commissioning structures and I 
think that’s going to be the way it’s going to go…I think that’s 
going to be the way. I’d love to be the leader. I’d love to be the 
one who’s there but we have to accept we’re a charitable 
organisation. There’s no money to do risky important pieces of 
work’ (Business, Guinness).   




6.4.4 Internal drivers responding to outside pressures 
It would seem from the interviewees that they consider drivers of 
performance measurement information to be predominantly internal. 
There is a different emphasis put on which of the board or senior 
management team are most influential although four case hospices would 
credit the senior managers as primary drivers of information. However, 
internal stakeholders are responding to external pressures, rather than to 
demands from regulators. These include the changing political landscape, 
increasing competition and the financial uncertainties that hospices face. A 
change of personnel – both senior managers and on the board, is 
predominantly the catalyst of change. 
Table 6.3: Drives of performance information requirements 
 Predominantly 
internal  

































Source: author’s findings from case analysis 
6.5 For what purposes is hospice performance information used? 




‘That’s a bit difficult because I can see how we use it for all of those 
things (purposes) actually’ (Trustee, Nightingale). 
Interviewees were asked for what purposes is performance 
information used. As discussed in Chapter 2, accounting literature provides 
a framework for the purposes of performance measurement information. 
Henri‘s (2006) analysis of prior literature identifies four categories: as well 
as legitimizing and monitoring, he argues that it contributes to attention-
focusing and strategic decision-making. In chapter 3, these are compared 
to organisational effectiveness, discussed in the voluntary sector literature. 
Information can be used to monitor performance against plan and justify 
how financial resources have been spent to an external audience, 
legitimising management actions. By reviewing management information, 
problems can be identified and decisions can be made about resource 
allocations. These four categories were used to ask interviewees about the 
purposes of performance measurement information and findings are 
shown in Table 6.4. Interviewees could choose whether to apply it to their 
specific area or respond generally about how information was used within 
their hospice. All interviewees were asked which of the four categories, 
defined by Henri, was the most important use of performance 
measurement information in their hospice. Each category was explained 
more fully, particularly attention-focusing – which was also explained as 
problem-identification.  There was more clarification of this category 
following the first case study, where this had been used as attention-
focusing, expressed in its outward role of communicating with the donors. 
In the following cases, it was broadened to attention-focusing including any 
kind of problem-identification. Strategic decision-making was abbreviated 
to simply decision-making. Legitimation was also described in terms of 
accountability.  Monitoring was the easiest to understand without further 
explanation. Interviewees were also asked whether performance 
information was designed to ‘prove’ to external stakeholders the good 
performance of the hospice or was used to ‘improve’ their internal 




operations. This was drawn from charity literature theory, particularly work 
carried out by the NPC (Pritchard, et al., 2012). 
 Of all the protocol questions, these produced the least insightful 
responses, partly as it was asked as a directed (closed) question toward the 
end of the interviews.  An ambiguous picture emerges with the majority of 
respondents struggling to answer the question about the four purposes of 
performance measurement information directly, even after the categories 
had been explained in more detail. Eight of the twenty-five respondents 
reply with ‘all four,’ notably four of the CEOs interviewed. The CEO at 
Barton suggests that they are all there, arguing that they need to prove 
what they are doing to the commissioners, they use information to 
extrapolate what services they should be providing in the future, and they 
use the stories from the TAR to demonstrate their needs to potential 
donors. 
Nine (in addition to the previous eight) make reference to 
performance measurement information being used for monitoring and is 
the most commonly identified category. With one exception, all Finance 
and Care personnel interviewed include monitoring.  The care director at 
Barton suggests that achieving standards is her priority.  No-one makes 
specific reference to attention-focusing as the only category. Two others   
identify it as the one category that they do not recognise in what they are 
doing.  They both independently imply that attention-focusing comes at a 
later stage of organisational development. This hospice, Nightingale, has 
recently undergone major personnel changes, with all senior managers 
except for the business director being a relatively recent appointment. This 
could therefore reflect the state of development of a particular hospice.  
Decision-making also has mixed responses with seventeen saying 
specifically that performance information is used for decision-making. 
However, three identify it as the one category that is not applicable to their 
hospice. All directors at Nightingale and Seacole identify decision-making 




with citing its importance, given the financial instability that they faced at 
Seacole. On the other hand, the Accountant at Barton chose all except 
decision-making (ie monitoring, legitimation, and attention-focusing) on 
the basis that decision-making would require adhoc information outside 
the regular reporting. Only one respondent cites legitimation as the only 
important category of the four purposes of performance measurement 
information.   
There is coherence across the roles which interviewees hold: all but 
one of the CEOs say all categories are important; all but one finance 
personnel choose monitoring.  Similarly, decision-making is unambiguously 
identified by two trustees, with another trustee saying all four are 
important. Responses may reflect the particular experience of an 
individual. The care director at Cavell was a relatively recent appointment 
and sees her role as challenging the status quo so prioritised problem-
identification (attention-focusing). In contrast, the business director at 
Nightingale was long-established in his particular retail role so recognises 














Table 6.4: Purposes of performance measurement information 
Source: author’s findings from case analysis 
Many respondents imply that the four categories are overly 
simplistic and then struggle to make clear choices: ‘Oh! This is hard!’ 
(Business, Cavell). The finance director at Cavell describes it as a sequence, 
although others suggest different orders in which you might use the 
information. Her trustee endorses this view:   Monitoring's first because if 
you haven't got that, the others don't flow. But you must have that in order 
to … Whichever way you look at it, it's all of them’. (Trustee, Cavell). One 
describes the categories as ‘feeding off each other’. I mean I could say that, 
they all feed each other, don't they? But you have to start somewhere, 
don't you I suppose. …There's no point in monitoring something … you can't 
monitor something that you haven't identified I suppose is what I was 
thinking’ (CEO, Nightingale). 































































Total 17 17 11 13 




Respondents were also asked to say whether performance 
measurement information was being used to ‘prove’ to external 
stakeholders what they had achieved. This was contrasted to using this 
information to ‘improve’ their internal operations. Respondents are mostly 
much clearer in their responses and much in favour of using information to 
improve how they managed the hospice with only two choosing the ‘prove’ 
category outright. Most acknowledge that there is a balance between the 
two. This is consistent with the findings of the previous section (6.4), where 
the majority suggested that information was driven by the needs of 
internal rather than external considerations. At Nightingale, the CEO 
suggests that they have to prove first what they are doing but could then 
move onto improving their internal operations. This is consistent with her 
detailed description of their strategic process earlier in the interview. 
Moreover, hospices produce a very different response to that of the NPC 
(Pritchard, et al., 2012) survey of 1,000 charities which concluded that only  
5% saw performance measurement information being used to improve or 
demonstrate their performance.  
‘I think it’s a mixture of both (prove versus improve) to be honest. 
We can use it as managers and trustees to improve, but I think to 
the public we use it to demonstrate our worth’ (Finance, Cavell). 
It is clear that information is being used in many ways for different 
purposes. To some extent, it is artificial to separate out the four purposes 
identified by Henri. However, most respondents are concerned with 
improving their operations rather than proving to the outside world what 









 As is expected from the voluntary sector literature, good 
performance in a hospice is difficult to determine. The NPC research 
suggests a good death as the overriding outcome but this is only cited by 
two of the interviewees and presents some immediate problems for 
performance measurement. The Trustee at Seacole commented: ’You could 
say we had 100% death rate and everyone was happy that they died?’ 
More interviewees express it in terms of patient and family experience; but 
as a CEO added ‘How can you measure someone’s experience when they 
are dying. For goodness sake, none of us are experts at it and when we are, 
we’re not here to tell the tale.’ This is taking an extreme example, but 
illustrates how hospices and at least some other voluntary sector 
organisations face problems in measuring their ultimate outcomes.  Many 
interviewees comment on how difficult it is to measure success, even when 
it not the perspective of the dying patient. 
‘The success is a very difficult thing to put forward. There‘s facts and 
figures that we see so many patients, so many beds are filled…but 
there is an unknown side. How do you measure the bereavement of 
a family, how do you measure how they coped with it, what is the 
success of the hospice in allowing them to cope with that?’ (Trustee, 
Seacole). 
The voluntary sector literature neatly defines outputs and 
outcomes but such distinctions are not observed in practice. In particular, 
the quality of life (an outcome) is easily muddled with the quality of service 
(an output).  This analysis shows how perceptions of performance delivery 
can vary depending on the role and concerns of the respondent.  
Predominantly, business directors are concerned with relationships and 
finance directors with processes. Whereas the interviewees’ functional role 
influences their approach to service delivery, it is the context of the case 
that determines what they perceive to be the drivers of performance 




information.  The recent appointment of a CEO and/or senior management 
team makes a significant impact. Broader societal changes, such as within 
the health economy, underlie this. While this analysis suggests that fine-
tuning distinctions between the purposes and uses of performance 
measurement information is not meaningful, there is an overwhelming 
conclusion that they produce information to improve rather than to prove 
to external stakeholders how well they have done.  This is not typical of the 
majority of UK large charities (Pritchard, et al., 2012).  
If outcomes are intangible and contested, if outputs overlap with 
outcomes and some outcomes are outside the control of the organisation, 
then effective and comprehensive performance measurement is likely to 
be problematic.  Chapter 7 examines what performance measures are 
reported internally and externally by the case hospices and whether they 
are aligned and integrated with the outcomes and outputs, identified by 
the interviewees here.  
  




Chapter 7: Hospice performance measures and measurement 
systems   
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 considers what good performance in a hospice looks like, 
how it is best delivered and the drivers and purposes of performance 
management information. This chapter addresses what actual measures 
are reported both internally and externally across the five case hospices.  It 
seeks to answer the third sub-question of the research - how is hospice 
performance measured; a key question identified by Connolly et al. (2015) 
in their call for field studies and a core question within Ferreira and Otley’s 
(2009) PMCS. It demonstrates how the diagnostic lever of control operates, 
described by Simons (1995, p. 59)as the ‘feedback systems which are the 
backbone of traditional management control.’ They ‘monitor 
organisational outcomes and correct deviations from pre-set standards of 
performance’ (Simons, 1995, p. 59).  
This chapter analyses the type of performance measures used by 
the five hospices to monitor the inputs, outputs and outcomes, by 
employing the voluntary sector ‘logic model’ as a framework, discussed in 
Chapter 3. This enables a discussion about how the hospices measure their 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Following the analysis of the SIRs and TARs in 
Chapter 5, an alternative method of reporting hospice effectiveness is 
proposed: how they align their performance measures to their strategies. 
This one of the three criteria for successful performance measurement 
systems identified from management accounting literature in Chapter 2, 
with the other two being  diversity and integration.  All three criteria are 
used to analyse the PMSs of the case hospices, enabling a discussion of 
whether the case hospices are operating mechanistic or organic control 
(Burns and Stalker, 1994) and transactional or communicative rationality 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009). 
 





 This chapter compares what is considered to be good performance 
and its delivery in Chapter 6 to what is actually measured. This reveals gaps 
in the performance measurement systems used by hospices. It 
demonstrates the limitations of applying the generic PMCS (Ferreira & 
Otley, 2009)  to the voluntary sector and makes suggestions how this could 
be modified. Moreover, it argues that performance is assessed in other 
ways. As well as using the formal reporting of performance measures, 
informal judgement is used to ‘diagnose’ or understand performance.  
 
7.2 Performance measures 
7.2.1 Inputs 
Formal inputs are controlled primarily through hospice accounting 
systems. The largest input into running a hospice is the staff team, making 
up about 70% of the cost base, varying from 61% to 73% across the five 
hospices.  Other significant costs are the patient-related costs, shops, fund-
raising, property and depreciation. These costs are controlled by 
department through budgets and monthly management accounts in all 
case hospices. Departments are categorised by either the service provided 
(eg in-patient unit, hospice-at-home, chaplaincy), by commercial area 
(retail, fundraising, lottery) or supporting function (eg finance, catering).  A 
typical set of monthly management accounts reports actuals against 
budget for the month and year-to-date. Cavell, Nightingale and Guinness 
also compare financial performance to the full-year budget; Cavell and 
Seacole report against the previous year-to-date financial figures. Guinness 
reports against a monthly forecast and compares the total year forecast to 
the budget. Full management accounts are circulated monthly to the senior 
management team and heads of department. Trustees with particular 
responsibilities for the financial management of the hospice (such as those 
on the Finance and General Purposes Board subcommittee or its 




equivalent) also receive monthly financial information. All boards receive a 
quarterly summary with the income and expenditure, with four getting a 
balance sheet and cash flow. Updated forecasts are also provided to the 
board in at least three cases. Management accounts are accompanied by a 
commentary, albeit this was under development in one case. A trustee 
who had come from a senior financial role in the NHS commented on the 
detailed level of these accounts and the high quality of the narrative that 
accompanied them. Others present it as clearly as possible, with one using 
cloud symbols to demonstrate good and bad news. 
‘I just do a very simple commentary (for the board) down the 
bottom there as well. I just believe in keeping things straightforward 
because I've found that people with the best will in the world, they 
don't understand the figures side of things…I'm not hiding anything, 
I just want to keep things simple and give that message.  (Financial, 
Nightingale) 
Not all inputs are controlled by accounting systems. ‘I think there is 
an area where it is difficult to measure which is our volunteer side’ 
(Business, Barton). This significant input is not often recorded in the 
Statement of Financial Activities (SOFA) or the management accounts. 
Another significant input is also unrecorded in the SOFA in three of the five 
hospices – donated goods. There are a number of non-financial reporting 
mechanisms to monitor staff and volunteer inputs. Barton and Seacole 
report staff absence and turnover. Nightingale reports on vacancies and 
equality. Guinness and Nightingale record staff training and employee 
numbers.  All hospices use individual annual appraisals to assess staff 
performance. Staff surveys are used to obtain regular feedback on how 
satisfied they are with their working environment in all cases. Volunteers 
are reported internally in a variety of ways with Barton providing an 
extensive analysis, with a detailed analysis of volunteer numbers by job 
category, hours undertaken and implied value. Other hospices do not 
analyse this in as much detail, although all hospices report volunteer 




numbers in external documents.  Internally, four hospices report some kind 
of measure on volunteers, even if it is a different set of measures in each 
case. Guinness reports volunteer numbers, Nightingale measures volunteer 
turnover and Barton monitors volunteer training.  Cavell analyses the 
backgrounds of its volunteer workforce by age profile, their backgrounds, 
where they are working, what they are working on and turnover rates.  
‘The bit that’s really difficult to measure is the added-value of being 
a charity with its volunteers and all its buy-in and people… and 
that’s the bit that you can’t quantify’ (Care, Cavell). 
 
7.2.2 Outputs: clinical performance  
For every hospice studied, the performance measurement 
information reported to the board, other than the management accounts, 
mainly concerns clinical performance. As we have seen in Chapter 6, the 
CEO of Nightingale distinguishes between clinical volume and quality 
information. Volume data is activity levels relating to the provision of 
services. Externally, this is provided to statutory funders, as an annual 
Quality Account and is made available to the general public via the website 
in three cases. A Quality Report is used to update commissioners quarterly 
in two hospices. One provides extensive activity data to the commissioning 
groups on a monthly basis within each of the service areas. For example, 
the in-patient unit typically reports on the number of beds, admissions, 
discharges and deaths.  Day hospice services are measured by numbers of 
referrals, attendances and sessions provided. For Hospice-at-Home 
services, the number of referrals, visits and contacts are recorded. 
Specialist community nurses report their face-to-face and telephone 
contacts. Other services,such as lymphoedema, bereavement support and 
additional therapies, measure the numbers of patients for whom they have 
cared. The quarterly reports contain similar performance information to 




the annual Quality Account but with less narrative and more monthly 
activity levels.  
Activity information also dominates the non-financial reporting in 
the TAR in all five cases. This is consistent with the reporting of 
performance by voluntary hospices in the UK and Wales generally.  Every 
activity measure cited somewhere within the 148 hospices is reported by 
at least one of the five hospices studied. These are usually reported as 
absolute activity numbers with no year-on-year comparisons or targets, 
both in the TAR and the other communications to the general public, such 
as newsletters and Annual Reviews. Even in the one example of an impact 
report, the quantitative measures are predominantly activity information.  
Typical output measures include numbers of patients and families, bed 
days, referrals, treatments, respite breaks, deaths/discharges, contacts 
(including telephone calls and chaplaincy conversations). 
Internal clinical reporting is also largely activity or output measures. 
At Barton, of the 67 KPIs on their monthly dashboard, 45 are clinical 
activity/output measures. These are compared to targets set by month and 
year-to-date and to an annual target. Senior managers are given clear 
responsibility for meeting these.  A further 8 measures also come under 
the responsibility of the care director.  All other hospices report on activity 
levels, in terms of volumes, in some form. At Cavell, activity data (eg 
patients, referrals, discharges, deaths, visits, telephone calls) given to the 
three local commissioners (CCGs) is presented by month by service to the 
board.  
Hospices are expected to report quarterly on clinical quality (as 
opposed to volume of activity) measures such as the management of 
pressure ulcers, slips, trips and falls, medicine management, infection 
control, complaints and compliments, any clinical incidents and 
safeguarding of children. Typically, trustees get the same information as 
the commissioners’ annual quality accounts and quarterly quality reports 




whereas a clinical board sub-committee (made up of trustees with 
particular clinical responsibilities and senior clinical staff) will receive more 
detailed and more frequent information. For example, at Barton, the 
Hospice Services Committee, a bi-monthly meeting chaired by a governor, 
receives internal performance information from a clinical sub-committee. 
The care director at Cavell is critical of the information required by the 
commissioners as it is made up of standard NHS hospital measures, many 
not applicable to a hospice. Meeting CQC standards can also be considered 
a quality measure. In two cases, the most recent CCG inspection report was 
posted on the hospice website. Guinness also differentiates between on-
going quality standards and strategically chosen Quality Performance 
Indicators (QPIs). It has also identified 38 clinical measures which are 
reported to the Care Governance Group and Care Assurance committee. 
These are grouped under five clinical objectives of ensuring services are 
responsive, caring, well-led, effective and safe.  This comprehensive set of 
measures has a variety of reporting mechanisms: narrative reports, 
outcome databases, exception reporting, audits and activity numbers. They 
have designed 44 quality performance indicators with targets against 
which they will report on in the future to the CCGs.  
 
7.2.3 Outputs: commercial performance 
Given their dependency on sources of income other than from 
public sector bodies, reporting of their commercial activity is vital to the 
hospices’ financial sustainability. All case hospices operate shops with 
separate statutory reporting for their trading companies. These funds, 
together with that generated through running lotteries, are consolidated 
into group accounts and provide financial performance information 
externally. A few TARs make reference to the numbers of shops but there 
is little additional non-financial external information. Internal reporting of 
commercial activities typically includes a range of retail output measures 
such as daily or weekly sales, average prices, shop margins and 




profitability, footfall, giftaid %, proportions of donated goods and sales by 
product category. Two hospices operate EPOS (electronic-point-of-sale) 
systems, giving them comparable information to a high street shop, 
whereas at one, the director responsible commented on relying on shop 
staff to provide feedback on customer numbers and feedback. Control here 
is maintained through detailed budgetary control, with sales targets by 
shop, and even by shop by day at one hospice.  
Fundraising performance is also monitored by means of comparing 
financial performance against the budget, typically by income stream, such 
as events, individual and corporate donations, lotteries, trusts and grants. 
Every income stream is then broken down to provide targets for every 
fundraising event. Some case hospices operate a donor or customer 
relationship database, from which adhoc information can be extracted to 
analyse patterns of donors giving. Non-financial measures include how 
many donors have been converted to other forms of giving. For example, 
this might analyse the number of people that have attended a particular 
event, and how many people have been converted to do more than one 
thing, or become a regular supporter, or have been offered other 
‘products’. Other examples include mapping donations from one event to 
another to find differences in participation. One hospice looks at ‘recency, 
frequency, and monetary value’, looking at patterns of individual giving. 
They can analyse geographical areas by demographic make-up, allowing 
them to target areas that have been historically underrepresented. 
Information can be acquired to analyse the potential donors through 
wealth profiling. 
 
7.2.4 Outcomes: patient satisfaction 
‘I have a view that the patient outcome or the patient’s experience, 
is whether or not they were treated in a way they should have been 
treated medically, clinically. And also their experience of the whole 




thing: Were they told where to go at the right place? How did they 
speak to them? Were they able to get the food they wanted? All of 
that whole treatment of the whole healthcare’ (Trustee, 
Nightingale). 
As we have seen in Chapter 6, the NPC considers the hospices’ 
overriding outcome to be achieving ‘a good death’, suggesting three 
outcomes that contribute to this. The first is ‘quality of life’; a view 
endorsed overwhelmingly by interviewees from all hospices. As patient 
experience is considered central to good performance, all hospices report 
patient satisfaction in some way. ‘When you start to hear and understand 
the patient stories…for me that’s the key indicator’ (Care, Barton). At 
Barton, formal patient feedback is collected through patient evaluations 
and focus groups. Cavell and Nightingale have patient satisfaction surveys. 
At Nightingale and Seacole, there are suggestion boxes for compliments 
and improvements. Despite being inundated by compliments, ’you've got 
to be able to dig deeper...there are always areas for improvement’ (CEO, 
Nightingale). Guinness provides extensive qualitative feedback from 
patients and their families in their quarterly reporting and their families by 
each of their five services areas, with actions taken to improve their 
performance. One has appointed ‘patient ambassadors’, who have input 
into hospice developments. For example, they attended meetings, pilot 
new services and give advice on questionnaire design. A business director 
comments that trusts are increasingly looking for the reporting of 
outcomes. ‘They are looking for the comments that are received and 
evaluation forms. We use a lot of comments based on the evidence’ 
(Fundraising, Barton). Her colleague at Nightingale also uses feedback 








7.2.5 Outcomes: clinical performance 
While patient and family experiences are extensively monitored by 
all hospices, few other outcomes are measured. Only two hospices use the 
term ‘outcome’ as an explicit part of its reporting aspirations.  The business 
director at Guinness explains why more information is needed, above and 
beyond outputs or even patient satisfaction. ‘We’ve made so many visits to 
so many people (but) that doesn’t tell me anything that I can sell. I need to 
say what happened during that visit, what difference that made to the 
family. And, again, that’s the kind of thing that doesn’t really come across 
in a KPI. Those are, again, outcomes’ (Business, Guinness). Her colleague 
explains that they aspire to describing social value, hoping to put numbers 
on interventions, giving examples such as supporting a family member 
‘going through a very tough time, stopped her going off to the GP, stopped 
her being referred to mental health services’ (Finance, Guinness). In 
contrast, the trustee at Cavell comments: ‘I'm really struggling with 
outcomes. They're all a bit subjective…we've helped them die.’  
 At all the hospices, the reporting of some outcomes is implicit, such 
as preferred place of death (Barton, Cavell, Nightingale) and numbers of 
non-cancer patients (Barton and Nightingale). Nightingale also reports 
acute admissions avoided. One (Barton) has analysed its referrals by 
geographical area by particular diagnosis (ie types of cancer and non-
cancer) and by patient age and gender. It also gives details of Citizen Advice 
Bureau support, including the value of benefits obtained. Guinness 
however is alone in developing an operational plan with an overt focus on 
outcomes. For each of its four goals, there are objectives linked to actions, 
milestones, inputs, output and outcome measures.  
7.3 Efficiency and effectiveness 
7.3.1 Efficiency  
If the logic model is to be followed mechanistically, efficiency 
should be measured by comparing inputs to outputs. From the cases 




studies, this is evaluated by hospices only in a few specific scenario. Return 
on investment (ROI) is calculated in relation to fundraising, comparing 
costs to income generated and by store. Occupancy is arguably a 
comparison between inputs (available beds) to outputs (beds used).  It is 
reported by four hospices and in several cases, it is considered one of the 
most important KPIs. The business director at Guinness argues that it is the 
key driver of the financial model. The CEO at Nightingale picks it out as the 
most important measure to ensure that they are serving the wider 
community’s needs, allowing as many as possible to benefit from their 
service. ‘Activity's important because I think one of the things that make 
xxx stand out. Compared to some hospices our occupancy is very, very high’ 
(CEO, Nightingale). Cavell reports efficiency-style measures to CCGs, such 
as bed-days by month and length-of-stay. Nightingale also highlights 
average time spent with patients, either face-to-face or on the telephone 
and the speed of referral. Despite these significant exceptions, efficiency as 
defined according to the logic model is conspicuous by its absence. 
Moreover, the hospices are arguably not attempting to create the most 
‘efficient’ operation. ‘As far as I am concerned, there is a red-line...I am not 
going to have the NHS turn round to me and say you have plenty of staff; 
you can reduce your staff ‘(CEO, Barton).  
‘This is quite a hard one actually because whoever you’re talking to 
would have a different view on whether we could be more cost-
effective. I think the level of staffing that we have has been 
reviewed by a specialist to ensure that we have the appropriate 
level of staffing, but I know that it’s still far more than you would 
have on a ward in a hospital’ (Finance, Cavell).  
 
Notably, hospices have struggled to create a meaningful cost per 
unit of activity, such as cost per bed or per patient per service. Several 
acknowledge such information would be very helpful, (despite the 
comment by the trustee at Guinness below). Such information is seen to be 




useful by those negotiating with commissioners and fundraising staff 
communicating the hospices’ needs. 
‘So one of our challenges that we’re still trying to resolve is, should 
we try to establish a unit of output? I don’t think there’s a huge lot 
of desire to go down that route, but it’s trying to get something that 
enables you to assess performance from one period to another. And 
it’s hugely difficult and in terms of that, it’s reflected in our 
negotiations with the commissioning groups as to how much they 
should be giving us for the service we provide, and how do you 
measure that service, and therefore what should it cost, how much 
does it cost per bed night to support a (patient) and what do you 
put into that?’ (Trustee, Guinness). 
At Barton, they are yet to develop it beyond a simple ‘layman’s calculation’, 
albeit with full cost recovery but are hopeful that the recent appointment 
of an accountant will help.  ‘Now we have a lead accountant, we are now 
looking at unit costs and a kind of pricing matrix...I would like to get some 
kind of cost/activity matrix, which is really powerful for the staff as well in 
terms of understanding how much a  typical visit costs’ (Care, Barton).  The 
business director anticipates such information could affect the length of 
stay of patients as no time limit is currently imposed. 
At two hospices, costing information has been generated to help 
their fundraising teams. Nightingale has calculated several examples of 
hospice costs but this is for marketing, rather than financial control 
purposes. For example, what level of donation used to show how much is 
needed to pay for a book for a bereaved child, a syringe driver, an in-
patient stay or a therapist for a year.  Nevertheless, the finance director 
describes the costing as ‘primitive’ and ‘basic’; the business director as 
‘naïve’. His trustee says: 
 ‘I want to know how much it costs to run a bed here. I want to 
know how much it costs for somebody to come and visit the day-




case unit. I want to know how much it costs for specialist palliative 
care, first visit and follow-up. I want to know how much it costs for 
the hospice-at-home service. I’m not quite sure what currency you 
would use for that but how much does it cost for counselling? It is 
going to be a difficult exercise to do but we need to do something’ 
(Trustee, Nightingale). 
At Cavell, the CEO acknowledges there are no costs by activity, although 
there are cost-of-care examples used for fundraising. At Guinness, they 
acknowledge that they are struggling to find meaningful cost information. 
Costing information needs to be more than providing marketing 
information but produced on a credible activity basis. ‘When we calculate 
the cost per (patient), per bed, night or the cost of each unit of any activity, 
there is precious little of those calculations that is driven by activity 
information’ (Finance, Guinness). 
Efficiency measures have been selected by one hospice for 
particular focus, although these are not calculated as the ratio of inputs to 
outputs, defined in the logic model. Nightingale has a scorecard of KPIs 
which is balanced between clinical services and other areas of the 
operation (retail, fundraising, HR, finance and governance).  Only 5 of the 
22 key measures are clinical and all are targeted on efficiency. Clinical 
measures include bed occupancy, average length of stay and speed of 
response to referral times. They also match the key performance indicators 
reported to the commissioners quarterly.  Other perspectives on their 
scorecard are also efficiency-style measures. Retail measures include profit 
per square foot; fundraising has average donation per respondent; finance 
has required resources against reserves. HR reports sickness, volunteer 
turnover and vacancies and they even measure attendance of trustees at 
board meetings. All measures are RAG (Red, Amber, Green) rated, 
measured by quarter with brief narrative explanations. 
 





If the logic model is to be used to assess effectiveness, outputs 
should be compared with outcomes. Guinness is the only example amongst 
the case studies to attempt to do this. Outcomes are measured indirectly 
through output measures. For example, the first goal is ‘expanding and 
improving care services’ with objectives of training and recruiting care 
teams, providing outreach services and building partnerships. Measures 
include recruitment undertaken, speed of clinical response, increased 
numbers of patients supported and improved service delivery.  
 Hospices were asked how they ensure that they are cost-effective, 
given the priority given to this in the King’s College report (Hughes-Hallet, 
et al., 2011). Responses would suggest that it depends on which 
stakeholder’s perspective is taken.  Several respondents consider this from 
the commissioners’ point of view. If they are getting a service for 30 to 40% 
of its cost, and if they pay less to the hospice than having a patient in a 
hospital bed, it is clearly cost-efficient for them. One commented that the 
commissioners should be exercising their judgement and take a view on 
how cost-effective the service is based on their experience.  
  ‘There couldn't be better value for money than that: 60 per cent of 
it is paid by somebody else!’ (CEO, Nightingale). 
  ‘We’re saying do it with us, because we’re set up with charitable 
funding that will enable us to provide it for you, and we’re only 
looking for a third of the cost, rather than 100% of it’ (Trustee, 
Guinness). 
 ‘It is a conundrum isn’t it? It depends what you are measuring 
against. If you are measuring against a hospital environment so 
you know what does it cost to a have patient in a bed in a hospital 
for 24 hours compared with a patient in a hospice, and they have 




tariffs to do that in other health provision. But then you know 
what actually is good value?’ (CEO,Cavell). 
 
Alternatively, it can be seen from an internal perspective, with the 
board and senior management team considering whether the hospice is 
getting the best value from its resources. Respondents cite the significant 
contribution made by volunteers. As we have seen, several hospices report 
the implied value of the hours offered by volunteers.  
‘They (commissioners) get a very good deal from the hospice...with      
£xm volunteer value’ (Care, Barton).‘Of course our volunteers are an 
absolutely critical resource … If I tell you that last year nearly £0.xx 
million was saved through volunteers in the hospices alone. It's a 
staggering figure’ (CEO, Guinness). 
 ‘I think our value for money is primarily centred around the 
additional service that is offered through our volunteers. We’ve 
got some phenomenal volunteers. I mean, if you’re looking at 
retail, we’ve got, what, 1x00 volunteers that support the shops, 
the work we do. We’ve got over x00 volunteers across care’ (Care, 
Guinness). 
It can also be achieved through effective processes, such as working 
patterns and procurement. At Guinness, they have been considering 
whether non-specialist aspects of the nursing jobs (such as washing-up or 
ironing) could be carried out by less well-qualified staff or volunteers.  
‘We are prepared to work across the organisation to reduce 
procurement spend. So we shouldn’t be buying retail, we should be 
buying wholesale – it means joining up and having one contract 
covering a number of things’ (Finance, Guinness). 




‘The process is obviously important, the efficiency of that process is 
important. We're currently reviewing all our income processes and 
making sure that they are efficient’ (Finance, Nightingale). 
Despite the lack of costing, some accounting practices are being 
encouraged such as cost-benefit justifications for projects at Nightingale 
and post-implementation reviews at Cavell. The finance director at Cavell 
argues that staff are the most likely to know where costs can be saved, a 
view consistent with continuous improvement philosophies such as TQM. 
‘I don’t have all the answers, so those people that work in those 
areas are the best people to know where they could improve their 
service or they could reduce their costs’ (Finance, Cavell). 
Hospices use benchmarking processes, albeit in very different ways. 
‘I need a benchmark in order to try and understand what cost-effectiveness 
is’ (Finance, Barton), a view supported by the trustee at Guinness. In 
response to the question of how cost-effectiveness can be measured, he 
replied: 
 ‘As an absolute, no; as comparables, are you improving your cost-
effectiveness year-on-year and how does your cost-effectiveness 
compare within your own organisation and against other 
hospices, and we do have some sharing of key measures across 
several other hospices. So that would be not an absolute measure, 
but certainly a comparable measure that I think helps’ (Trustee, 
Guinness). 
‘So I think hospices could be guilty of just saying, ‘We’re 
wonderful,’ with no external references’ (Care, Cavell). 
At Nightingale, they have benchmarked themselves against regional 
hospices with the finance director attending a local hospices group. 
Guinness has also used a national KPMG survey on health issues more 
generally. Where several hospices operate within one charity, internal 




comparisons can be drawn but respondents are keen to point out this has 
to be done carefully due to the different services offered by each hospice.  
At Seacole, the commissioners are attempting to make comparisons with a 
local competitor hospice. CEOs also talk to their counterparts at other 
hospices to make informal comparisons. At Cavell, they use third sector 
data to benchmark their performance against national fundraising 
measures. At Barton, they are hoping to share data on retail operations 
with a regional group. This is not without its problems: a care director said 
hospices were reluctant to share data. 
‘The trouble is you're measuring apples and pears. I mean we 
know it doesn't really say a lot but we have showed that to our 
commissioners and we do talk to them about benchmarking and 
work that we'd like to get involved in more with Hospice UK as it 
evolves around benchmarking and outcomes’ (CEO, Nightingale). 
‘At best, you're going to look at it and explain away why you're 
different’ (Trustee, Cavell). 
Process changes to make improvements have to be made with 
great care to preserve the culture of the hospice.  Many staff have left the 
NHS and come to hospices due to frustrations over reforms being 
perceived to be at the detriment of a caring environment.  Many are 
concerned to maintain the holistic philosophy of hospice care. To break 
down services into cost-effective service packages risks undermining the 
fundamental approach advocated by hospices. 
   ‘It is part of the holistic service we provide. And so those measures 
remain work-in- progress as to how do we actually capture that 
without us losing sight of what we’re about. We’re not about 
generating units of output; we’re about providing care, but how 
do you actually measure that?’ (Trustee, Guinness). 




For some interviewees, cost-effectiveness is as much an attitude as 
a process. ‘I think it's definitely a bit of both’ (Finance, Nightingale).  Several 
respondents commented on the sense of responsibility among staff to 
ensure they are incurring expenditure prudently. Some commented on 
how staff are acutely aware of how long it has taken a volunteer to raise 
the money through an event, tin collection or by serving in a store. Another 
spoke of being brought up to look after money carefully.  
‘I would say that people are conscious about money, so at an 
individual level they will search around for the cheapest place they 
can buy something’ (Finance, Guinness). 
‘We are quite thrifty actually. Quite different from the NHS...We 
don’t use a lot of bank staff or agency staff because the team is so 
good at working together that they will work extra shifts. We have 
to use now and again but it is a different kind of mind set. There is 
an awareness that the money that comes in is often old ladies 
shaking a tin’ (Care, Barton). 
 
Cost-effectiveness remains ‘a very, very tricky subject in this sector’ 
(Finance, Guinness). She suggests that asking how many productive hours a 
person actually delivered requires a ‘massive, massive cultural shift for this 
organisation.’ The finance director at Barton describes the effect of 
discussing cost-effectiveness as ‘corrosive.’ There is moral pressure; he asks 
who could deprive a patient of expensive oxycodone even if the budget has 
run out. It is also culturally bound up with not being like the NHS.  
‘In part, I think…that the NHS has lost its plot in terms of what it is 
really about. It is driven by business and not necessarily focusing on 
care. That’s one thing but having said that we do need to be 
effective but the metrics need to be different’ (Care, Barton). 
 




7.4 Diverse, aligned and integrated performance measures 
 In chapter 2, three criteria for an effective performance 
management system were set out. Measures should be diverse, including 
non-financial   as well as financial measures. Measures should be aligned to 
the organisational strategy, an essential component of the Ferreira and 
Otley (2009) PMCS framework.  Measures should also be integrated, 
demonstrating causal relationships between measures, such as within a 
BSC. The reports used by the case hospices to present information to the 
board illustrate different styles of internal performance measurement 
systems, each partially meeting these criteria. 
 
7.4.1 Diversity of measures within the case hospices 
Analysis of the performance measures, set out in Appendix 9, 
clearly shows the diverse range of both financial and non-financial 
measures used by all the case hospices. Inputs are predominantly financial 
measures or costs controlled through management accounting systems, 
while outputs are activity measures, the majority of which relate to the 
clinical service provision. Barton’s dashboard of key performance indicators 
is an example of a performance measurement system that is clearly diverse 
but not aligned nor integrated with 53 of the 67 KPIs, being clinical activity 
measures.  
 
7.4.2. Alignment of measures to strategy within the case hospices 
Three case hospices do not merely report diverse measures but 
strive consciously to align performance measures to their strategy. Cavell 
has identified critical success factors, linked to their strategic themes, 
under the banner of 3Ps: patients; people; and pounds. These are 
measured in a variety of ways; for example, one CSF is concerned about 
clinical performance- the efficiency and effectiveness of access and 




availability of services.  This combines quantitative targets, such as 
occupancy, increased numbers of referrals, with action plans such as the 
recruitment of staff in targeted services. Nightingale uses a BSC format and 
is clearly working towards alignment.  Just prior to the interviews, a 
presentation of their plans for their strategic process identified strategic 
alignment as one of five key characteristics of good management 
information. They had developed a vision and mission for the hospice and 
each director had drawn up a departmental strategy for their area of 
responsibility to deliver this. A BSC of KPIs aligned to this was already in 
operation and departments were working on detailed departmental 
operation plans and key performance measures at the time of the 
interviews. However, no causal links are established between the different 
perspectives. It bears some resemblance to the non-profit scorecard set 
out by Kaplan (2001), such as including measures for donors and 
beneficiaries, as opposed to private sector customers. The scorecard 
perspectives are defined by organisational responsibility rather than the 
non–profit perspectives (mission, donor, beneficiary, finance and 
operations) suggested by Kaplan (2010).  These do not constitute a causal 
model as there is no strategy mapping nor cause-and–effect linkages.  
 
7.4.3 Integrated performance measurement systems 
One hospice, Guinness, sets out to achieve all three criteria with a 
diverse, aligned and integrated performance management system by 
including inputs, outputs, outcomes and measures. Four strategic goals 
drive the activities and objectives of the operational plan. For example, the 
goal ‘expanding and improving our care services’ has an activity called 
‘building the right capabilities’. Actions include recruitment, training, 
monitoring patient outcomes and developing impact measures.  Most 
objectives have specific outputs as actions or numbers recruited or trained, 
visits or referrals increased.  Outcomes are less clearly defined, either as 




outputs (increase in numbers), improvements to service (rather than the 
outcome of a patient) or as a ‘contribution’ to the overall goal of 
supporting more patients. They are developing a scorecard by each goal 
based on measurable inputs and outputs. They will separately report 
against 44 quality indicators as measures with defined acceptable levels of 
performance.  However, as outputs and outcomes are not used to calculate 
any measure of efficiency and effectiveness, it does not fully achieve the 
objectives of the logic model. 
Control is exercised not just by measures as both Guinness and 
Cavell include milestones in their performance reporting. Seacole uses the 
operational plan, drawn up from its strategy, to monitor actions ‘with 
deadline disciplines’ (CEO, Seacole). This is very detailed including 40 pages 
of actions, all RAG rated and reported to the board. The finance director at 
Guinness poses a fundamental question:  
‘How was that money helping us achieve our own broad objectives? 
So the number one question that tends to trot out of my mouth is, 
‘That sounds a fab idea, but how does it help us do what we set out 
to do?’ (Finance, Guinness). 
In Chapter 5, it is suggested that effectiveness may be considered by 
looking at achievements against plan. Four of the five cases hospices 
demonstrate this through their internal reporting, by aligning measures to 
strategy, measuring outputs and outcomes and reporting against narrative 
action plans. Hospices also report their achievements externally, through 
clinical and financial reports. Quality Accounts show how hospices have 
achieved their goals and what their plans are for the future.  Three 
hospices report against improvement and innovation goals agreed with the 
commissioners. As we have seen in Chapter 5, a review of the returns to 
the Charity Commission, the charities over £1m were required to report 
their achievements against objectives in the SIR upto 2014. The first phase 
of the research investigated the strategic alignment of hospices throughout 




England and Wales by looking at how well the aims, strategies, annual 
objectives and achievements are aligned in the annual SIRs. Thus, both 
internally and externally, effectiveness can be considered as whether they 
have achieved what they set out to do in the hospice’s strategy. This 
research suggests that a different interpretation of integrative reporting is 
more suitable for the voluntary sector. Rather than integrating 
performance measures within causal models, performance is reported by 
integrating words and numbers. Both milestones and numbers are 
reported by three hospices; Cavell, Guinness and Seacole. Appraisals rather 
than reward systems are used to maintain internal control in all case 
hospices. 
 
7.5 Strategic processes  
‘I find it quite uplifting, quite inspiring. I think everything we do on a day-to-
day basis is really led by the strategy’ (Business, Guinness). 
 The case hospices all follow strategic planning processes that are 
consistent with the Ferreira and Otley (2009) PMCS framework. A care 
director here describes the strategic planning process at Guinness: 
‘We have the strategy, which is, obviously, the top line – we’re 
going to invest x amount so we can increase the numbers of 
(patients) and families that are going to receive the service from 
us. Then we have the next layer down, which is our operational 
plan and some of the things that we’re going to do to be able to 
achieve that. So that would be about, you know, ‘We’re going to 
recruit three outreach nurses’, ‘We’re going to recruit volunteer 
coordinators that can actually bring in the volunteers to achieve 
the additional numbers’. And then the next stage down is more 
departmental and that was what we call our…well, it started off 
as a document with key performance indicators but we actually 
call them quality performance indicators now’ (Care, Guinness). 




Four of the five hospices set quite specific, strategic goals:  ‘picking out two 
or three key deliverables’ (CEO, Cavell).  One summarises their hospice 
strategy as  ‘people, patients, pounds’; another as ‘care, influence, 
innovation’; a third identifies their overriding objective as  looking after a 
certain number of patients by the end of the decade and the fourth has set 
out twelve strategic priorities. These goals are measurable in three cases 
and therefore can be considered equivalent to the ‘key success factors’ of 
the Ferreira and Otley framework. They are also linked to external 
accountability, reporting back in the Annual Review against what they said 
they would do. 
‘Then each year producing an annual review and part of that will be 
we said ‘we were going to do this, and this is where we're up to’. So 
either we've fully met that aim or objective or it's part way there or 
we're not going to do it now because’ (Business, Nightingale). 
 
7.5.1 Mechanistic control and transactional rationality 
 It can be argued that hospices are using mechanistic control. Burns 
and Stalker (1994) suggest this is characterised by a hierarchical authority 
with specialised functions and technical tasks, such as the clinical, 
commercial and financial roles within a hospice.  There also are elements 
of transactional control (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2009) with formal 
rationality in setting performance indicators, numerical measures and 
rational authority. There is the need for rules of behaviour, particularly for 
clinical compliance. Strategies are translated into operational plans by all 
hospices, in a manner consistent with the Ferreria-Otley framework 
‘Whenever we’re setting an organisational strategy, it always has to link 
back to the vision’ (Business, Cavell). Interviewees refer to separate 
departmental strategies (such as fund-raising, retail, clinical, 
communications, estates). One commented on how they were working to 
improve the links between the clinical governance strategy and the overall 




hospice strategy as ‘they didn’t marry and…should be interdependent’ 
(Care, Cavell).    At the largest hospice, the organisational structure includes 
strategy implementation groups. The ‘top line’ strategy, determined by the 
Strategic Development Group, drives the operational plan with specific 
actions for middle management which is then broken down into 
departmental objectives.  The strategy implementation groups also 
feedback to senior management so their considerations are taken into 
account in future strategic planning.  At Nightingale, departmental 
strategies were under development at the time of the interviews but there 
were references to estates and communication strategies. At Seacole, the 4 
page vision is linked to a 40 page operational document, outlining action 
plans for every department. 
 In line with the Ferreira and Otley framework (2009), there is 
alignment between strategy and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) at 
Cavell and Guinness. At Nightingale, the departmental strategies were 
under development at the time of the interviews but they had drawn up 
lists of proposed departmental KPIs. Alignment of strategy to objectives, 
financial plans and key performance measures is explicit in one hospice. 
‘We make sure all its plans for doing at the operational level really do have 
a strong link to the organisation’s five year strategy...so our annual 
operating plans links very clearly back to that. And over time we’ve 
introduced a bit more performance measurement as well (so) the trustees 
have some assurance that we’re delivering on our promise to them and to 
the (patients) basically’ (Finance, Guinness). In two cases, the operational 
plans drive detailed long-term integrated financial plans. ‘So a five year 
budget is key and a ten year vision’ (CEO, Nightingale). At Nightingale, they 
are clearly aspiring to achieve this (seen in their presentation regarding 
their strategic planning process). KPIs are therefore derived from the 
strategic plan in three of the four cases, as the framework proposes.  With 
clearly defined goals, aligned strategic objectives and measures, and a clear 




flow from the board via SMT through the organisational structures, both 
mechanistic control and transactional rationality can be seen. 
 
7.5.2: Extending Ferreira and Otley’s PMCS framework 
 While the hospices’ strategic planning process is consistent with the 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) framework, there are however a number of 
differences. The organic controls identified by Burns and Stalker and the 
communicative rationalities by Broadbent and Laughlin reveals some 
limitations of the PMCS framework when applied to the voluntary sector.  
In Chapter 2, Figure 2.4 lays out the key questions making up their PMCS. 
In Table 7.1, evidence from the case hospices is used to address the first 
eight core questions. However, the table has been extended to incorporate 
several additional aspects that emerge from this primary research. Ferreira 
and Otley could argue that these are addressed in their outer rings 
(questions 9-12), such as PMS use, although they are criticised by 
Broadbent and Laughlin for being too vague. However, other aspects 
included in the ‘additional hospice features’ column show how the Ferreira 
and Otley framework needs to extended for hospices and arguably other 
voluntary organisations. First, every hospice has it values clearly stated as 
part of its strategy, with motivation through commitment more typical of 
an organic approach described by Burns and Stalker (1994). It also is typical 
of the substantive rationality described by Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) 
including ethical ends, or ‘value rationality’. Second, strategic planning in 
the case hospices is more inclusive than the hierarchical framework 
suggests. At least one respondent from each hospice commented on how 
staff are consulted for their views on their hospices’ strategy. At two 
hospices, there are formal processes to involve staff of all levels in the 
determination of strategy, albeit both had taken place for the first time just 
before the interviews took place. 




‘I wanted to make sure that everybody, right through from the 
board to the ward has an opportunity to make contribution or 
comment and to know they would be listened to’ (CEO, Nightingale). 
 ‘there’s a recognition of a need to involve as many people as 
possible in the formulation of strategies, probably 40 or so 
people’(Trustee, Guinness). 
At Barton, they informally consult staff other than the SMT and board. 
‘People (staff) are asked for their views of where they see the organisation 
in 5 years’ time (Business, Barton). At Cavell, there has been a top down 
process but there is now a desire to involve staff as they re-consider their 
strategic direction. Despite the concerns of two directors over people not 
buying into the strategy, the CEO comments that delivery of strategy is 
‘collective’  and that they ‘are redefining our strategic direction and that is 
influenced by all the people.’  This is characteristic of the communicative 
rationality described by Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) with an inclusive 
approach to determining objectives.  
Third, discussions take place not only at different operational levels 
within the hospices but also with external stakeholders. While 
acknowledged, it is not explicitly identified in the Ferreira and Otley 
framework.  In two cases, there is consultation with external stakeholders 
(commissioners and the local community) in the development of their 
strategy. One hospice respondent commented explicitly on patients’ views 
being taken into consideration. ‘We constantly have an ear to what 
patients want’ (CEO, Cavell). Stakeholder consultation is also criteria of 
Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2009) communicative rationality.  Fourth, staff 
are involved in the strategic process by means of individual appraisals. 
Individual objectives are largely driven by the strategic planning process, 
with all case hospices specifically confirming how their appraisals are linked 
to the overall hospices objectives.  One finance director (Guinness) went as 




far as to say that ‘for me, what glues it together are individual performance 
plans.’  
‘More strategically, they have appraisals and as part of the 
appraisal process we mutually agree service objectives linked to 
strategy’ (Care, Barton). 
Rather than having KPIs to hold them to account (as envisaged by Ferreira 
and Otley), this is also achieved through objectives and milestones. At 
Seacole, the operating plan is an action plan, without KPIs.  Negotiated 
objectives and qualitative rather than quantitative evaluation are both 
examples of the reflexive authority described by Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2009) as communicative rationality. 
‘As part of the appraisal process, we mutually agree service 
objectives linked to the strategy so they have a programme of work 
that leads to the kind of vision and then review in an bi-annual 
basis’  (Care, Barton). 
(referring to understanding the 3 key goals) ‘It’s basically so that 
people feel like it is then part of them and part of their everyday and 
it’s measured in their appraisals’ ( Business, Nightingale).  
 Fiftly, while the time horizon of the strategic plans drawn up by all 
hospices is consistent, the effect of ‘emergent strategies’ is  not explicitly 
identified within the Ferreira and Otley framework. One hospice has 
recently decided to plan for the next ten years; two have a five year plan; 
one updates their plans on a 2 or 3 year cycle and the 4th has a rolling 4 
year strategic plan. In addition to this, one has blue sky 20 year outlines for 
capital developments and a ten year retail plan. 
‘It sounds like the Russians every 5 years, we have a 5 year plan’ 
(CEO, Barton). 
Nevertheless, all hospices acknowledge that plans are subject to change 
and appreciate the need for an emergent strategy. They cite examples such 




as responding to government funding opportunities and changes in legacy 
income (CEO Barton), ‘seizing the opportunity’ to get cheap shop locations 
at a time of recession (Business, Barton); retail trends to inform strategic 
direction (Business, Cavell). Others comment on the need for a flexible 
approach: 
‘Also being realistic rather than having a prescribed tick list of things 
that have to be done in a time frame but more informed about how 
things change, develop and priorities shift and being responsive to 
that’ (CEO, Cavell). 
‘So it stays live rather than siting as a big hefty document on a shelf’ 
(CEO, Nightingale).  
Hospices are responding to uncertain times through networks and 
consultation, and thus more suited to an organic approach described by 
(Burns & Stalker, 1994). The lack of costing systems and reluctance to take 
on budgetary control responsibility endorses hospices operating organic 
rather than mechanistic controls (Chenhall, 2003). While Ferreira and Otley 
(2009) imply that their framework is applicable to all organisations, Table 
7.1 illustrates how it could be adapted for the voluntary sector 
predominantly reflecting a different organisational purpose (such as 
incorporating values and external stakeholders’ views). It may also be 
affected by the typical size of these organisations, being smaller than 
private sector organisation envisaged by Otley and allowing a less 
hierarchical approach to strategic planning. 












Barton Cavell Nightingale Guinness Seacole 
Q1. 
Vision/mission 
 Mission in SIR 
Vision & mission 
in TAR 
Aims in SIR and TAR Aims, vision and mission in 
SIR and TAR 
Aims in TAR 
Vision & mission in SIR and in 
impact report 
Aims in TAR 
 Values Values in TAR  
and information 
booklet  
Extended on staff 
poster 
 Values in TAR and postcard 
with values for internal and 
external stakeholders 
Values in impact report and 
strategy document 








SMT presentations to board 
on national hospice world, 
health and social care, 
dementia, death rates, 
national developments 







objectives set out 
in SIR and TAR 
Strategic imperatives 
set out in SIR 




Strategic aims in SIR and 
TAR 
3 key goals on postcard 
Clear ‘topline’ objective 12 priorities in strategy 
document 

























Staff asked for 
views 
Annual away day 
‘Ear of patients’ 
 





‘very inclusive process’ 
Bi-annual away-day 
5 strategy implementation 
groups – feeds back up to 
strategy development group 
Middle managers heavily 
involved 
Consultative 
Need to involve as many as 























 Adopted alternative model of 
care within overall strategic 
goals 
Extended main goal by 2 years 





  5 year plan (‘like 
the Russians’) 
 2or 3 year cycles 
Top level plus 
detailed operating 
plan 
5 year plan, 10 year vision 
5 year financial plan 
integrated 
5 year plan extended to 10 
Strategy linked to operating 
plan to departmental plans 
4 year plan linked to detailed 
operational plan 








Barton Cavell Nightingale Guinness Seacole 
 Sub-
strategies 




  In documentation Explicitly mentioned Explicitly mentioned  
 Milestones  Included in critical 
success factors 







Budgets(directors) 5 year financial plan linked 
to strategy 





   Annual review reports 




 Targets set by 
budgets but not 
targets as such 
Theoretically linked 
to reward but there 
is no reward 
available 
No financial reward   









link back to the vision 
Budgets linked to strategy 
Integrated via appraisals 
 
Operating  plan and strategy 
integrated  
Linked to individual appraisals 
Conscious alignment of KPIs 
Operating  plan  derived from 
12 strategic priorities 
Source: author’s own analysis, comparing management control literature to case findings 




7.6 Do hospice performance measure systems actually report ‘good 
performance’?  
To assess how effective hospice performance measurement 
systems are, a comparison is drawn between what hospices deem as good 
performance and its delivery in Chapter 6 and what is actually measured in 
Chapter 7. Table 7.2 shows how many outcomes and outputs are 
measured, such as patient quality of life, family support, quality of service, 
staff satisfaction and financial sustainability.  However, there are some 
notable gaps: coping skills; place of death; admissions prevented; and 
community reputation.   Simons (1995) considers that completeness is a 
criteria of successful performance measurement. It can be argued that the 
performance measures reported by hospices are incomplete and therefore 
their performance measurement systems are lacking. On the other hand, 
hospices may not be measuring what they consider to be unmeasurable 
such as leadership and communication.   
‘Time and time again the housekeeping staff: how they smile, how 
they behaved…It just kept coming up. Now to everyone in the 
hospice, that will be a really massive sign of success but we can’t 
put a number on it, of course’ (Finance, Barton). 
Hospices do not attempt to measure some of the most important 
aspects of their work as they cannot be measured.  However, that does not 
mean that they are unimportant or that they should not be managed. If 
aspects of hospice performance cannot be measured, then alternative 
methods need to be sought on how to manage them. The management 
control literature suggests that Simons’ 1995 Levers of Control is a holistic 
framework which includes diagnostic measures as only one part of a more 
complex interaction of controls.  This has informed the skeletal framework 
set out in Chapter 5 and is used to guide identification of complementary 
controls operating within the hospices in chapter 8.  
 




Table 7.2 Hospice performance measurement and management 
 
Source: author’s findings from SIR and TAR analysis 
 
 
7.7 Informal diagnostics 
‘The letters we constantly get in from the public you know that says 
it all. If any business had the amount of letters, even 10% of what 
we get, you know you would have a very successful business’ 
(Business, Barton). 
Not only are some aspects of hospice management not managed by 
means of formal performance measures, there is also evidence of 





Outcomes Quality of life Patient surveys, focus groups, 
monitoring complaints 
Coping skills  
Place of death  
Admissions prevented  
Family support Family surveys 
Outputs Quality of service CCG reporting trips, falls, drug 
errors 




Staff satisfaction Staff survey; some HR 
measures 
Staff recruitment, training  
Volunteers Hours  
Financial sustainability Management accounts but 
little costing 
Donated goods  
Leadership  
Communication, autonomy  
Community reputation  






 Actions against plan (Seacole) 
Critical success factors (Cavell) 
BSC (Nightingale) 
Logic model (Guinness) 




performance being ‘diagnosed’ or assessed in other ways.  Formal 
measures are complemented by informal diagnostics. Patient experience is 
considered the key measure of the hospices’ outcome of improving quality 
of life, typically measured by patient surveys and evaluations. However, 
hospices also use spontaneous patient, family and carer letters as a 
method of demonstrating their success.  
‘For me the real acid test is… the spontaneous comments and stories 
that come in without being prompted’ (Care, Barton) 
‘I think just the letters that we receive … even for somebody who 
has very recently lost a loved one, it speaks volumes’ (Finance, 
Cavell). 
‘We have had some staggering letters back from people’ (CEO, 
Barton).  
The hospices are aware of the subjectivity of such evidence, especially as 
patients and their families are ‘a captive audience’ (Care, Cavell) , at such 
an emotional time. ‘Most likely they are going to give positive feedback, 
particularly when they are feeling extremely vulnerable’ (Trustee, Barton). 
Ultimately, they are not paying for the services provided. ‘There is a danger 
of course that families will always say good things because they're getting 
all this for nothing’ (CEO, Guinness).  However, the care director at Barton 
argues that it provides similar evidence to extensive formal reporting (but 
without the cost).  ‘In the NHS when they talk about doing ward rounds 
with the tick box, it is actually about relationships and having time to do 
it...walking around every half-hour with your clip board. If we did that it 
wouldn’t demonstrate any more than the comments that are coming.’ It is 
these stories that are used extensively in external documents to illustrate 
their ‘success.’ ‘There is a lot of evaluation work and from a funding 
perspective, it’s very, very helpful when we are looking for evidence of 
outcomes to support making applications’ (Business, Barton). Patient 
stories are also used in Quality Accounts to the commissioners. The trustee 




at Barton concludes: ‘You absolutely must take notice of that but it 
absolutely must not be your only measure because it is not going to be 
sufficient’ (Trustee, Barton). 
‘I think for me it is the qualitative evaluations of the patient 
experience but there are some caveats with that. Because the 
families are always so grateful for the care we provide, when we 
have discussions with the service user group, we are desperate to 
find something that we are not good at doing’ (Care, Barton). 
There are other examples of how interviewees describe informal 
ways to assess performance. Trustees are appointed for their skills and 
experience to spot when performance might not be good as expected. 
Their visits to the hospice are a means of informally assessing performance 
or alerting them to problems. 
‘Informally my knowledge that I bring to the organisation is about 
what I would expect to see in a finance department…when I bring 
my expertise, yeah, and then little bells start ringing and I think 
who I need to ask about this, that and the other. So that’s when 
the informal stuff comes in’ (Trustee, Nightingale). 
The CEO and directors speak of using intuition to pick up problems. While 
all hospice carry our staff surveys, one CEO, in answer to the question how 
do you know you are doing well, replied that he walks around the hospice 
every day. It can be ‘hearsay in the corridor’ (Business, Barton), ‘a general 
feeling’ (Business, Nightingale) or sensing the atmosphere in a meeting. 
The CEO at Cavell comments that ‘from people whispering in your ear to 
the general jungle drums, you pretty soon know when things aren’t going 
so well and there are issues.’ 
‘I think we do have sufficient dialogue to get under the skin of 
what’s going on’ (CEO Guinness). 




‘I can know what the numbers tell me. But they very rarely tell me 
enough. I need to spend less than an hour anywhere in this 
organisation to know whether I feel things are going OK or not. And 
boy, do I know it immediately’ (CEO, Guinness). 
‘At the end of the day you can sense, our experience tells us, you can 
sense from the discussion in the room whether we're good, bad, 
indifferent’ (Finance, Nightingale).  
  Senior staff rely on informal communications as an early warning systems 
as informal diagnostic tools. At one hospice, the business director relies on 
informal conversations among SMT colleagues to know how well the 
hospice is running: 
‘I think through conversations with my peers at the SMT meeting 
because they monitor the number of patients in and out of the 
hospice’ (Business, Cavell). 
Success is also considered to be how they are perceived within the 
wider community. Informal feedback from the community also gives 
reassurance of performance. At Nightingale, the CEO considers an increase 
in social media posting such as Twitter and Facebook followings as an 
indicator of good performance. 
‘Feedback. You get feedback and comments from people, the 
spontaneous ones and my team do a lot of networking out in the 
community and we’re always listening to what people are saying 
about the hospice’ (Business, Cavell). 
The CEO at Barton speaks of the esteem in which the chair of the governors 
is held locally. The CEO at Nightingale interprets the invitation to herself 
and her colleague to lead a project as evidence of the hospice’ good local 
reputation.  




‘How our CCG and our colleagues in the health community value us, 
and I mean one really good indicator for me this year has been that I 
was asked to project lead the end-of-life work stream…That was a 
real tick in the box in terms of the value that they place on the 
organisation, I think’ (CEO, Nightingale). 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
 In analysing the performance measures used by the case hospices, 
three limitations of their effectiveness are exposed. First, a comparison of 
what is considered to be ‘good performance’ and its delivery and what is 
actually measured reveals significant gaps such as leadership and 
reputation. This is not necessarily about weak reporting but concerns 
identifying important aspects of hospice performance which cannot be 
measured. Second, the limitations of applying mechanistic and hierarchical 
approaches to hospices is seen when the Ferreira and Otley framework is 
used to understand the hospices’ strategic processes. Although the authors 
have acknowledged the need to include wider aspects of performance 
management in their outer rings, this remains vague. Analysis of hospice 
performance suggests that explicit acknowledgement is required of values, 
external stakeholder interaction, internal communications at all levels 
including emergent strategies as well as milestones and appraisals.  Third, 
performance is assessed informally as well as formally through 
spontaneous family letters, trustee expertise and ‘jungle’ drums. 
This chapter also concludes that external performance information 
is reasonably consistent across the five hospice cases, primarily set out by 
clinical and financial regulators. However, there is a wider variation in the 
internal reporting of performance within the hospices studied.  From the 
management accounting literature, discussed in Chapter 3, three criteria 
for an effective performance measurement system are identified: diversity 
of measures; alignment of strategy to measures; and an integrated system, 




demonstrating cause-and-effect between measures. The case hospices 
performance measurement systems at best only partially fulfil these 
criteria.  All hospices report a diverse range of measures, with one merely 
setting out key performance indicators on a monthly dashboard, 
predominantly made up of clinical measures. Three more hospices 
demonstrate alignment explicitly with one hospice linking its strategy to 
critical success factors, another using a BSC format. The third not only 
achieves alignment of measures to strategy but also uses the logic model 
to connect outcomes, outputs and inputs; a possible example of an 
integrated system. However, none of the hospices fully demonstrate the 
cause-and-effect relationships expected within management accounting 
literature. 
Milestones supplement measures to provide more comprehensive 
accountability. While hospices do not have the causal models proposed by 
the management control literature, they do integrate their qualitative and 
quantitative control systems. Hospice performance measurement 
demonstrates a balanced approach but one that balances words with 
numbers rather than across different metrics. 
‘With the impact statement, it’s no numbers without words and no 
words without numbers and that’s really important in terms of 
communicating the value of the work that we do. You need both.’ 
(Business, Guinness). 
The description ‘diagnostic’ as a lever of control underestimates 
what the hospices are actually doing. This research proposes that the term 
‘judgement’ is used to describe both the informal and formal assessment 
of performance.   Informal diagnostics are used to complement the formal 
measures, such as a sixth sense of how the hospice is performing internally 
and its external reputation in the community. In a similar vein, there is a 
sense of responsibility to provide value for money but little information to 
measure cost-effectiveness. In Chapter 8, a more holistic approach to 
performance management is proposed, arguing that mechanistic and 




instrumental performance measurement systems must be complemented 
by broader organic and communicative perspectives of management 
control. 
 ‘If you're getting caught with a mechanistic argument just 
introduce a qualitative statement and stop yourself trying to do 
the maths. Because these things are not best served by mechanical 
processes I'm afraid. I've no difficulty with them; I mean I'm not 
anti-quantitative measures by any means. But there's got to be a 
balance between what a family will say … Anecdote is not a bad 
thing to get, providing the anecdote is balance’ (CEO, Guinness). 
  








In Chapter 7, it becomes evident that some aspects of hospice 
performance are not and arguably cannot be measured. Clear criteria are 
given for effective performance measurement systems In Chapter 2. 
Management control theory suggests that there must be a clear aim or 
purpose; whose outputs must be measurable; the measures need to be 
predictive, showing the cause-and-effect relationship and corrective action 
must be able to follow (Emmanuel, et al., 1990, p. 8). Simons (1995, p. 59) 
incorporates three of these in his diagnostic lever of control (excluding the 
aim or purpose). Chapters 6 and 7 show that hospices only partially fulfil 
these criteria: aims are not always clear and often intangible. Cause-and-
effect relationships are hard to demonstrate and corrective actions cannot 
always be taken.  Many interviewees comment on aspects of hospice 
performance that cannot be measured.  
‘We are doing somethings brilliantly but we can’t quantify it, we 
can’t measure it’ (Finance, Seacole). 
When asked how good performance is delivered, the majority responded in 
terms of relationships rather than processes. The majority of respondents 
endorse the need for performance measurement information but 
recognise its limitations. Hospice management relies on informal, as well as 
formal, methods to alert them to issues. Chapter 7 gives examples of the 
informal diagnostics being used to assess hospice operations. This chapter 
asks if some aspects of hospice performance cannot be measured, how can 
they be managed? 
The skeletal framework, developed in Chapter 5 from management 
control and voluntary sector literatures, is used to guide a response to this 




question. This chapter explores how other organic management controls 
operate in conjunction with cybernetic performance measurement 
systems. It is argued in Chapter 3 that management control should be 
considered as a package, encompassing many different control 
mechanisms (Malmi & Brown, 2008). Four themes emerge from the 
discussions of about how good performance is delivered in practice in 
Chapter 6:  committed and motivated staff, style of leadership, autonomy 
and communication. There are clearly management controls operating in 
hospices that are beyond performance measurement. These have been 
identified as: ethos, including staff motivation, values, leadership and 
volunteering spirit; responsibility including autonomy; and relationships 
incorporating communication. The skeletal framework is then fleshed out 
with details from the hospice case studies in table 7.1 with a view to 
creating a new voluntary sector performance management framework in 
chapter 9. 
 
8.2 Voluntary sector and hospice ethos 
‘I think hospices are special places…there’s an unknown spirituality in 
the place’ (Trustee, Seacole). 
 In chapter 3, some characteristics of voluntary sector 
organisations are identified including their purpose and motivation, the 
role of finance, governance structures and multiple stakeholders. These 
factors create an ethos that is quite different from both the private and 
public sectors. Hospices share these as well as having their own distinctive 
ethos. As Cecily Saunders (2001) has said, the hospice movement is as 
much about a philosophy as buildings and their facilities. That philosophy 
promotes a holistic approach to psychological and spiritual needs as well as 
physical care. This section considers the ethos of the case hospices, using 
the definition of the voluntary sector given by Salamon and Anheier (1997).  




8.2.1 Voluntary sector ethos: non-distribution of profits 
  The first distinguishing characteristic of the voluntary sector 
identified by Salamon and Anheier (1997) is the non-distribution of profits.   
The case hospices not only retain all surplus’ generated but also do not 
regard maximising that surplus as their primary purpose.  We have seen in 
the SIR and TAR analysis that the overall aims of the hospices do not 
include financial considerations and there is no explicit financial objective 
in any of the case hospice mission statements. In Chapter 6, interviewees 
explain what is considered to be ‘success’ in a hospice from their different 
perspectives. The trustee at Seacole says that what distinguishes a hospice 
from a hospital is the ‘compassionate, very spiritual’ aspects; ‘it’s basically 
about people...thinking of the care of that person.’ He contrasts the 
personal ambitions, even in a hospital, to the genuine care of the hospice 
staff. By exception, one hospice alluded very obscurely to financial 
sustainability, as a ‘lasting and thriving’ provider of end-of-life care.  This is 
cited by the trustee at Cavell who adds ‘I try not to let finance rule my 
thoughts. I try and think of other things that should be important.’  The 
trustee at Guinness overtly states that finances are not their goal: ‘We 
need to achieve whatever we set out to do to make sure our financial 
position remains stable and secure but that isn’t anything to do with our 
objectives.’  However, all case hospices have trading companies which 
transfer their profit as a gift-aid to the hospice. Thus, they are examples of 
the blurring of the distinctions between the private and voluntary sectors. 
While the hospices’ mission is not concerned with profit maximisation, 
making a surplus is a means to fund the services they provide, rather than 
being an end purpose. The trustee at Cavell explains that attitudes ‘are 
different in different parts’ of the hospice with a business attitude in retail 
and a service attitude in care provision.  
‘I always say to people when they ask the question why are you 
successful, they are usually asking from a financial perspective. I 




always say it is because we run ourselves as a business and not as a 
‘charity’ (Business, Barton). 
 
The case hospices provide evidence of the increasing 
commercialisation of the voluntary sector. The Barton business director 
made the point that six or seven years ago, it was seen as surprising to 
have commercial staff on the senior management team but ‘it wasn’t long 
before they said actually yes and I think I have got the ability to look at both 
sides.’ There have been a number of factors which have contributed to this 
more business-like approach. First, hospices can no longer be complacent 
about funds being donated with little fundraising effort: 
‘Always there to care, but actually with your help we are always 
there to care. And we have to constantly remind people that you’ve 
got to pay for it…I think as a hospice and a charity you do need to be 
business-like. I think you have to be very proactive. Gone are the 
days where you sat there and waited for the donations to come in’ 
(Business, Cavell). 
  
 Second, respondents at two hospices comment on the potential 
competition from the private sector, given the changes in the health 
economy. Commissioners are looking to private sector companies, such as 
Nuffield, Virgin Healthcare, BUPA, nursing agencies, and PULSE to provide 
health provision who ‘will be lobbying at the door of GPs to say we can do 
this better for you. So you have got to have that business acumen’ (Care, 
Barton). 
‘We’re moving towards a culture of privatisation, particularly 
working within the Health and Social Care sector. We are needing to 
compete with other providers out there, who are for-profit 
organisations. So we need to be promoting our service as a quality, 




specialist service that is not-for-profit but is of value’ (Care, 
Guinness).  
 
 The business director at Guinness speaks in terms of having a distinctive 
product with a price that she can take to commissioners. ‘It needs to be 
quite specific: what are we doing; what are you paying for; what are you 
going to get?’     
  Third, the changing profile of staff is bringing about a more 
business-like approach. There are examples of the senior management 
teams being ‘very commercially focussed’ (Trustee, Nightingale). There is 
also a changing profile amongst members of the board. ’They have quite a 
corporate mindset’ (Finance, Barton). There are examples of tensions that 
result from this, such as the CEO of Barton explaining that in dealing with 
the poor performance of staff ‘one of the problems with the governors, 
some of whom come from the private sector, (is that they) do not 
understand that there are some legal hoops that you have got to go 
through because I don’t want to risk the organisation ending up in an 
industrial tribunal.’  The care director comments that the trustees at 
Guinness are making increasing demands for performance measurement. ‘I 
can see the frustrations from the trustees, who are constantly wanting 
more because they need to be able to justify where the income’s going’ 
(Care, Guinness). 
 With these different perspectives, there is potential for conflict 
between the need for being commercially-orientated while simultaneously 
achieving the hospice’s mission.  
‘You see it (high quality service delivery) demonstrated when people 
go the extra mile. I think it is potentially our downfall...because we 
so much want to say yes, but then struggle with the implications of 
saying yes to everything’ (Care, Cavell).  




 Three finance and business directors are clear about their commercial 
responsibilities, seeing no conflict. Here is an example of an unambiguous 
response to the question of a potential conflict of interest: 
‘My team are here to deliver income and that's the end of it, which 
might be a bit cut-throat for some people,…it's the only way we're 
going to be able to deliver the services. We're not a charity that's 
here to look after our employees’ (Business, Nightingale). 
 
On the other hand, a CEO comments on his finance director being in no 
doubt that they are doing it for ‘the one and only purpose of providing 
care’(CEO, Nightingale), despite having to make difficult decisions on 
making the budget balance. Two finance/business directors and one CEO 
recognise the tensions between commercial needs and the hospice’s 
overall purpose:  
 
‘I think that it's a fine balance between being a commercially viable 
business, having to take on things that you perhaps wouldn't 
ordinarily do...(and) a need to remain authentic to your 
cause’(Business, Nightingale). 
 
They therefore put the commercial aspects of running a hospice into the 
wider context of its mission: 
 
‘I don’t think there’s much conflict because we know that we’ve got 
to make a profit. We invest that profit in care and that’s our 










8.2.2 Voluntary sector ethos: not funded by the state 
 Interviewee perceptions of the ethos of the hospices are often 
expressed in contrast to the public sector, Salamon and Anheier’s (1997) 
second defining characteristic.  Many hospice staff have moved from the 
NHS: ‘They are coming to us because they're almost escaping from this to 
go and do what they always wanted to do’ (CEO, Guinness). There are a 
number of characteristics which distinguish an voluntary hospice from a 
NHS hospital. Indeed, respondents comment more on the differences 
between the hospice and the NHS than their similarities, notably having 
the time to care for patients, as they are free of the demands of 
performance management, NHS rules and regulations and continual 
reorganisation. The predominant theme of respondents was that staff 
could care for patients in a way that they felt they could no longer do so in 
the NHS. ‘The added advantage of being a charity is that we can really 
focus on the care of the patient’ (Care, Barton). The Guinness CEO explains 
that ‘they felt that they weren't any longer doing it, and now could see that 
they're going to again, and start doing so. And that captures them very, 
very quickly.’  He goes onto say ‘they’ve left the health service to come into 
an organisation like this and don’t go back to it because when they get here 
it is exactly what they are hoping it might be.’ He cites an example of a key 
member of staff: ‘She actually wanted to be able to give care to individuals 
patients.’ A finance director expresses this in terms of the rule and 
regulations: ‘Lots of the nursing staff, care staff, have come out of the NHS 
and that’s quite interesting. They come to escape the rules and regulations’ 
(Finance, Guinness). There is an appreciation that NHS hospitals operate in 
a different environment, subject to political and media pressures. 
‘The NHS, and this is my perspective, is very driven politically...So you 
have staff who are working in a spectrum of continual reorganisation 
and, in reality, that takes away from the focus of care to patients’ 
(Care, Barton) 




 At one hospice, staff to patient ratios are significantly better than 
in the NHS, allowing ‘the relationship to be developed with the family and 
patient because you have the time to do it. In reality in the NHS they haven’t 
got that luxury’ (Care, Barton). 
The unique character of hospice ethos is however something substantially 
more than having better staff to patient ratios than the NHS. A CEO at a 
different hospice believes that the same care can be provided with 
numbers similar to a NHS hospital. There is however something quite 
elusive in hospice culture that needs to be preserved. 
 ‘We managed to give really good compassionate care with dignity 
and to sit and hold people's hand. So why is it different here? I 
need to understand why it feels different’ (CEO, Nightingale). 
 From the interviews, it is clear that the fundamental hospice ethos 
is far more positive than being defined by the negative ‘non-profit’ or by 
not being a public sector organisation. Despite the increasing 
commercialisation and the extent of statutory funding, all hospices share 
the broader ethos of the holistic approach to palliative care. The care 
director at Barton explained how its philosophy, arising out of a social 
movement, made its ethos fundamentally different to that of the NHS. 
 
‘So there is that difference between the NHS and the hospice… 
certainly the hospice in xxx was developed from a social movement 
perspective and very much embedded in the heart of the 
community’ (Care, Barton). 
 
At least one member of each hospice commented on the commitment to 
the holistic approach to providing the ‘whole package’ of care, including 
psychological and spiritual support. 




‘And I think the whole patient care is really important. We don’t 
have funding for social work or counsellors from the NHS or indeed 
the spiritual care but that is the whole package’ (Care, Barton).   
The care is not limited to the patient but is a benefit for all those involved: 
 ‘It is absolutely for some people a therapeutic journey, the whole 
hospice experience, and I do wonder about the people who don’t 
get that, because their relatives die in other circumstances, that 
equally has a morbidity that is difficult to measure’  (Care, Cavell). 
 
8.2.3 Voluntary sector ethos: independence  
 
‘We’re a charitable organisation so we value the independence that 
being charitable gives us’ (Business, Guinness). 
 
A key component of the case hospices ethos is that of independence - 
the third definition of the voluntary sector given by Salamon and Anheier 
(1997). At least one interviewee from each hospice stresses the importance 
of their self-management. Several interviewees speak of their 
independence in terms of not being part of the public sector, such as 
avoiding the over-regulation discussed previously or having the ability to 
negotiate over reporting requirements, which will be discussed more fully 
later in this chapter. However, hospices value the opportunity to make 
their own decisions in a number of other ways. The finance director at 
Barton cites the example of how they set salaries independently of NHS 
pay scales. They can also provide what they consider to be the most 
appropriate care and support for individual patients. The business director 
at Guinness gives an example about how the commissioner might offer a 
certain level of care but the hospice has the discretion to provide more 
care where they feel it is necessary. 
 




‘I do think because we are an independent hospice and because we 
receive so little of our funding from the NHS it does give us an 
opportunity to make certain decisions ourselves...we have more say 
in driving clinical services within the guidelines that the NHS require’ 
(Finance, Cavell). 
 
Independence enables a hospice to make decisions much more 
quickly than their counterparts in the public sector. The CEO at Nightingale 
explains how strategic change takes years to make an impact in the NHS, 
leaving the workforce demoralised. At a hospice, the board has the ability 
to make the decisions, can determine whether they have the funding and 
implement the change quickly. 
 
‘I think going back to that thing about independence...(it) is very 
evident (that) being an independent organisation the decision to 
action time is very short…. And often it is about a team of people or 
a way of working and those adjustments can be made very quickly 
and you can then quickly see the impact. And that has a 
tremendously positive effective on morale and motivational levels’ 
(CEO, Nightingale). 
 
The trustee at Nightingale cites the example of being able to open a shop 
as the opportunities arises, contrasting it to the slow decision-making in 
the NHS. He does however qualify his statement, commenting that as the 
board only meets quarterly, decision-making could be quicker still. This 
view is endorsed by the finance director at Barton who considers decision-
making only to be quick in contrast to the NHS but slow when compared to 
his experience of the private sector. 
 
‘The NHS falls down because it takes so long to do anything: things 
slow down so much they stop and then people change because it’s 
taken so long to do it and then it needs to start all over again and 




that’s why it never achieves anything’ (Trustee, Nightingale). 
 
Hospices are fiercely independent, to the extent that they preserve 
their autonomy from each other and their national umbrella organisation. 
This is illustrated by an example from a business director regarding 
fundraising and branding. It shows the degree to which they value their 
local connections and preserve their geographical monopoly. 
‘Hospice UK has 2,400 retail outlets. They're all governed roughly by 
a geographical area that is aligned to the hospice care. But the fact 
that they work in such fragmented silos means that they don't get a 
lot done’ (Business, Nightingale). 
 
Charities often cite innovation as a key benefit of being a charity 
and this is commented on by a few interviewees.   One hospice includes 
innovation as one of its three key headline objectives: ‘We're innovative 
and we have an influence’ (Business, Nightingale). A CEO at another spoke 
of the historic contribution of hospices to innovative approaches to 
palliative care. ‘We must retain our independence. We must have the ability 
to be innovative and commission our own services’ (CEO, Barton).  
‘I think they are keen to retain an independent status...It shows all 
sorts of win-wins for them engaging with the voluntary sector, 
around working a bit more innovatively’ (CEO, Nightingale)   
 
8.2.4 Voluntary sector ethos: volunteers 
‘we survive or fail on the back of our volunteer workforce’ (CEO, Cavell). 
‘volunteers are an absolutely critical resource’(CEO, Guinness). 
   
 A strong belief in the purpose of the hospices enables the hospices 
to marshal huge resources from volunteers, ‘remarkable people’ (Trustee, 
Barton). This fourth characteristic of Salamon and Anheier’s (1997) 




definition makes a considerable contribution to all the hospices studied. 
The CEO at Guinness cites savings through having volunteers, which is ‘a 
staggering figure.’ At Nightingale they are ‘very much part of the strategy 
as well’. Without the volunteers, hospices would not be able to operate in 
the way they do. The Barton finance director described it as a ‘winning 
business model...We can do a hell of a job with millions of pounds of 
donations and over a 1000 volunteers.’ Often volunteers are treated in the 
same way as staff – such as participating in hospice-wide communications, 
training and meetings. For example, at Cavell, they have removed nursing 
uniforms that differentiate between staff and volunteers, to make the 
volunteers feel more included and respected.  
  
8.3  Ethos and hospice performance management 
  
 In chapter 2, the role of social controls in the effective operation of 
organisations is discussed. Ouchi (1979) distinguishes social controls from 
market and bureaucratic controls. Merchant and van der Stede (2012) 
contrast personnel controls with results and action controls. Malmi and 
Brown (2008) see clans, values and symbols as one of three levels within a 
whole package of control.  Tessier and Otley (2012) draw the distinction 
between social and technical controls. Chenhall et al. (2010) consider how 
Bourdieu’s concepts of cultural and economic capital can build social 
control within an NGO.  Simons (1995) envisages a belief lever as one of his 
four control mechanisms.  However, Simons’ belief lever is limited to 
formal controls, such as the mission statement.  In the hospices and 
possibly other voluntary organisations, this underestimates the importance 
of the commitment to mission and purpose and thus this research 
proposes a broader ‘ethos’ lever of control. Moreover, the ethos lever not 
only acts as an enabling control but also a constraining control so operates 
in a different way of the belief control within the private sector. 
 




8.3.1 Performance management: mission statements 
 Clearly the ethos is a significant part of the control systems 
operating within the case hospices.  This is partly exercised through formal 
mission statements. The hospice mission statements, described by the CEO 
of Cavell, provides the direction of travel: 
‘a physically written description of what we are trying to achieve…I 
think the first thing is being very open and honest and transparent 
and produce something that is simple easy  to understand, has a 
clear  sort of measurable direction of travel within  the timeframe 
that has been set for it’ (CEO, Cavell). 
All case hospices set out their purpose, albeit in various ways. They all have 
their mission and/or vision on their websites. Where they have Quality 
Accounts and/or Statements of Purpose, the mission or vision is included. 
However, different wording is used in other public documents, depending 
on their audience. Interestingly, only two hospices use their mission 
statement in their Annual Review or Impact Report. All charities are 
required to set out their charitable purposes or objectives, in their returns 
to the Charity Commission, and can use different wording to the mission 
statements. In only one case, the same vision/mission statement is used in 
both the SIR and the TAR.  In two cases, the TAR cites the charitable objects 
set out in the memorandum of association, a more long-winded, legal-style 
definition of their activities. This would support the view that the TAR is 
considered to be a ‘grey’ document serving a legal rather than promotional 
purpose (Connolly & Dhanani, 2009). In another case, there is a different 
set of wording, possibly a timing difference as the strategy was under 
development at the time of the study.  
The case hospices share many common themes in their mission 
statements. They are of a very general nature, referring to the provision of 
end-of-life or palliative care for those with life-limiting illnesses. Where 
they include references to more specific objectives, they could apply to all 




case hospices, such as providing care in different settings, seeking to 
educate, enhancing the quality of life, working in partnership with other 
providers and serving a specific geographical area.  All five hospices also 
have a vision statement, again with similar and shared themes that could 
apply generally, such as providing free care and being leaders of end-of-life 
care provision. The idea of a simple statement is endorsed by respondents 
from two hospices. The finance director at Guinness says by keeping it 
simple and repeating it, ‘people will eventually understand.’ The business 
director at Nightingale adds ‘the key part of filtering the information down 
is to keep it really simple.’ Thus they are broad enough to include all 
operational practices but sufficiently vague not to determine any 
performance measures. 
 The mission statements communicate basic values and purpose. 
Four of the five hospices have formally documented their values and use 
them alongside their mission and vision. In one hospice, they have 
extended the mission/vision to expand on the detail behind the values: 
compassion and love; commitment to quality; communication; dignity and 
respect; whole patient care.   The care director at Guinness seeks 
assurance that ‘her staff understand what managing dignity and respect is 
about in practice.’ At Barton, they see these values being delivered by 
‘collective leadership.’  
‘We have got the overall vision statement but it is also about values 
which I think are really important and again from the hospice 
movement there is this thing about compassion and love. The added 
dimension that I think hospices provide is that link with spirituality. 
So these are our core values and I think the difference between the 
NHS and the hospice in reality is that hospices are grounded in 
values’ (Care, Barton). 




The importance of sharing common values is expressed by many 
interviewees, from trustees giving up their time, senior managers working 
within a team and in the recruitment of new staff. 
 ‘I can see the value of having a team who all work together and 
get on and have shared values and going in the same 
direction...that actually makes a huge impact on what you can 
achieve as an organisation’  (Business, Nightingale). 




8.3.2 Internal use of mission statements 
As Simons (1995) envisages, formal mission statements are used 
internally for three purposes: communication; motivation; and determining 
priorities.  First, the case hospices communicate their mission statements 
formally within their organisations. There are different methods of 
disseminating the vision and mission amongst staff. At Cavell, the CEO 
ensures ‘that information is available so that it is readily available for staff 
to see on electronic transmissions through the internet.’ He also holds 
‘state of the nation’ meetings with all staff on a quarterly basis, at which he 
and other colleagues present, thus ‘giving the perspective of senior 
management, but also from their particular role’ (Care, Cavell). Another 
hospice has designed a poster extending the mission and vision to include 
values. A third has produced a postcard to give each member of staff as a 
‘reminder of our values, our mission and our aim’ (Business, Nightingale). 
This operates in a similar way to that seen in other studies using Simons’ 
belief lever of control such as Bruining et al. (2004) where soapbox 
meetings and business magazines are used to communicate new values 
after a management buy-out. Arjalies and Mundy (2013) study how new 
CSR strategies are communicated through French private sector companies 




using values charts and internal conferences. Plesner Rossing (2013) 
observes how a change of transfer pricing policy was implemented by 
communicating new values among its employees. 
 Second, the mission, vision and values have an important 
role to play in motivating and empowering staff. The business director 
contrasts the clinical service ‘who are very close to service delivery and the 
purpose of the organisation’ with the support services. For the latter, a 
well-articulated mission is especially important, as their contribution to 
patients is indirect.  The Nightingale business director comments on how 
their goals are clear to all employees: ‘Whether you are the person who is 
emptying the bins or the chief executive, you say my role here is to make 
sure we deliver better care, that we’re innovative and we have influence.’ 
This is echoed by the finance director at Guinness: 
‘They’re starting to get the idea that they’re here for that objective 
first and foremost and the fact that they’re preparing accounts or 
doing a health and safety check is important but subsidiary to it. 
That’s why they’re doing those things, not because of the function in 
itself’ (Finance, Guinness). 
 Third, the mission statement has an important role to play in 
determining priorities with the increasing tensions between protecting 
their mission while becoming more commercially aware. ‘We check back 
around quality and say if there are incidents which maybe relate to 
something that doesn't feel comfortable as an organisation; where does 
that fit with our values?’ (CEO, Nightingale). The business director at 
Barton cites using the mission statement to keep his retail staff ‘focused on 
the (hospice’ s) objectives…if we are compromising the organisation as 
whole, we question it’. Chenhall et al. (2010) observe how the belief lever 
could help balance a potential conflict between the interests of the 
employees and a welfare organisation. 
 




8.3.3 External use of mission statements 
‘I think the vision is communicated in all sorts of ways. I think it is 
communicated in public events. I think is communicated in their 
literature’ (Trustee, Barton). 
 Simons sees the mission statement primarily as an internal 
document. However, the importance of mission statements within the 
hospices, and possibly for voluntary sector organisations as a whole, is as 
much external as internal. Moreover, it is not simply an enabling lever of 
control or ‘yang’; it also acts as a constraint or ‘yin.’ This research suggests 
that the vision, as set out in mission statements or charitable objects, 
serves different purposes in hospices, and arguably in voluntary sector 
organisations as a whole, from that of private and public sector 
organisations. A mission statement has a much more significant role to play 
with its external stakeholders. Mission statements are actively used to 
promote the hospices’ cause in fundraising, thus acting as an enabling lever 
of control. Chenhall et al. (2010) cite how a mission statement can be used 
to raise the profile of an organisation externally.  The postcard used by one 
hospice is primarily designed for external use to communicate its vision, 
‘care, influences and innovation,’ to external stakeholders.  They have 
published a simple leaflet ‘Strategy at a Glance’, available to the public. The 
business (retail) director comments on how the methods of 
communication have become more holistic, with the business director 
explaining the importance of the ‘drip effect’ of information from signage 
to press releases and social media to explain their purpose. This ultimately 
results in the income generation needed to support that mission. At 
another hospice, the care director cites an example of the vision being 
used actively to set up a centre for palliative care as an educational 
partnership.   
 The mission statement nevertheless also acts as a constraining lever 
of control. Whereas the ultimate purpose of a private sector business is to 




maximise shareholder value which does not require explicit publication, 
and a public sector body is providing a clear service on behalf of 
government, a charity must define its own fundamental raison d’etre itself. 
The Charity Commission requires that every charity determines and 
publishes its charitable objects, setting the limits of their activities with 
legal implications. Thus, the hospices’ mission and objects are setting 
boundaries on what activities are appropriate. This in turn ensures that 
external stakeholders can be assured donations are being spent in line with 
what they intended. 
 
8.3.4 Staff motivation 
   ‘This is your vision, not my vision’ (CEO, Nightingale). 
 Recruitment and training, along with mission statements can be 
used to motivate staff. In Chapter 6, the importance of recruiting staff with 
the ‘right’ attitude and then inducting and training them appropriately has 
been identified as key to delivering good performance. However, staff 
motivation in the hospices is much more profound than this. Staff 
motivation is not extrinsic through reward but intrinsic due to the sense of 
mission. Many examples are cited by the interviewees to illustrate how the 
mission has been taken on board by staff, although one admitted to 
adoption being ‘probably a bit mixed…in some places it is alive fully,  and in 
other it is still on a journey’ (Business, Cavell). 
 
‘I think there is a commitment to always wanting to do the best 
thing for the patient and being responsive to them’ (Care, Barton). 
Moreover, they need to be able to reassure the Care Quality Commission 
(the regulators) that ‘our staff are signing upto our mission and 
values...They may not be able to tell it to me ad verbatim but they were 
able to identify the key principles’ (Care, Guinness). When asked about how 
the mission and vision statement actually affect individual members of 




staff, interviewees suggest that formal documents only have a part to play. 
For control to promote ethos effectively, substantially more is needed than 
the statement of mission and vision or even formally documenting the 
values which underpin them. 
 ‘So it’ll no longer be the traditional vision statement on the wall as 
you walk into the building; so actually this is about how this 
organisation operates, behaves, represents itself. And that for me, 
when I think about a vision and how to create a vision and how I 
think it’s successful, that would be the approach’ (Business, 
Cavell). 
  It can be argued that formal mission statements are the 
products, not the drivers of motivation. Mission statements only play a 
part in inspiring staff: ‘For clinical staff they are passionate, their driver is 
that they want to provide the best care and then they deliver that care 
(Business, Cavell). This is not limited to care staff ‘I only need to spend two 
hours in a hospice to feel better again when I am feeling jaded...because it 
is so hugely uplifting to see what they do. This is about the culture of the 
organisation’ (CEO, Guinness). ‘without a doubt I am motivated through the 
services we deliver...and that is a massive massive self-drive for me 
(Business, Barton).  Interviewees comment how staff are prepared to 
volunteer for fundraising events as they are so dedicated to the mission.   
 ‘I can see evidence here that a huge amount of people and across 
all areas from clinical to the catering to finance support areas who 
are also proactive in doing additional things...That may be 
marshalling an event, we have a mid-night walk...and that shows 
me that people are happy in the job they’re doing and in the place 
they are working’ (Finance, Cavell). 
 
 




8.3.5 Values demonstrated in leadership and volunteering spirit 
 In Chapter 7, it is suggested that the Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) 
PMCS framework should be extended for use in the voluntary sector by 
including values. This goes beyond simply stating them within a mission 
statement. For a mission to be credible, staff behaviour needs to reflect the 
values, set out in their documents. Three respondents from different 
hospices comment explicitly on the need for senior members of staff to 
provide appropriate role models. 
‘I think they (values and vision) are so interlinked and so closely 
related, and I think for me the values are the delivery of the vision. It 
might sound a bit strange. So your values are things that you want 
to do, believe, behave, deliver, which delivers the vision’ (Business, 
Cavell). 
  Leadership is explicitly mentioned by three hospices in connection 
with mission statements and how the vision and mission is actually 
adopted within the organisation. When asked about how he took the vision 
and make it happen, the CEO at Barton replied what ‘you are actually 
delving into is leadership…so much of the ethos of the hospice comes from 
informal leadership.’ 
‘the important thing for me is about having a vision, being a strong 
leader, making sure that the organisation can say, whoever you are 
you can articulate where you think the organisation's going. But 
actually the work really starts now because I think the next stage is 
about us really unpicking what we say about our values and our 
beliefs. What do we mean by that? What do we mean by our 
mission?’ (CEO, Nightingale). 
  The strength of conviction is evident amongst the 
volunteers, with no obvious equivalent in the private sector levers of 
control described by Simons. The care director at Barton observes that 




‘what they volunteer for is something that they value.’ She goes onto 
explain that they are perhaps one of the reasons why the culture is quite 
different to an NHS hospital. ‘We are blessed with volunteers. They bring in 
a different dimension so you have not got totally professionals which brings 
in another level of humanity. Perhaps that is why the culture is different’ 
(Care, Barton). The trustee comments on her fellow trustees who are 
‘recruited for the wealth of experience but are also giving up time 
voluntarily’. She comments that ‘the values in a hospice are very 
synonymous with my own values’ (Trustee, Barton). Other respondents 
speak of those who are giving up time, having experienced the hospice for 
themselves.   
 ‘If I go back to my volunteers – the little old ladies in the shops – 
they're there because they want to give something back and they 
want to volunteer. It's a good thing to do’ (Trustee, Cavell). 
 ‘You rarely see in the NHS somebody who’s being looked after in a 
hospital, their relatives coming back year on year doing something 
to support that, whereas that happens in hospices. And I also 
believe there is something therapeutic in that’ (Care, Cavell). 
This research suggests that ‘ethos’ is a more appropriate description of the 
belief lever of control within the voluntary hospices. The sense of mission is 
more profound than in the private sector, as the conviction of volunteers 
and staff demonstrate. The mission statement is a product not a driver of 
intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivation. It also operates as both a 
constraint as well as enabler in setting out the mission for external as well 
as internal stakeholders. Thus, the belief lever of control is broadened to 
ethos to capture some of the differences within the voluntary sector. 
 8.4 Responsibility  
 We have seen how cybernetic controls operate within hospice 
strategic planning in Chapter 7.  Malmi and Brown (2008) identify 




cybernetic and planning controls as the second layer of their MCS package, 
including budgets. They suggest a third layer made up of administrative 
controls which includes governance and organisation structures as well as 
policies and procedures. This is part of Simons’ (1995) boundary lever, 
which combines strategic planning with external regulation and internal 
policies. Tessier and Otley (2012) argue that the level of control should be 
taken into account, separating strategic and operational controls within the 
boundary lever. Under the umbrella term of responsibility, this section 
compares how formal boundary structures and processes are 
complemented by informally set limits on the hospice senior management 
teams and operational staff.   
 
8.4.1 Budgets: targets and rewards 
‘We are constrained by budgeting and you have to plan everything 
in advance because you don’t have the flexibility to say part way 
through the year I suddenly want to do  so and so for £50k’ (CEO, 
Cavell). 
 Budgets play a role in ensuring strategic control in both Simons’ 
(1995) LOC and the Ferreira and Otley (2009) PMCS framework. All 
hospices prepare annual budgets, setting boundaries on what expenditure 
can be incurred. In two cases, a five year financial plan has been 
constructed to agree with the narrative strategic plan. As part of the 
operational planning process, two hospices explicitly mention setting 
targets and one confirms that it is implicit by setting a budget. All hospices 
manage their operations through budgetary control with the monthly 
reporting of management accounts. 
‘I think because I issue monthly management accounts to each of 
the heads of department, then it allows me to spot very quickly if 
something’s going astray but also gives them the confidence of 
actually doing a good job’  (Finance, Cavell). 




 There is concern that managing boundaries through budgetary 
control has not been fully implemented in three of the hospices.  The 
finance director at Barton talks of needing to educate staff. He is 
concerned that staff do not understand the financial reporting. ‘I was 
coming up against people who did not really know much about their 
budget...I need to educate them...I want them to tell me in budget terms 
what is going to happen. The quicker that they take control, the more the 
system is working and so that’s the good way of controlling. And so that 
monitoring of performance but it has only just started’ (Finance, Barton). 
His fundraising colleague commented that her team found it ‘frightening’, 
and uses smiley faces rather than variances. She said that ‘everyone does 
the budgeting process but I would be very surprised if everyone truly 
understood it.’ At Nightingale, the finance director made a similar 
observation. ‘With the best will in the world they don’t understand the 
figures side of things...the’ve got no idea on budgets, their figures weren’t 
shared’. He is working to build relationships as the finance function had 
been remote prior to his appointment. The trustee confirmed it was only 
the second year that they had had delegated budgets as a result of which 
they were able to identify ‘some really crazy things (were) happening and 
they took lots of steps to try and reduce that back down’ (Trustee, 
Nightingale). The former finance director had not made site visits while his 
successor sees the close working relationship between finance and other 
departments as essential. As the finance director says, monthly 
management accounts were ‘a bit of a novelty.’ 
 Budgets in the hospices do not operate in the way envisaged by 
Ferreira and Otley (2009), setting out targets for financial incentives.  
Instead, the hospices aspire to budgets imparting responsibility through 
delegation. Their motivation to keep to the budget is purpose-driven, 
rather than linked to financial reward. At Guinness, the care director 
commented on how the newly appointed finance director was supporting 
budget holders ‘to become more autonomous.’  At Barton, ‘the boundaries 




are set in that each individual knows what is expected of them and they 
have their own sets of…we don’t call them targets but in financial terms 
that’s what they are. But everyone has their own area of responsibility and 
my message and mantra is that it is your area of responsibility (Business, 
Barton). One hospice sets explicit targets and they are intending to 
differentiate between target and budget. ‘A budget which we believe we 
can realistically achieve, but in addition to that to challenge, and to set 
some targets for people to aim towards’ (Financial, Cavell). None of the 
hospices provide financial incentives for budget performance. Staff are not 
motivated by monetary reward but by a sense of purpose. ‘We work 
because we absolutely love it ‘(Care, Barton). ‘Nobody does this as a job, 
this is a vocation, this is something everybody does and the minute you stop 
feeling like that you might as well go because the pain is huge’ (CEO, 
Guinness).   
 
8.4.2 Board meetings and reporting  
‘I think we do have a very robust plan of committee meetings that 
take place on a regular basis’ (Financial, Cavell). 
  At board and senior management level, the five hospices have 
similar structures of meetings and reports. Two hospices have participated 
in the Cass project on hospice governance, one of which has concluded 
that they had good governance arrangements while the other has 
consolidated meetings as they were advised that they had too many. 
Nevertheless, these and the other three hospices in this study have similar 
structures. All have quarterly board meetings with at least one annual 
away day, invariably to discuss strategy. Every hospice has a structure of 
board sub-committees. One trustee chairs a board sub-committee, 
although other trustees attend as well. All hospices have some kind of 
finance sub-committee, although their remits can differ.  Two focus on 
financial issues, including financial control, remuneration and investments, 




such as the Financial Advisory Group and Finance and General Purposes 
subcommittee. Another has a boarder remit, called Resource Assurance 
and covers management, staffing as well as finances.  All hospices have a 
clinical sub-committee, although this is given a variety of names (Clinical 
Quality, Clinical Governance, Healthcare Governance, Care Assurance).   
One has a wide remit under the title Hospice Services including clinical 
quality, education, health and safety, and major incidents, while others are 
focused on clinical issues. There are trading boards responsible for the 
separate statutory entities of the trading companies with some but not all 
trustees being directors and some having additional non-trustee directors. 
There is more variation amongst the remaining sub-committees.  In three 
cases, the business aspects are brought together in one sub-committee, 
including fundraising, marketing and communications. In two, human 
resources has its own sub-committee.  Two have separate sub-committees 
for overseeing governance arrangements and board development. 
  Clear rules are laid down for governance, commented on by at 
least one interviewee in each hospice, such as terms of reference of 
committees, internal reporting requirements and meetings. At Guinness, 
there are twenty policy/practice groups for clinical governance alone each 
with its own terms of reference. At Cavell this has been simplified to eight 
clinical reporting groups. ‘We do have to set ourselves rigorous governance 
structures so can demonstrate performance externally based on evidence’ 
(Care, Cavell). At Nightingale, the business director explains that ‘they're 
made quite explicit around the way that we conduct ourselves, the kind of 
information that we discuss at certain types of meetings and the way that 
we minute that information and it's quite transparent.’  
The board reviews documents made available for publication, 
including the Financial Statements and Annual Trustees’ Report and the 
clinical Quality Account.  Typically, board members receive strategy 
documents, the annual budget, quarterly financial reports and reports from 
the sub-committees. They receive key performance data, such as KPIs, BSC, 




and critical success factors, discussed in Chapter 7. Reports are prepared by 
the subcommittees and submitted to the quarterly board meetings.  Adhoc 
reports and presentations are given by senior managers as issues arise.  
Monthly management accounts are available but usually only summaries 
are sent to trustees on the finance sub-committees. 
 
 
8.4.3 Senior management and staff meetings  
Senior management teams meet regularly with different degrees of 
formality. One hospice has formal monthly meetings of its heads of 
services or strategy development group. Three other hospices have a blend 
of formal and informal meetings. One hospice has formal meetings on a 
weekly basis which the care director acknowledged as ‘probably overkill’, 
but an improvement on her previous experience. 
‘To me, some of my frustrations in my previous job was the lack of 
that time with senior people…but it keeps us quite tight and there 
are some advantages to that’. (Care, Cavell).  
Nevertheless, minutes are only taken at the first monthly meeting. At 
another hospice, they meet weekly but no minutes are taken. This is to 
allow open and frank discussion in an atmosphere of trust ‘one of the 
reasons we don’t minute those meetings is so the members of SMT can be 
brutally honest with each other’ (CEO, Barton).  A third hospice also has 
formal monthly and informal fortnightly meetings. At lower levels of the 
organisations, particularly on the clinical side, there are multitudes of 
different meetings.  
 ‘There seems to be huge numbers of meetings, but it’s actually 
joining them up that’s missing’ (Care, Cavell). 




 Hospices have formal channels of communication with all their staff 
and volunteers. ‘(We) have as many communication channels as possible’ 
(CEO, Cavell).  Posters set out values and mission statements. At one 
hospice, a personal letter has been sent from the CEO to communicate key 
messages. At another, an intranet is being developed to provide an online 
method of communication for all staff, with the CEO trying to mimic a 
‘grapevine’ to encourage them to logon. Hospice-wide briefing meetings 
are held formally in four, with one giving a ‘state-of-the-nation’ talk four 
times a year to which volunteers are also invited. Different trustees take 
part each time ‘for people to get to know them’ (Care, Cavell).  At another, 
volunteers are welcomed at an income-generation meeting. Hospices also 
use TV screens, newsletters and noticeboards to keep staff and volunteers 
abreast of events. 
 
8.4.4 External regulations and policies 
 The case hospices are subject to a number of external regulators. 
The majority of voluntary hospices in England and Wales, including the five 
case hospices, are companies limited by guarantee so are subject to 
company law. As charities, they are regulated by the Charity Commission. 
Trustees are formally restricted by the charitable objects set out in their 
legal documents such as their memoranda of association or constitutions. 
Under charity law, specific donations can also be restricted or designated, 
allowing donors to ensure that their funds are used for specific purposes.  
They are members of bodies setting out good practise, such as Hospice UK, 
and the Fundraising Standards Board. Many operate lotteries and are thus 
bound by lottery regulation. As care institutions, they operate under the 
CQC and are subject to health and social care regulations such as 
safeguarding, drugs control, and governance of confidential patient 
information. The regulation imposed by health and social care is the most 
commented on, with some interviewees seeing it as setting minimum 




standards, while others question whether some of the requirements are 
appropriate for hospices. All of the case hospices have been subject to 
unannounced CQC inspections. Moreover, regulation can be seen as a 
benefit: ’We need to be regulated. We owe it to our families and our 
commissioners but it is about being regulated appropriately’ (Care, 
Guinness). 
‘I’m the Accountable Officer for control drugs, so I would do an 
update on that and what we’ve reported to the local intelligence 
network. I’m the Caldicott Guardian, so I am responsible for any 
issues that have arisen in relation to information governance. I’m 
the designated Safeguarding Officer, so safeguarding always has 
a separate heading in my report. And I’m, obviously, the 
nominated individual for CQC, so anything in relation to 
regulatory issues that I need to update on that. So those are the 
other key areas’ (Care, Guinness). 
Boundaries are set on individuals as a result of the regulatory environment, 
particularly for clinical staff. 
 ‘supervision is a statutory requirement under regulation. So every 
single nurse and carer and so on will have one-to-one supervision 
at least monthly’ (CEO, Guinness).  
  
8.4.5 Internal policies and procedures 
External regulation is enforced and extended internally through 
policies and procedures. For example, financial procedures maintain 
control of expenditure throughout the organisation, explicitly mentioned 
by Cavell and Barton: 
‘From a finance perspective, I have some really robust policies and 
procedures with clear expenditure limits on individuals around the 
hospice. Everybody has signed up to purchasing policies and 




procedures, different people within different departments have 
limits. We have financial regulations. We perform internal audits’ 
(Finance, Cavell). 
In the case of hospices, there are also extensive clinical requirements. 
Cavell has developed these to the extent of gaining external accreditation, 
described by the trustee as a ‘kite-mark,’ in part to enhance their 
reputation. They have had to review all their policies and procedures which 
brings a huge burden: ‘A big onerous responsibility on the organisation to 
make sure those documents are credible and upto date and valid and 
reviewed’ (CEO, Cavell). At Seacole, they carry out unannounced visits by 
trustees who are specially trained in what to observe and even audit the 
quality of their appraisal system. Other research using Simons’ lever of 
control as a framework for analysis  (all within the private sector) has found 
similar examples of internal policies setting boundaries, such as CSR 
guidelines (Arjaliès & Mundy, 2013); customer relationship guidelines 
(Bruining, et al., 2004); and transfer pricing rules (Plesner Rossing, 2013).   
There is a balance to be struck by the formal procedures laid down 
and what can be dealt with in an informal way. The care director at 
Guinness gives the example of complaints.  Families are reluctant to 
complain and in some cases just want to have a quiet word about 
something. However, the care director is trying to log as much as they can, 
thus seeing an increase in complaints not being due to more problems but 
by resulting from a more robust process. It is ’not about hanging the staff 
members out to dry but it’s about ‘let’s see how we can do better’ (Care, 
Guinness). Cavell have also recently introduced a ‘statement of concern’ to 
pick up more incidents formally. This process of formalisation is discussed 
by Tessier and Otley (2012) and recognised by Bruining et al. (2004) as they 
observe how after a management buy-out, more formal policies were 
written by the new owners. 
 




8.5 Performance management: responsibility  
 Simons (1995) balances his enabling belief lever with a constraining 
boundary lever with formal controls such as the regulation and strategic 
planning; both evident in the case hospices. This research however 
proposes a broader concept than a boundary lever. In addition to the 
imposed constraints that Simons envisages, hospices demonstrate a wider 
sense of self-imposed responsibility. They are not merely accountable 
through reporting structures but have a ‘felt-responsibility’ to external 
stakeholders and the wider community. This sense of responsibility is 
partly a result of professional backgrounds but is also from the 
commitment to mission. The term ‘responsibility’ therefore is more 
appropriate than boundary in a voluntary sector context. Moreover, this 
better captures a paradox: setting boundaries also enables more autonomy 
and independence.  
 
8.5.1 Responsibility to stakeholders  
‘There is a correlation between what I am willing to do for them’ 
(and what they pay) (Business, Guinness). 
 There are not only formal governance structures but also an 
informal sense of responsibility to other stakeholders evident within the 
hospices. Some are more prominent than others reflecting the salience of 
those stakeholders (Mitchell, et al., 1997). We have seen how hospices 
value their independence as part of their ethos. This is in part due to their 
legal status but it also reflects the relative influence of the funders. There is 
unanimity amongst interviewees, across all roles and hospice 
organisations, that the extent of funding affects the influence of the funder 
on the organisation.  Where costs are fully paid by statutory sources, 
hospices accept that they are bound to do what is requested of them: 




‘A ‘paid bed’: And that’s where a commissioner’s got a particular 
identified need...And in those instances, they will pay 100% of the 
costs. So, in those particular cases, the commissioners call the shots’ 
(Business, Guinness). 
However, where they receive a significantly lower proportion of statutory 
income, they assert their independence. 
 
‘Don’t try and force your business and processes on me  because  
you only commission  26% of my services,  I  commission 74%’ (CEO, 
Barton). 
The five case hospices are not fully funded by the NHS, albeit with 
different arrangements for their statutory funding. Two have block grants 
with no stipulations over performance levels (although the finance 
representative could see how close the commissioner was trying to set 
targets in one case in their negotiations). One has an ‘historic’ grant with a 
standard NHS community contract with many performance criteria that do 
not apply to hospices. Two others have a variety of different arrangements 
with a series of statutory bodies. It was generally considered that not 
receiving full funding from NHS commissioners ensures the hospices’ 
independence. 
 
‘My view on this has changed slightly actually because when I first 
started here, I thought, well, obviously it would be best if they were 
NHS funded as much as they could possibly be…. And now I’ve 
realised that actually with an increase in statutory funding comes 
more obligation towards those bodies that are giving you that 
statutory funding’ (Trustee, Nightingale). 
 
 When asked whether their independence would be threatened if 
they had statutory funding levels of over 50%, the respondents were 
unanimous in agreeing that their self-determination would be threatened. 
‘I make the point that not more than half because one still wants to 




continue to do what we do in the way we want to do it’ (CEO, Cavell).
 Where the proportion of statutory funding is relatively high, the 
finance director is clear: ‘I do not feel independent…because we are so 
reliant on NHS income...it feels as if we are very, very regulated. ’ The 
trustee commented that there is always the ‘threat that you could have 
that service taken away’ if they fail to provide the information required by 
the CCGs.   However, where a case hospice receives significantly less than 
50% of its total income from statutory sources, an increase in this funding 
would be welcomed. A smaller proportion of statutory income might make 
them more independent of the NHS but it also makes them more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in other sources of funding which are less 
reliable and more costly to generate. 
‘The downside of that is we can be then also be constrained by 
charitable income generation. At the end of the day, it is ultimately 
the generosity of individuals that make that happen in lots of 
different ways. Corporately, collectively and individually. So the 
independence and that authority to change is also constrained by 
the generosity of others ultimately’ (CEO, Cavell). 
 
8.5.2 Responsibility to the community  
 ‘Hospices also have strong local and regionalised traditions. It's 
got a fairly high profile locally, a good reputation’ (Trustee, 
Cavell). 
 Reliant on the community as the main source of funds, they are 
‘dependent on a grateful public as they recognise it could be me or mine’ 
(Trustee, Barton). The business director at Nightingale spoke of his ‘patch’ 
as hospice shops are somewhat territorial. Their local reputation is their 
unique selling point, according to the CEO at Barton. ‘We are proving our 
worth and therefore why they should donate to us.’ Their dependence on 




funding brings a strong sense of moral responsibility: ‘Social responsibility 
to the community…it’s what we do here and the fundraising community 
brings in most of our income and they expect us to support those families 
(Business, Guinness). It extends beyond patients to employees, with the 
case hospices being a ‘large business in the local community…that means 
we have a responsibility to the community in all sort of different ways’ 
(CEO, Nightingale).  
 However, social awareness due to the need for funding is 
outweighed by a sense of community and co-operation. Within the case 
hospices, moral responsibility influences staff attitudes to spending money, 
with similar examples being cited by three of the five hospices. 
‘I mean we do consistently keep saying that that was someone 
running a half marathon, if someone's wasted some money that 
someone's endured 13 point whatever miles for … that £60 that 
could've been dealt with better’ (Finance, Nightingale). 
The hospice movement is known for its community roots. CEO at Barton 
explains that their current strategy is to ‘reinvest back in our heartland.’ 
Hospices are using community nurse specialists to complement the support 
provided at the hospice site as an ‘integrated care model’.  ‘Community 
work is about the desire to give the patient the opportunity to die at home’ 
(CEO, Cavell). ‘There is a very strong case for collaborative working’ 
(Business, Barton). The CEO of Guinness stresses the importance of co-
operation even if the benefit cannot be attributed to one part of the 
collaboration. He cites Henry Truman saying ‘It doesn’t matter how we get 
there, so long as you get there as ‘you're adding in from the side through 
opportunities other agencies, organisations, individuals, contributing to 
that improvement in wellbeing’ (CEO, Guinness).  
 
8.5.3 Sense of responsibility:  professional and organisational culture 




 While they value their independence, this in turn brings other 
responsibilities. If performance expectations are not imposed by funders, 
the board and senior management team create their own in providing 
what they consider to be the best service for their patients.  
‘And there is a lot of freedom to be had…freedom and accountability 
and responsibility that can be taken by an organisation…because a 
lot of freedom comes with that and we could provide a better 
service’ (Trustee, Nightingale). 
 
There is evidence of a sense of responsibility both professionally and 
organisationally within the hospices. The trustee at Barton gives the 
examples of role descriptors as means of setting individual boundaries and 
these are clearly part of the formal systems. She also describes 
’professional boundaries for those giving direct line care...and I also think 
training is about setting boundaries’ (Trustee, Barton). At Guinness, the 
finance director has ‘for want of a better expression, behavioural 
standards, it’s not just what we do, task-wise, whether we’re good, bad or 
indifferent at it, but it’s how we approach our job.’  Informal controls are 
set by the culture of the organisation. ‘I buy into the philosophy then 
everyone else buys into the philosophy and no way will I do anything that 
harms this organisation’ (CEO, Barton). ‘It’s a natural process of inculcation 
whereby people just know’ (CEO, Guinness). He gives the example of staff 
knowing where to draw the boundary in their professional relationships 
with patients and their families: ‘Because if you think about it you've got to 
be incredibly close to a family, friendly but never a friend’ (CEO, Guinness). 
8.5.4 Performance management: autonomy  
‘I don’t feel constrained’ (CEO, Cavell). 
  There are clearly constraints on CEOs:  ‘I think a strong board is the 
constraint for the CEO and in particular a strong Chairman who is 




independent of the CEO, whilst working effectively together. So the 
combination of a strong board and a strong chairman and clear measures 
of what we’re expecting, so that there is accountability’ (Trustee, Guinness). 
An accountant contrasts the tight control of the CEO exercised by the 
trustees with the autonomy he had experienced between non-executive 
directors and CEOs in commercial life, such as in approval levels for 
expenditure.  Yet, despite these, all CEOs spoke of their empowerment, not 
restrictions. Two spoke of the informal constraints, such as self-restraint 
and professional boundaries. 
 Simons (1995) argues that organizational participants can view 
boundary systems as either constraining or liberating, as freedom of action 
within specified bounds.   ‘In a perverse way constraint creates freedom in 
which the inspirational role of beliefs systems can flourish’ (Simons, 1995 
p53). ‘Although boundary systems are essentially proscriptive or negative 
systems, they allow managers to delegate decision-making and thereby 
allow the organization to achieve maximum flexibility and creativity.’ He 
goes as far as to suggest that employees are protected from senior 
management pressures by such boundaries. There are ample examples of 
this paradox, with hospice managers feeling liberated, within certain 
bounds, across all case hospices: 
‘If you’ve got somebody in a role, no matter how junior, if you could 
create an environment where they’ve got full ownership of that role, 
they understand what needs to be achieved but you allow them to 
achieve that in their way, I think you get the best out of people’ 
(Business, Cavell).  
Similarly, the senior managers in three hospices commented on the 
autonomy that they are given as opposed to the constraints under which 
they placed, both by the board and the CEO. The care director at Cavell 
answered ‘very little’ when asked about the boundaries that are put 
around her job. The business director at Barton attributed her long 




employment at the hospice to the autonomy she had been given. The 
finance director relishes his independence after his experience of the 
commercial world. 
‘I give them (directors) a lot of freedom on a day-to-day basis and I 
expect a lot of autonomy from them...what are the key areas that 
you're going to deliver on? And we agree those upfront and then we 
would have a process of checking back against where they said they 
were’ (CEO, Nightingale). 
Acknowledging their own freedom, senior managers try to give those that 
report to them equal freedom. They do also expect to be informed if things 
are not going to plan. 
‘If, for whatever the reason, you are not going to meet your target 
or something is not going to be achieved, it is your responsibility to 
let me know’ (Business, Barton). 
 
8.6 Relationships 
We have seen cybernetic control mechanisms operating within 
performance management systems in Chapter 7. This chapter has shown 
how these are complemented by Malmi and Brown’s (2008) two other 
layers of control which make up their package of controls (administrative 
and culture). By examining these under the headings of ethos and 
responsibility, both formal and informal controls are seen to work in 
conjunction. Mission statements are complemented by the conviction of 
staff and volunteers. Policies and procedures are complemented by 
organisational philosophy. Underpinning these control mechanisms are the 
formal meetings between the board and senior managers, or Simons’ 
interactive lever of control. However, in voluntary hospices, the 
communication amongst all stakeholders is evident, including the board, 
staff, volunteers, funders and the wider community. Informal relationships 




as well as formal information-based face-to-face meetings are part of this 
interactivity. 
 
8.6.1 Internal board and SMT relationships 
The interactive lever of control identified by Simons (1995) is 
concerned with the formal information systems used by managers to 
influence their subordinates’ decisions. We have seen the challenge and 
debate between board and the senior management team within the 
strategic planning process. There is clearly an emergent strategy as the 
board seek to involve other managers in identifying strategic uncertainties, 
very much as Simons envisaged in Chapter 7. However, we have seen in the 
responsibility section how there are different patterns of interaction 
between the senior managers, with a mix of formal and informal meetings 
within all the case hospices. There are also notable differences in the 
formality of the relationships between board and senior management 
teams (see section 3.2 for charity governance arrangements). To ensure 
good governance and accountability, the trustees acknowledge the formal 
role they need to play. ‘As a trustee, it is a very formal role actually’ 
(Trustee, Nightingale). One staff member commented on the formality of 
the trustee role: ‘It is always the trustees who make the final decision. It 
means that there is quite formal relationship between the trustees and 
senior management team with quite a lot meetings’ (Finance, Barton).  
Despite this, the role of the trustee is generally regarded as one that 
provides leadership and strategic direction but is not involved in day-to-day 
decisions, ‘It's a sense check really that we're heading in the right direction’ 
(Finance, Nightingale). 
‘The ED’s are the executive and they are accountable for the 
operations; I don’t see too many incidences where trustees are 
getting involved in the day-to-day’ (Finance, Guinness). 




The relationships between boards with their senior management 
teams strike a different balance in their formal and informal interactivity 
across the case hospices. At Nightingale, the relationship between the 
board and SMT is predominantly formal, possibly due to the lack of change 
in membership. ‘They seem to be more remote than I've met in other 
hospices (Finance, Nightingale). The finance director comments on the 
need to appoint trustees for a limited period as some had been on the 
board for twenty years. Another comments that they are ‘perhaps from a 
different era and we do need to evolve the situation.’ She explains that this 
should include bringing more women and younger people, rather than the 
‘good chap from The Rotary.’ The CEO also says that she was working hard 
with her board to ‘understand the complexities of the business much better 
and to bring in new board members and really strengthen the governance.’ 
In a second hospice, there is involvement at the highest level but with 
scope for the SMT to act as they see fit, albeit in dialogue with their 
trustees. The finance director typically meets a trustee three times 
between formal meetings: ‘one immediately before to discuss the content 
of the assurance meeting; one perhaps some time after the assurance 
meeting to say where we’re going; and one in the middle to keep abreast of 
what’s going on. I think there would be similar dialogues going on. I know 
there are similar dialogues going on with fundraising’ (Trustee, Guinness). 
At Seacole, the trustee declares ‘it’s not my role to interfere...we are the 
check and balances. I think we are the constraints.’  In the other two, the 
boards are more proactive in taking the strategic initiative and decision-
making. Several senior managers described their relationship with trustees 
as a partnership. At Barton, there are weekly chats between CEO and 
Chairman. 
‘There is an open dialogue… it does feel like partnership’ (Trustee, 
Barton). 
‘The Treasurer is in more often but on an informal basis, walking 
around chatting to the troops but others don’t do it’ (CEO, Barton). 




At Cavell, trustees are involved more closely but working in 
conjunction with the senior management team. They all have their 
individual role descriptions and appraisals; they also have a handbook and 
induction. If they chair a sub-committee, they are expected to write the 
reports for the board meetings in conjunction with the appropriate senior 
manager. The finance director describes her treasurer as her ‘partner’ 
adding ‘as a senior management team we probably drive their thinking 
down certain routes...but when we go away on our away days, we all focus 
on the plan of action to help us achieve those goals’ (Finance, Cavell).  ‘It 
wasn't us and them and it wasn’t management preaching to trustees, it 
was a facilitated session, which we all agreed’ (Trustee, Cavell). Trustee 
support is welcomed: 
  ‘Having worked in other charities where trustees can be more 
demanding and create work where actually it isn’t required, here 
they are quite supportive…I would say I work in partnership with 
trustees’ (Business, Cavell). 
In one case, there is a moderate concern that the trustees are 
intervening a little too directly, following the Cass review after which the 
trustee concluded that strategy ‘has been too much led by the senior 
management team (CEO, Barton). ’They used to really rubber stamp that  
but perhaps if it is not being managed correctly they will be dictating what 
the hospice should do  as opposed to governing what we do’ (Business, 
Barton). The finance director concludes ‘we have an executive which is not 
an executive’ (Finance,Barton). There are clearly different and quite fluid 
patterns in the formality of trustee and senior management relationships. 
  
8.6.2 Internal staff and volunteer relationships 
‘I do get a sense of togetherness’ (Trustee, Cavell).  




While every hospice has examples of the formal communication 
channels, all cases express the need for strong informal communications 
between employees. While the relationships between board and SMT 
illustrate different patterns of formality between the hospices, informal 
interactions between staff at all levels are considered to be a vital part of 
running all hospices.  
‘So you have got that kind of support process and time and explicit 
permission to take yourself away for half an hour and have a chat 
with the chaplain about how you are feeling…The staff were 
working in an environment which is very stressful’ (Care, Barton). 
Senior staff recognise the importance of making time to listen to 
staff, as part of their remit. ‘I don’t like to turn somebody away, because I 
think as a leader that’s part of your responsibility’ (Business, Cavell). Senior 
managers acknowledge the need ‘just to be accessible, to be visible, to be 
easy to talk to’ (Business, Cavell). One hospice stressed the ‘open door 
policy’ of its senior managers; its CEO was even criticised for being too 
accessible in his 360 degree review. Two other CEO’s spoke of the 
importance of being available to staff with one seeing walking around the 
hospice is an important aspect of his leadership ‘walk slowly amongst your 
men and smile’  (CEO, Barton). Another pays weekly visits to the hospices 
under his remit. A fourth CEO speaks of corridor chats: 
 ‘It's about people stopping you in the corridor or me stopping 
them and having a chat and hearing how they are first-hand’ 
(CEO, Nightingale). 
Good communication is essential for maintaining morale and motivation, 
both of staff and volunteers. Mutual support amongst staff is also 
encouraged in both formal and informal ways. 




 ‘we're also running something called Coaching Conversation, which 
allows people at a lower level to have chats with one another about 
things that are mutually beneficial ‘ (CEO, Guinness). 
‘There is a formal process but without a doubt there isn’t someone 
they can’t turn to and they think they would be listened to’ 
(Business, Barton). 
As we have seen in Chapter 7, senior staff also rely on informal 
communications as an informal diagnostic tool. When asked how they 
knew if the hospice was ‘doing well’, many answers from senior staff 
referred to the informal interactions with staff. Inter-departmental 
interactions are also considered to be key, partly within the clinical 
functions but also across support departments. In three cases, the finance 
managers are working to build closer relationships with their clinical 
colleagues. ‘Previously the finance team was very isolated in its role and 
one of the key things that we wanted to achieve, with the appointment of 
the head of finance, was somebody that could do the numbers but could be 
external facing. Because what we recognised was that we needed 
engagement in the finances beyond the finance function’ (Trustee, 
Nightingale). The recently appointed finance director at Guinness sees ‘the 
rest of the organisation as a customer of our service.’  Such relationships 
are not restricted to the finance function. The CEO Barton wanted ‘to mix 
the smoke’, (improving inter-departmental communication), when he took 
on the role, the CEO at Cavell talks of ‘cross fertilisation’ between clinical 
and medical staff and the business directors at both Seacole and 
Nightingale use the same phrase about avoiding silos: the strategic process 
is ‘very much about not working in silos so instead of doing things in 
insolation we’re doing things collectively’ (Business, Nightingale).  The 
business director at Seacole speaks of the need for ‘a good flow’ through 
the organisation to best serve the patients and supporters, as well as cost-
effectiveness, achieved through the cross-fertilisation across disciplines. 
Such relationships are helped by the size of the organisation which is also 




seen to promote good interactive relationships by two of the three smaller 
hospices. 
 ‘One of the things with having a smaller hospice…you’re visible and 
people become confident to approach you and ask questions’ 
(Finance, Cavell). 
 
8.6.3 External commissioner relationships 
 A broader concept of interactive systems than Simons (1995) 
described is needed to reflect the contribution of both formal and informal 
communications to the good performance of a hospice. This is not limited 
to relationships within the hospice but to the external stakeholders as well, 
such as funders and the wider community. Simons (1995) suggests that 
there should be interactions between senior and operational management 
to determine strategy. However, we have seen how hospices demonstrate 
a much wider involvement of stakeholders in their planning processes (see 
Chapter 7). The CEO at Nightingale speaks of the importance of 
communication at the outset, consulting not only internal but also external 
stakeholders in the construction of the vision. Their key goals and 
deliverables ‘were shared far and wide across all of our local public sector 
organisations, through some community groups, some hard to reach 
groups with volunteers.’ By creating a ‘collective vision’ she believes that 
they have ‘created a much stronger sense of autonomy I think and 
contribution from people at every level, including volunteers, because 
they're very much a key part of the strategy as well. So I think it's about 
talking to people and getting into those conversations early’ (CEO, 
Nightingale).  
 Control is exercised as much through hospice relationships with 
their NHS funders as through formal diagnostic reporting, previously seen 
in a public sector case studied by Kominis and Dudau (2012). As the care 
director at Barton said: ‘in my role, it is important that I have good working 




relationships with people such as commissioners’. While one respondent 
stresses the lack of freedom to negotiate on the levels of funding, they do 
discuss what constitutes appropriate reporting metrics. ‘So we’ve done a 
lot of negotiation with xxx on what we would like to report back on that’s 
valuable to them and meaningful’ (Care, Guinness). It is the relationship 
between them that works to their mutual benefit with the collaborative 
nature of the relationship being noted by interviewees.   
‘The advantage of not being totally funded by the NHS means that 
we have a level of freedom and I would want the minimum of 
reporting to take place so we can focus on the care of the patient 
rather than doing lots of returns which we do in the NHS that takes 
up time…So mutually we have agreed with commissioners that 
these are the key metrics. We have a good relationship with the 
commissioners’ (Care, Barton). 
Hospice staff are concerned that moving to a tariff-based system would 
undermine this spirit of collaboration and increase the administrative 
burden: 
  ‘We need to meet much the same level of contract conditions that 
someone like Virgin healthcare would..all sorts of details we have 
to sign in blood to say we comply. So it’s hugely onerous for a 
small organisation like this’ (Finance, Guinness). 
  ‘the language of competitive tendering is not supportive of 
collaborative working because what happens is you start to set up 
coalitions’(CEO,Seacole).  
Such an approach would result in hospices becoming more transactional 
and less relational. Instead, the CEO at Nightingale sees palliative care as a 
golden thread: ‘In order to help change the culture around end-of-life care, 
my personal view is it would be more helpful to move away from a tariff 




and to actually think about how you can weave palliative medicine into all 
aspects of medicine within various settings.’ 
 In three hospices, there is a well-developed collaborative relationship 
and in a fourth they are hopeful of negotiating improved reporting in the 
near future. ‘So we are doing so much work around this (quality) which is 
good that they are now listening to us and not using these silly measures’  
(Care, Cavell). In the fifth, it is harder due to having many contractual 
relationships but the director responsible says: ‘A lot of what I do is based 
on relationships, that the commissioner understands our service‘. They are 
also working towards achieving consistency across different funders. At 
Seacole, the CEO believes that managing a mixed portfolio of different 
financial arrangements, even within the statutory income, is the key to 
managing a high dependence on statutory sources. She encourages 
strategic discussions with higher levels of the CCG management rather 
than just monitoring the contract details, although she experiences 
frustration that the NHS strategy evolves so much more slowly than that of 
the hospice.  
 
8.6.4  External Community relationships 
‘This is where you get the independence...it is the volunteers and the 
funding’ (CEO Barton) 
 Hospices are seeking to build collaborative relationships with their 
communities. Their mission is to provide the services needed within their 
localities. To do this, they are dependent on their volunteer workforce. 
Hospices are most concerned to preserve their local reputations. The 
external accreditation achieved by one hospice allows them to endorse 
their high standards of quality publically. The business director at Barton 
explains that the shops need to present a professional image, worthy of 
the quality of clinical provision offered to patients. Two CEOs comment on 




the importance of giving appropriate messages, both ultimately to ensure 
their funding levels are maintained.  
‘Talking to the staff, making it clear to them what is the unique 
selling point to xxx…it is its reputation.  Anything that would impair 
the reputation would impair fundraising and their jobs’ (CEO, 
Barton). 
Increasing efforts are put into effective communication strategies. 
Investment is made in donor relationship systems. ‘I mean part of the 
common strategy is to engage with people better’ not simply promoting 
single events but using different social media for different audiences. ‘It's 
using the right channels to do the right thing to get to people’. Moreover, 
she is looking for long-term income streams ‘Every time I write a cheque 
out to a charity it's going to be xxx. That's the relationship we want to get 
with people.’ To achieve this, information has an important role to play. 
‘Then you've got to give them something, it's about that exchange. And the 
exchange from our point of view is information’ (Business, Nightingale).  
 
8.6.5 Performance management: relationships at the heart of the hospice  
‘In simplistic terms, we are a business involved with people’ (Care, Barton). 
In the context of a hospice, Simons’ LOC overlooks the importance 
of informal interactions and communication in the achievement of its 
impact. Fundamentally, relationships are at the heart of a hospices’ 
operation. We have seen it has a key role in sharing information between 
the board, senior management team, staff and volunteers. It underpins the 
effective leadership on which good staff morale depends. Nevertheless, it 
is the caring relationships built by staff with patients that is at the heart of 
what makes performance ‘good’ in a hospice (see Chapter 6). To achieve its 
outcomes, a hospice is heavily dependent on staff interaction through 
understanding a patient’s needs. At one hospice clinical staff have training 




in advanced communication skills as ‘communication is so essential in 
terms of patients and carers’ (Care, Barton). In another, communication is 
an explicit part of their strategy. At Barton, the values include ‘collective 
leadership’, explained by the care director as: 
 ‘I mean I think a lot of the time the staff that work in a hospice, 
whether it's the chaplain or housekeeper or nursing staff or 
whoever, they're assimilating a lot of information about a patient 
and a family which translates into a total package of care which is 
very difficult to define and describe and certainly very difficult to 
purchase. And I mean as much as it would be wonderful to think 
you could deliver care like that in any setting to any person, to me 
it's inevitable I think that hospices have captured that so well, 
because of their purpose and what they're trying to achieve. But if 
you could bottle that and deliver that in other settings as well that 
would be very powerful’ (CEO, Nightingale).  
Thus, communication is at the heart of what the hospice is setting out to 
achieve and also benefits where there are good interactive relationships 
with external stakeholders including funders and the wider community.  
 
 




Table 8.1 Generic and voluntary sector Levers of Control  




SLOC : defining 
features 
Voluntary sector 
levers of control 
Sector–specific modifications Hospice examples 
Belief Formal, information-
based  mission 
statements to 





Informal ethos as well as formal belief  
Purpose and values, rather mission statement, inspires and directs 
Intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivation 
Volunteering spirit, staff commitment 
Charitable objects act as a boundary defining activities 
External mission enables stakeholder funds to be spent appropriately 
Resolves internal conflicts over priorities, preventing mission-drift 
Holistic philosophy including 
psychosocial and spiritual aspects of 
care.  
Boundary Formal strategic plans, 
budgets 
Formal policies and 
procedures 





Informal boundaries as well as formal 
Organisational culture and professional boundaries 
External stakeholder influence sets limits 
Sense of responsibility to the community 
Self-restraint through commitment to the mission imposes constraints 
Cost-control through commitment to mission 
Commissioner relationships as 
relational  as well as transactional 
control 
 
Diagnostic Formal performance 






Informal diagnostics used to evaluate performance 
Sense  of atmosphere, corridor conversations  
Community reputation 
Anecdotal stories 
A good death is an intangible 
outcome.   
Spontaneous family letters 
Trustee hospice visits 
Interactive Formal meetings 
between executive 
directors and senior 
managers to identify 
emergent strategies 
Relationships Informal communication  amongst all levels of staff 
External as well as internal communications 
Community relationships 
To aspire to a good death involves 
good relationships and 
communications between patients, 
families, board, staff and volunteers. 




8.7 Flesh on the skeletal framework 
 
Derived from the analysis of case hospices, Table 8.1 sets out how 
the LOC framework may be adapted for use in both the voluntary sector. 
Examples from hospice performance management are used to ‘flesh out’ 
the skeletal framework set out in chapter 5, derived from the literatures of 
management control and the voluntary sector. This incorporates some of 
the fundamental differences between the voluntary sector and the private 
and public sectors, such as being mission-driven with multi-stakeholders 
and different governance structures. Three themes are identified in this 
chapter – ethos, responsibility and relationships. This is supplemented by 
evidence from the case hospices to build a new performance management 
framework. 
A new lever, ethos, captures a more complex set of controls than 
Simons envisages in his belief lever. Rather than a formal mission 
statement inspiring employees, the commitment and sense of purpose of 
trustees, senior managers, staff and volunteers is evidence of strong 
intrinsic and informal motivation. Mission statements operate in different 
ways to other sectors, acting as a boundary, defining and limiting its 
activities, as well as motivating staff. Such limits ensure that stakeholders 
can provide funds in the knowledge that they should be used as they 
intended. Mission statements are cited where conflicts arise to ensure the 
mission is prioritised over commercial expedient.  
 This research proposes a responsibility lever instead of Simons’ 
boundary lever. As well as the formal controls of rules, procedures and 
strategic plans, this includes informal constraints, such as organisational 
culture and acceptable professional behaviours. A sense of personal 
restraint arises from a commitment to the mission. The influence of 
stakeholders sets expectations and puts limits on a voluntary sector 
activities. Cost control is not only maintained through budgets but also a 
. 




sense of responsibility.  The case analysis suggests that the diagnostic lever 
needs to incorporate more than performance measures, discussed in 
chapter 7. Entitled judgement, this lever describes how performance is 
evaluated in voluntary sector organisations. Informal diagnostics, such as 
anecdotal letters, corridor conversations, a CEO’s sixth sense of how it is 
performing internally and reputational feedback from the community all 
contribute to how the performance of a hospice is evaluated.  
Simons’ fourth lever, interactive, is considered here to underpin the 
other levers to such an extent that it is not a separate lever at all.  It 
includes communications between all stakeholders, not just meetings 
between senior managers and their direct reports. As informal 
communications have as important role to play as formal face-to-face 
meetings, this is described as relationships. This supports Simons’ own 
elaboration of his framework where he distinguishes between ‘design 
attributes’ and ‘attention patterns’; the latter being the use of lever such as 
interactive (see Chapter 2). 
 
8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the question if hospice performance cannot 
be fully measured, how can it be managed effectively. It draws upon the 
management control and voluntary sector literatures from which a skeletal 
framework is derived. Responses from semi-structured interviews with 
hospice personnel, guided by the protocol informed by the Ferreira and 
Otley’s PMCS framework, are used to put ‘flesh’ on the skeleton. In chapter 
7, a new lever ‘judgement’ is proposed to enhance Simons’ diagnostic 
lever. This chapter also highlights the need to extend Simons’ LOC to 
incorporate informal as well as formal controls in other levers and 
applicable to all sectors. This chapter also recommends modifications to 
SLOC for use within the voluntary sector, including an ethos and a 
responsibility lever, in place of belief and boundary respectively. Together 




with relationships, these form a new performance management framework 












Chapter 9: Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
Drawing on the skeletal framework, developed in Chapter 5, a new 
framework is developed for understanding performance management in 
voluntary hospices in the UK in this chapter. The skeletal framework 
incorporates the features of two management control frameworks: 
Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control (LOC) and Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) 
Performance Management and Control System (PMCS). It also includes 
modifications suggested by management control theorists and the 
characteristics of the voluntary sector. Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) PMCS is 
used to analyse the strategic alignment of the aims, strategies, objectives, 
measures and achievements of 148 hospices in England and Wales in 
Chapter 5 and to develop the interview protocol for the case studies.   
Simons’ (1995) LOC framework is used to analyse the responses from 
twenty-five trustees, CEOs and senior managers in the five case hospices in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The skeletal framework enables the integration of 
these findings and provide insights into the role of performance measures 
in the management of hospices. Analyses of the statutory returns and the 
case studies add the ‘flesh’ to the skeletal framework. (Broadbent & 











9.2 Development of a voluntary sector performance management 
framework 
Figure 9.1: Skeletal framework  
Source: author’s own interpretation of the literature of management 
control and voluntary sector performance measurement. 
A framework for voluntary sector performance management is 
derived using the findings of this research to flesh out the skeletal 
framework (see Figure 9.2). This is a circular framework rather than a 
hierarchical, linear or causal linear model. Performance management is 
more than mechanistic and transactional diagnostic measures. It 
incorporates organic and relational controls. Three of the four levers of 
Simons’ framework (belief, boundary and diagnostic) are represented by 
triangles. However, this research concludes that his fourth interactive 
control underpin these three levers and is not a separate lever or ‘design 
attribute.’ Instead it is how the other levers are used or an ‘attention 




pattern.’  These triangles represent the formal information systems 
identified by Simons.  However, the voluntary sector performance 
management framework also includes the broader informal levers of 
ethos, responsibility and judgement to complement the formal belief, 
boundary and diagnostic levers respectively.  Informal controls identified in 
the case hospices include values, intrinsic motivation and volunteering 
spirit within the ethos lever. The commitment to the community, 
stakeholder influence, organisational culture and professional standards 
are informal controls operating within the responsibility lever. Judgement 
is exercised when evaluating the performance of voluntary organisations, 
informed by the anecdotal evidence of patient letters, community 
feedback, corridor conversations and trustees visits. Figure 9.1 illustrates 
how the levers of controls overlap each other. Ethos set limits through 
defining the hospices’ purpose and influences how performance is 
evaluated. Strategic plans set boundaries and determine what 
performance measures are used. 
 















Source: Author’s own 




9.2.1  Not a hierarchical framework 
Attempts to impose vertical linearity on performance management 
frameworks in the voluntary sector over-simplify the complex mix of 
mission and money, described in both narratives and numbers. Evidence 
from the case hospices supports the conclusions drawn in the voluntary 
sector literature that good performance is intangible, difficult to define and 
has multiple objectives eg Forbes (1998) and Sawhill and Williamson 
(2001). This is contrasted with perceptions of simplicity in the private 
sector with its single bottom line (Kaplan, 2001; Speckbacher, 2003).  Many 
interviewees comment on the difficulty of defining the fundamental 
purposes, objectives and how success is perceived in practice. ‘It’s a really 
difficult question’ (Business, Guinness). The overriding outcome suggested 
by the NPC and independently identified by two interviewees is the 
provision of a ‘good death.’ This is an extreme example of a voluntary 
sector outcome, as its beneficiaries cannot provide even anecdotal 
evidence of good performance. However it illustrates how voluntary sector 
outcomes may not be measureable and how many other factors need to be 
considered to determine ‘success’. Good outcomes can also include the 
needs of stakeholder groups other than the patient, such as families and 
other health care providers. Proxies for a good death, such as place of 
death and hospital admission prevented can be employed.  Factors which 
contribute to a good death such as the quality of service provided can be 
used to imply good performance.  When a comparison is made of what 
respondents consider to be good performance against what they actually 
measure, there is not a complete match. Rather than suggesting that this 
indicates inadequate management control, it can be concluded that good 
performance management is not necessarily demonstrated just by the 
measurement of outcomes. Representing the flow from aims or outcomes 
to performance measures as a clear hierarchy, such as in the Ferreira and 
Otley (2009) PMCS framework therefore over simplifies the complexity of 
voluntary sector performance management. 





9.2.2 Not a causal model 
Management control theory sets out four key conditions for 
effective performance management: there must be a clear aim or purpose; 
whose outputs must be measurable; the measures need to be predictive, 
showing the cause-and-effect relationships; and corrective action must be 
able to follow (Emmanuel, et al., 1990, p. 8). Simons (1995) not only 
endorsed this but supplements it with the condition that performance 
measures should be complete.  Even if their outcomes are not easily 
measureable, hospices do have many outputs that can be measured. We 
have seen the extensive reporting of financial performance internally in the 
management accounts and externally in their statutory returns.  
Operational output (statistics on the care provided) provides most of the 
numerical reporting in the TAR and Annual Reviews, funder reports and 
internal performance measurement. However, there is little evidence that 
these outputs are used to demonstrate any cause-and-effect relationship. 
Quality of care is taken as a proxy for a good death but no direct causal 
links are established between the two. There is little evidence of any 
internal costing systems relating cost per unit or activity operating 
effectively in the case hospices, beyond illustrative costs used for 
marketing purposes. Moreover, after seven years of discussions and 
analysis, the National Palliative Funding Review has not been able to 
determine any agreed tariff for hospice services, relating stages 
(currencies) of patient decline with the costs of activities to support them. 
While the voluntary sector literature on performance measurement 
has a myriad of different systems for measuring performance, one 
dominant model is that of the logic model, whereby inputs, outputs and 
outcomes are compared to assess efficiency and effectiveness.  Connolly 
and Hyndman (2003) have criticised the lack of reporting of these ‘higher’ 
levels of performance in UK Charity statutory reports over the last thirty 




years. The findings of the analysis of the hospice SIR and TARs (in Chapter 
5) supports the conclusions that there is an apparent lack of reporting of 
efficiency and effectiveness measures. However, this research does not 
endorse the conclusions drawn from their analysis that poor quality 
external reporting is a product of weak internal control systems.  Instead it 
suggests that efficiency may not be an appropriate question to ask of 
voluntary sector organisations. Moreover, effectiveness is better 
determined by considering how they fulfil their objectives, rather than by 
measuring outcomes against outputs. 
Evidence from the five case hospices suggests that the distinction 
between outputs and outcomes becomes blurred in the perception of the 
interviewees. ‘The words are interchangeable really’ (Trustee, Seacole). 
Outcomes are clearly contrasted with outputs in the logic model. ‘Outputs 
represent what a programme actually does whereas the outcomes are the 
results it produces’ (Poister, 2003, p. 38). However, when asked about 
good hospice outcomes, almost half of the interviewees reply in terms of 
quality of service, or outputs, rather than the results of the programme. 
The distinction between quality of service and quality of patient experience 
is not clear and used interchangeably.  There is a significant overlap of 
what is considered to be success and the means by which success is 
delivered, as the response of the trustee at Cavell below suggests.  
 ‘Good performance in a hospice? And I’d go back to finance, to 
make sure that it's managing its finances…. But there is something about 
quality. Are you providing a good quality service? How do you measure 
that...quality is a bit of a perception. What you need to do is understand 
that that's how it's being perceived by the patient, their carer and the 
family so that … there are ways of doing that, which you know. Patient 
surveys and the latest thing is friends and family tests and that kind of stuff’ 
(Trustee, Cavell). 




Financial viability, committed staff and good community relations are all 
considered as part of the good performance of a hospice.  Thus the ‘ends’ 
and ‘means’ become intertwined and so it is misleading in any framework 
for the performance management of voluntary hospices to have clear-cut 
linear or causal relationships between outputs and outcomes. This research 
suggests that it is less clear in the perceptions of hospice management.   
Any framework which incorporates a mechanistic causality is likely to 
misrepresent what is happening in practice. 
One hospice employs the BSC, a model distinctive for its cause-and-
effect relationships. However, Nightingale’s BSC focuses on efficiency 
measures rather than cause-and-effect links.  The use of the BSC here 
endorses the findings of Gurd and Guo (2007) that many healthcare sector 
BSCs have not evolved beyond a dashboard and do not demonstrate the 
higher levels of strategy-mapping proposed by Kaplan and Norton (2000). 
This may not be due to lack of sophistication on the part of the hospice but 
can imply that the BSC, operating as a causal model, is an inappropriate 
way of assessing hospice and arguably, voluntary sector performance.  
 
9.2.3 Diverse, aligned and integrated performance measures 
While a hierarchical or causal model may misrepresent voluntary 
sector performance management, there is evidence of diverse, aligned and 
integrated performance measurement systems within the voluntary 
hospices. The performance measures used are clearly diverse with non-
financial measures, particularly operational care metrics being reported 
alongside financial measures. Extensive efforts are made to align 
performance measures to hospice strategies with four of the five case 
hospices explicitly doing so. They demonstrate different approaches to 
achieving strategic alignment. Cavell identifies critical success factors which 
measure the key elements of their hospices strategy. Nightingale use a BSC 
format to report against key indicators across the main function of their 




operation. Guinness has created an extensive reporting structure based on 
the logic model, incorporating outcomes, outputs and measures. Seacole 
uses an operational plan to link hospice strategy and individual appraisals. 
The hospices integrate their performance management systems but 
not in the causal way described by the literature. Hospice performance 
measurement demonstrates a balanced approach but one that balances 
words with numbers rather than across different sets of metrics. Three 
hospices use narrative reporting as well as numbers in their board reports 
to demonstrate their good performance within their hospice. At Cavell, the 
critical success factors are described in both words and numbers. At 
Guinness, the logic model incorporates milestones as well as numerical 
targets.  Seacole reports against strategic milestones with operational and 
financial data being reported to the board separately.  
‘With the impact statement, it’s no numbers without words and no 
words without numbers and that’s really important in terms of 
communicating the value of the work that we do. You need both.’ 
(Business, Guinness). 
Hospice performance reporting is integrated but not as described in the 
voluntary sector performance measurement literature.  Operational 
outputs are reported against strategic aims, thus incorporating both the 
strategic and operational dimensions of management control 
recommended by Tessier and Otley (2012). However, outcomes are 
predominantly described in terms of the impact on an individual patient or 
their families.  There are only a few cases where they consider the broader 
impact of the hospice on society.  One CEO acknowledges a responsibility 
to ensure beds are utilised efficiently so that as many patients as possible 
can benefit.   One trustee expressed the good performance in terms of the 
hospice’s strategic aim of meeting the estimated need of all the patients in 
the community. These findings support the argument of Ebrahim and 
Rangan (2014) that measuring shared outcomes and societal impact should 




be the responsibility of organisations at a higher level and not the 
individual organisations. In the case of hospices, the number of people 
dying in their place of choice is a health authority, not a hospice, outcome. 
Any framework should therefore reflect strategic outcomes in as far as the 
voluntary organisation is able to make an identifiable impact on them.  
9.2.4 A comprehensive framework with informal as well as formal 
controls 
This research supports the view that a voluntary sector 
performance management framework should be comprehensive by 
incorporating both informal as well as formal levers of control.  Prior 
research calls for the examination of informal controls operating within 
Simons’ LOC (Martyn, et al., 2016; Mundy, 2010). However, there has been 
limited empirical evidence of how this operates in practice and this is 
mainly confined to research in the private sector. Collier (2005) has 
demonstrated this but only for two of the four levers, observing how 
boundary and interactive levers operate informally in an entrepreneurial 
company. Bruining at al. (2004) examine the change of culture in an 
organisation following a management buy-out. There is just one study 
using LOC to examine a voluntary organisation: Chenhall et al. (2010) 
analyse the clash between cultural and economic capitals in an NGO.  By 
extending Simons’ LOC to incorporate social controls, the skeletal 
framework can be used to analyse the responses of twenty-five 
interviewees and bring insight to how informal controls operate within the 
case hospices. 
 Belief is a powerful part of the management control system 
operating within the case hospices. Simons’ (1995) in his LOC describes 
how formal information systems exercise control in his belief lever. He 
identifies mission statements as the primary means to motivate and inspire 
employees. Indeed, the case hospices are using mission and vision 
statements in the way in which he envisages. They are formally drawn up, 




communicated throughout the organisation and are used to motivate staff.  
However, Ouchi (1979) and Merchant and van der Stede (2012) do not 
limit such controls to formal information-based controls and recognise the 
contribution of informal, clan, social and cultural controls to management 
control. The case hospices endorse the inclusion of informal values and 
commitment to mission within a performance management framework.  In 
fact, the holistic hospice philosophy is such an important factor that this 
research proposes a new lever, ethos, which encompasses much more than 
mission statements. The sense of purpose amongst trustees, senior 
management teams, staff and volunteers is not driven by a formal 
document. Leadership provided by the board and CEO, the values upheld 
by them and their senior management team and the conviction of 
volunteers all suggests that the commitment to mission is a product of 
informal social control. The mission statement is not the source of 
inspiration and motivation, as argued by Simons for the private sector, but 
the result of the strong ethos within hospices and arguably the voluntary 
sector as a whole. 
 Boundaries are set by the hospices and their management team 
through formal governance processes, identified as administrative controls 
by Malmi and Brown (2008). In many ways these are akin to the boundary 
systems, described by Simons (1995). Hospices are subject to regulation 
through society’s laws, organisational belief systems and professional 
codes of conduct. We have seen how hospices choose to extend these 
through policies and procedures across all aspects of their operations. 
Simons (1995) emphasises the need for strategic boundaries to be set 
through the planning processes considered as a cybernetic system in Malmi 
and Brown’s (2008) package of controls and discussed in Chapter 7. These 
are clearly evident in all case hospices with strategies being drawn up, and 
operating plans, annual budgets and appraisals setting out expectations for 
the hospices and their staff. While there are many examples of boundary 
controls operating in the private sector (Bruining, et al., 2004; Arjaliès & 




Mundy, 2013; Plesner Rossing, 2013), there is only one example in 
voluntary sector literature. This merely confirms that boundary controls 
are circumvented by belief control (Chenhall, et al., 2010).  
 The findings of this research show how informal as well as formal 
boundary controls impose limits on the case hospices.  Bruining et al. 
(2004) argue that the internal organisational philosophy imposes 
boundaries on staff in their study of management buy outs. Such informal 
boundaries can be found in the case hospices too but the findings shed 
light on other informal constraints as well. In the responses from the 
interviewees, it can also be seen how limits are set through the external 
influence of stakeholders. Funders exert pressure through the dependence 
of the hospices on their donations. However, there is not only evidence of 
externally imposed constraints and accountabilities but also self-imposed 
boundaries, or a ‘felt-responsibility’ (Ebrahim, 2003).   Senior managers set 
limits on themselves through a sense of self-restraint.  They develop a 
sense of responsibility from the informal commitment to mission and 
impose limits on themselves. In a similar way, there is a sense of 
responsibility to provide value for money. Staff are cost conscious, not 
necessarily due to the imposed financial controls but as a result of a 
commitment to manage their operations responsibly. This implies that a 
broader notion of ‘responsibility’ should be used in the proposed 
framework for performance management in the voluntary sector rather 
than simply the formal boundary controls. Trustees, CEOs and senior 
managers are given responsibility through formal management control 
systems such as organisation structures and governance procedures but 
they also take responsibility for themselves as a result of their commitment 
to mission and purpose and knowing from where the money has come. 
There are several aspects of hospice performance that are not 
frequently captured by the formal diagnostic performance measurement 
systems. Volunteer time and donated goods are not often measured as 
part of the inputs. Goodwill and compassion are not measured as part of 




the outputs. Anecdotal evidence, such as patient stories, is not part of the 
measurable outcomes. Informal diagnostics are used to complement the 
formal measures, such as a CEO’s sixth sense of how the hospice is 
performing internally and its external reputation in the community. 
Judgement, the third lever, is used by trustees, CEOs and senior 
management in evaluating the performance of the hospices.  Simons 
(1995) envisages his interactive lever as the formal information-based 
systems where senior managers interact to manage strategic uncertainty. 
However, there is as much evidence of informal communications being an 
important part of hospice performance management as the formal 
information systems. The case hospices provide abundant evidence of 
informal communication playing a fundamental role in the management of 
the hospices, alongside formal meetings between the board, and senior 
managers. This is not surprising and prior research has provided evidence 
of this in all sectors. Collier (2005) argues that control is exercised in an 
entrepreneurial company through the informal meetings with staff in pubs 
while travelling. Bruining et al. (2004) see the venture capitalist, 
owner/manager relationship as key after a management buy-out. Kominis 
and Dudau (2012) find a move from diagnostic to interactive controls in the 
public sector. Chenhall et al. (2010) find evidence of informal organic 
controls operating as case workers have informal meetings with co-
ordinators.  
 
9.2.5 Interactive control underpins a performance management 
framework 
Simons (1995) identifies the interactive lever as a separate control 
system, operated by senior managers. It is clear that interactivity within 
the hospices does not only include formal meetings between the board and 
senior managers but informal communications with staff, volunteers and 
external stakeholders. Mundy (2010) goes as far as to argue that the 




interactive lever is the most important of the four controls advocated by 
Simons. Management control theorists such as Tessier and Otley (2012) 
argue that the types of controls need to be distinguished from the uses of 
those controls. Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) set out to extend Ferreira 
and Otley’s PMCS framework, particularly the outer rings which 
incorporates Simons’ LOC. Their conceptual framework is designed to show 
how organisations chose to operate different controls on a continuum 
between relational and transactional approaches.   The case hospices 
provide evidence of both relational and transactional controls operating in 
tandem.  In Chapter 6, delivery of good performance is achieved through 
people as well as processes.  However, Simons (1995) in his appendix 
draws the distinction been ‘design attributes’ or types of control, such as 
boundary and belief levers, and ‘attention patterns’ or uses of control such 
as diagnostic and interactive methods. He goes on to show in his appendix 
that controls are not only used diagnostically, but that diagnostics can also 
be the levers of control themselves, as performance measures.  This 
suggests that there are three, not four formal levers of control: belief; 
boundary; and diagnostic. They can all be used interactively and arguably 
this underpins the framework as a whole.  The mapping of Ferreira and 
Otley’s PMCS (2009) onto Simons’ (1995) LOC in Chapter 2 shows how all 
elements of the PMCS framework are used interactively. Indeed it is hard 
to imagine any organisation operating without extensive communication 
between all levels of management in most if not all of its operations. 
This research therefore concludes that any notion of control 
involving interactivity should include both formal and informal 
communications across all organisational levels and with both internal and 
external stakeholders. The term ‘relationship’ provides a more 
comprehensive description of this lever.   However, these relationships 
underpin every other control to such an extent that it is misleading to 
represent it as a control in its own right. This endorses Malmi and Brown’s 




(2008) typology which does not identify communication or interaction 
separately.  
 
9.2.6 A framework with overlapping controls 
 A defining characteristic of Simons’ (1995) LOC is the dynamic 
tension between the different levers. There have been several studies 
which have demonstrated the importance of observing how all of Simons’ 
four levers of control are operating in conjunction (Tuomela, 2005; Mundy, 
2010; Bruining, et al., 2004; Kominis & Dudau, 2012). His levers are 
designed to balance the tension between the enabling and constraining 
influences. While boundary and diagnostic levers limit an organisations 
activities or ‘yin’, belief and interactive controls are designed to promote 
innovation or ‘yang’. While Tessier and Otley (2012) dispute the positive 
and negative connotations, they accept the enabling and constraining 
terminology. The belief control is therefore seen as a ‘positive’ enabling 
‘yang’ control, counterbalancing the ‘negative’ boundary control.  
However, this research shows how mission statements put limits, acting as 
the ‘yin’ around certain activities in a voluntary sector context. They are 
used to define their fundamental raison d’etre in the absence of a 
fundamental private sector purpose of maximizing shareholder value and 
public sector service provision.  While the use of mission statements as a 
means to engage stakeholders has been cited in levers of control literature 
(Arjaliès & Mundy, 2013; Chenhall, et al., 2010), the case hospices illustrate 
how it can be used to set boundaries (see Chapter 8). The mission 
statements and charitable objects ensure the activities are used to fulfil its 
purpose. This should also make certain that stakeholder funds are spent in 
line with their intentions. Mission statements are also used to determine 
individuals’ objectives within their appraisals and set out the values to be 
upheld by staff members. Expectations of acceptable behaviour are set 
through recruitment, induction and training, showing how the values can 




be put into practice. There are examples in the case hospices of how the 
mission statement helps to resolve conflicts within the organisation, 
limiting the free action of senior managers.  
‘My particular challenge is with the retail company. Of course, we're 
supported by commercial undertakings and commercial 
drivers...And I still have to say in the end you belong to me, you're 
not an independent company. These are the constraints under 
which we operate and I'm afraid you will adhere to them as well, 
however annoying and frustrating you may feel it to be. At which 
point of course I get lots of steam being blown at me’ (CEO, 
Guinness). 
 
This could provide evidence to support the theoretical claim by Tessier and 
Otley (2012) that belief could be considered part of boundary control. 
Alternatively, this research suggests that the belief and boundary levers of 
control overlap each other (see Table 9.1).  
Moreover, there are ample examples of overlaps between the other levers 
of control. There is extensive overlapping between the boundary and 
diagnostic levers. Strategic plans, budgets and costing systems not only 
determine the limits under which managers operate but also set out the 
diagnostics against which they will be measured. Milestones focus senior 
managers’ attention on certain priorities and allow progress to be 
monitored. Operational KPIs set limits and enable performance evaluation. 
Belief systems also overlap with diagnostic controls. Mission statements 
determine which measures are considered important and why they are 
selected as the key indicators of performance. Informal diagnostics, such as 
sensing an atmosphere and interpreting corridor conversations, are 
influenced by the judgement and ethos of senior managers. A sense of 
achievement is gained through intrinsic motivation in fulfilling its purpose 
as well as diagnostic results.  








Ethos of the organisation determines what is acceptable 
organisational activity 
Purpose, set out in mission statements and charitable objects, sets 
limits on a voluntary organisation’s activities  
Charitable objects ensure stakeholders’ funds are spend in line with 
their beliefs 
Mission statements are used to set objectives in individuals’ 
appraisals 
Mission statements include values, guiding senior management and 
staff behaviours 
Personal conviction in the mission encourages self-restraint 
Recruitment, training and induction helps to create and communicate 
organisational ethos and limits  
Conflicts are resolved with reference to mission 
Responsibility/ 
Judgement 
Strategic plans set boundaries and determine measures 
Budgets, KPIS and costing systems  limit expenditure and enable 
performance evaluation 
Milestones focus management attention on acceptable activities and 




Mission statements set out what is considered to be good 
performance, thereby influencing what is measured 
Informal judgements influence how performance is evaluated  
Ethos provides intrinsic motivation and sense of fulfilment, instead of 
reward through achievement of performance measures 
Source: author’s analysis of the case study findings 
 
9.3 Conclusion 
A new performance management framework for the voluntary 
sector is proposed. The findings from the hospice case studies enable the 
flesh to be put on the skeletal framework drawn up in Chapter 5. This 
framework is not hierarchical, nor causal. It is comprehensive in that it 
includes both formal and informal controls. It is argued that one of Simons’ 
levers, interactive, is not a separate lever but describes how the other 
three levers are used. This has implications not just for the voluntary sector 
but also for all sectors. A more nuanced understanding of how the levers 
overlap and interact with each other is offered. Three new levers of control 




are identified: ethos, responsibility and judgement, underpinned by 
relationships. 
  




Chapter 10: Conclusion  
10.1 Introduction 
Voluntary hospices in England and Wales are typical of voluntary 
sector organisations in that they are under increasing pressure to account 
for their performance to a wide range of stakeholders in a variety of ways. 
This thesis considers whether it is meaningful to measure their 
performance. While the purpose of hospices, including their outcomes and 
outputs, is expressed in a number of ways, there is an overarching aim of 
enabling its beneficiaries to experience a ‘good’ death. If this cannot be 
measured meaningfully, then it is reasonable to ask how hospices can be 
managed effectively. There is well-established research into performance 
management within management accounting, developing from the seminal 
work of Anthony (Berry, et al., 2005) and a growing literature on voluntary 
sector performance measurement. This thesis considers how the theories 
from each set of literature could influence the other and how frameworks 
developed in one sector might be applied effectively in the other. In 
particular, this research considers the applicability of Ferreira and Otley’s 
(2009) Performance Management and Control System and Simons’ (1995) 
Levers of Control to the research of management control within a 
voluntary sector setting.  
Adopting middle-range thinking, a skeletal framework for research 
into the performance management of English and Welsh voluntary 
hospices is developed from these literatures (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2013; 
Laughlin, 1995). This skeletal framework provides the language to make 
sense of voluntary sector performance management by carrying out 
inductive research into five hospices case studies. The ‘flesh’ is then put on 
the skeleton to create a framework for performance measurement and 
management for UK hospices and possibly the voluntary sector as a whole. 
 




10.2 Gaps in management control and voluntary sector performance 
measurement literature 
This thesis draws on both the literature review of management 
control and voluntary sector performance measurement. These reveal gaps 
in both sets of literature.  The review of management control literature 
demonstrates that there has been limited discussion of voluntary sector 
performance management within it. Certain characteristics of effective 
management control are identified in the literature. Performance 
measures need to be diverse, including non-financial as well as financial 
measures (Ittner & Larcker, 2003). Performance measurement systems 
need to be aligned to organisational strategies and objectives (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996). Performance management requires integrated models, 
demonstrating cause-and-effect (Chenhall, 2005). Moreover, effective 
management control includes organic controls such as social and cultural 
controls (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012).  Informal controls complement 
formal controls; transactional controls must be balanced with relational 
controls (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2014; Broadbent & Laughlin, 2009). These 
all constitute a package of controls but not as a prescriptive system. 
Specifically, there are no examples of the performance management 
framework, Simons’ Levers of control being applied fully within a voluntary 
sector organisation. 
The literature review of voluntary sector measurement also reveals 
gaps in the literature. There are calls for more studies into UK charity 
performance and how it is measured within the charity reporting literature. 
This review compares the literature of voluntary sector performance 
measurement to management control theory, considering how differences 
between the private, public and voluntary sectors affect notions of 
effective management control. It questions if management control theory 
applies to the voluntary sectors and to what extent it needs modifications 
to suit this particular context.  Voluntary sector organisations have 
different purposes, governance structures, multiple stakeholders and 




shared outcomes, all of which have implications for effective control. 
Nevertheless, the purposes of performance measurement information 
within the voluntary sector are not so different to that of the generic 
literature.  This research uses the four purposes of performance 
measurement information identified by Henri (2006): monitoring; decision-
making; attention-seeking (problem-identification); and legitimation.  
However, when the voluntary sector performance measurement literature 
is compared to the characteristics identified in the management control 
literature, differences emerge.  The voluntary sector has an abundance of 
measurement tools which are diverse, aligned and integrated (Cordery & 
Sinclair, 2013; Moxham, 2013). Performance measurement includes 
qualitative as well as quantitative methods, incorporating participatory and 
relational models.  There is, however, no explicit acknowledgement of the 
notion of management control as a package.  
 
10.3 Research questions and methodology 
This research sets out to consider how voluntary sector 
organisations exercise effective control over their operations.  In particular, 
it seeks to answer the question of what role performance measures have 
to play in management control; ie how measures are used to manage their 
operations. It considers how other control mechanisms complement 
performance measurement in the management of a hospice. This requires 
an understanding of what is considered to be good performance in a 
hospice, how the delivery of good performance is ensured, what measures 
are used and how these contribute to overall control or performance 
management.  To answer this fully, it is important to understand what the 
information is used for and who drives the need for that information. An 
inductive approach is considered the most appropriate as it there has been 
little prior research and it addresses not simply what performance 
measures are reported but how and why those measures are used. As the 




voluntary sector is so diverse, this is explored by investigating one sub-
sector, voluntary hospices in the England and Wales.  They share many of 
the challenges facing the voluntary sector as a whole, such as a 
dependence on reduced government funding, increasing pressures to 
report their performance, and a blurring between sectors as they seek 
more commercial income. To gain an overview of this subsector, the first 
phase of the research analyses all 148 hospices in England and Wales with 
an income of over £1m in 2012. This examines their statutory returns to 
the Charity Commission which reports on their aims, strategies, measures 
and achievements. 
While the statutory returns give a comprehensive view of what 
measures are reported externally, it does not provide insight into the 
internal operations of the hospices. Prior research has inferred the quality 
of internal performance measurement from what is externally reported 
(Connolly & Hyndman, 2003). The second phase of this research 
investigates if such an assumption is credible. Statutory returns can help 
address what measures are reported by hospices, albeit in the context of 
their aims and strategies, but they cannot reveal how the measures are 
used in practice.  Connolly et al. (2015) call for research into how individual 
charities understand what is meant by ‘performance’, how it might be 
measured and reported.  An inductive approach is adopted to gain insight 
into what role performance measures have in the overall management of a 
hospice. It uses middle-range thinking (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2013) to put 
the ‘flesh’ of voluntary sector performance measurement on the ‘skeleton’ 
of management control theory. Otley (2016), in paying tribute to the 
contingency approaches to research into management control over the 
past 30 years, now calls for more qualitative research to be undertaken in 
this field; not only does he recommend case studies, he also endorses 
middle-range thinking as an appropriate research strategy. This is achieved 
through case studies of hospices: semi-structured interviews of twenty-five 
senior managers and trustees are analysed alongside the documents of the 




five voluntary hospices. As the five hospices are placed within the context 
of the hospice sector, this research adopts Yin’s model of an embedded 
case study approach (Yin, 2009). 
10.4 Choice of management control framework  
Two frameworks from the management control literature are 
considered as a means to investigate how performance measures are used 
within the five case hospices.  Having identified a gap in the voluntary 
sector literature of management control as a package, two comprehensive 
frameworks are used to structure this research.  The first phase of the 
research employs the Performance Management Control System (PMCS) 
(Ferreira & Otley, 2009) to analyse the statutory returns of 148 voluntary 
hospices in England and Wales. This addresses three research sub-
questions: what is considered to be good performance; how is it best 
delivered; and how is it measured. It is particularly useful for establishing 
the extent to which the hospices align their aims, strategies, measures, 
objectives and achievements; a key characteristic of effective management 
control. The second phase of the research uses the Ferreira-Otley PMCS to 
structure the questions addressed to the interviewees but carries out 
thematic analysis, informed by Simons’ Lever of Control (LOC) (1995). This 
puts performance measurement (diagnostic control) into a broader context 
of management control by considering the complementary levers of belief, 
boundary and interactive control. Three further sub-questions can also be 
addressed: who and what drives performance measurement information; 
how is it used; and what role do measures play in the management of 
voluntary hospices. 
 
10.5 Findings from the analysis of hospice statutory reports 
The analysis of the statutory reports (SIRS and TARs) for 148 
voluntary hospices in England and Wales show how certain characteristics 




of effective performance measurement are demonstrated. Performance 
measures are diverse in that they include non-financial measures alongside 
the financial statements. There is partial alignment seen from the 
comparison of aims, strategies, measures, objectives and achievements. 
While there is a good degree of coherence overall in the themes put 
forward by the hospices, at an individual hospice level, there was little 
strategic alignment. There is limited evidence of the use of integrated 
causal models, such as the public sector logic model which compared 
inputs, outputs and outcomes or the BSC with four linked perspectives, 
extensively used in the private sector. A comparison of the Summary 
Information Returns (SIRs) and the Trustee Annual Reports (TARs) 
demonstrates that, while charities have to report their achievements 
against specific annual objectives in the SIR, no detailed objectives for the 
following year are reported in nearly 70% of the TARs.  Following Lord 
Hodgson’s (2012) report into the Charities’ Act of 2006, the SIR is no longer 
required. While the new Charities SORP (FRS 102) (Charity Commission, 
2015) lays out reporting of objectives and achievements in more detail 
than SORP 2005 (Charity Commmission, 2005), it does not specify that a 
charity should report its achievements against the specific annual 
objectives declared in the previous year by the charity (which had been 
required in the SIR). This research suggests that any future regulation 
should encourage charities to declare specific annual objectives as well as 
longer term future plans and then report against them in their TAR in the 
following year. 
 
10.6 Findings from five hospice case studies 
Analysis of the external reporting of hospices gives limited insight 
into how measures are actually used internally. Twenty-five senior 
managers and trustees from five hospices were interviewed and key 
documents analysed to understand how performance measures are used in 




practice. Fundamentally, good performance in a hospice is difficult to 
define and even harder to measure. The achievement of a good death is at 
the heart of the philosophy of the hospice movement. As such, it provides 
an extreme example of an intangible outcome amongst voluntary sector 
organisations.  It can be observed by those sharing the experience but this 
hardly provides objective measurement at such an emotional time. There 
are proxy measures such as choice of place of death or ability to cope. 
Some involve complicated counterfactuals, such as saving hospital 
admissions and reducing pressures on bereavement services.  It is possible 
to measure some aspects of how good performance is delivered, or the 
means rather than the end, such as the provision of high quality services. 
Volumes of services can clearly be measured but measurement of the 
quality of services (such as number of trips and falls) is criticised for not 
providing meaningful information. Moreover, staff motivations, 
commitment and personalities are viewed as critical to successful delivery 
of services but they are also intangible or measured by crude proxies of 
staff turnover and absence. There is considerable overlap between good 
performance and its delivery, in the responses of interviews.  While the 
voluntary sector literature neatly defines outcomes and outputs, 
interviewee perceptions blur such distinctions.  
The five hospices respond to these challenges by reporting their 
internal performance in different ways. The sheer number of different 
performance measures is vast and is dominated by financial inputs and 
service outputs. However, there are limited attempts to make connections 
between the two at anything other than a high level.   Conspicuously, there 
are no detailed costing systems other than a crude cost per bed-night and 
illustrative costs for marketing purposes (such as cost of a syringe driver to 
control a patient’s pain or a day of patient care). One hospice, by 
exception, reports in a format derived from the logic model reporting 
outcomes, outputs and inputs but does not attempt to measure efficiency 
and effectiveness by comparing outputs to inputs or outcomes to outputs. 




Hospice performance measurement systems are diverse but are only 
partially aligned and there were no examples of integrated, causal models 
that would enable the efficiency and effectiveness of hospices to be 
measured.  This would appear to support the conclusions of external UK 
charity reporting and endorse the claim that perceived poor reporting 
externally reflects weak internal performance management. However, 
evidence from the five hospices contradicts the conclusions of the SIR and 
TAR analysis. Although only one of the five case hospices achieves 
alignment in their external reports, four of five report this internally. One 
hospice reports nearly 70 predominantly clinical measures to the board, as 
a dashboard with no overt link to their strategy. However, three of the 
remaining four cases use their strategies to determine their measures. 
They do so in quite different ways:  critical success factors derived from 
strategy; using a BSC format to monitor efficiency-styled measurements; a 
logic model styled report to control actions as well as performance 
measures; and operational action plans. Rather than just numbers, words 
and milestones are used to report achievements. 
This thesis argues that mechanistic, quantitative, causal 
performance measurement models may not hold the answer to effective 
performance management.  More interviewees comment on people or 
relational aspects than process or transactional means to deliver good 
performance.  Twice as many use activities rather than measures to 
describe their achievements in their SIRs. Efficiency and effectiveness is not 
reported in a manner anticipated by the logic model. Instead, effectiveness 
can be shown by comparing achievement against strategy and objectives, 
but more often in words than in numbers. Moreover, a comparison 
between what is considered to be good performance and how it is best 
delivered to what is reported internally by the hospices shows that there 
are gaps.  Outcomes such as coping skills, place of death and admissions 
prevented are intangible or outside the control of the hospice, playing only 
a part of the complicated journey of patients and their families. Outputs 




such as staff motivation, leadership, communication, and hospice 
reputation go unmeasured. Yet these are key parts of what constitutes 
good hospice performance and its successful performance management. In 
the absence of a comprehensive set of measures, this thesis argues that 
voluntary sector performance management should recognise the concept 
of management control as a package.  
 
10.7 Contribution of this research 
10.7.1 Development of a hospice and voluntary sector performance 
management framework 
This research makes a contribution to both the management 
control and voluntary sector performance measurement literatures by 
proposing a new performance management framework.  It suggests that a 
broader view of performance management in the voluntary sector is taken. 
Rather than seeing this merely as acting on performance information, it 
needs to acknowledge that measures are only one part of a more complex 
‘package of controls’. The overwhelming majority of interviewees see 
information requirements being driven internally and confirms that it is 
mainly used for monitoring and decision-making.  When asked about what 
the purposes of performance measurement information, they suggest that 
it is used to improve rather than prove their performance to the outside 
world, unlike most of their UK charity counterparts (Pritchard, et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, this research also reveals the extent of complementary 
management controls operating alongside the measurement information. 
This thesis also suggests modifications to generic management control 
frameworks, in particular Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) PMCS and Simons’ 
(1995) LOC, for use in the voluntary sector. Three levers of control are 
identified: ethos, responsibility and judgement. This thesis argues that 




Simons’ interactive control is not a separate lever but underpins the other 
levers of control.  
 
10.7.2 Modification of the PMCS framework for the voluntary sector  
This study of hospice performance management contributes by 
shedding light on the limitations of applying generic management control 
frameworks in a particular context; in this case the voluntary sector.  
Textbooks on management control make brief comments on their 
suitability to sectors other than the private sector eg Ferreira and Otley 
(2009). In Chapter 7, this research shows that, while largely applicable, 
there need to be some sector-specific modifications. The Ferreira and Otley 
PMCS (2009) framework needs to recognise the role of values as well as 
mission and vision. It needs to acknowledge the different motivations of 
the voluntary sector, replacing the extrinsic reward and incentive question 
with an understanding of intrinsic purpose-driven mission.  It also needs to 
include milestones and staff appraisals as well as key performance 
indicators as measures of performance. If hospices are typical, voluntary 
sector organisations consult external as well as internal stakeholders in the 
formulation of their strategy and there would appear to be more internal 
consultation at all levels of the organisation. The other modifications apply 
to all sectors such as recognising external environmental analysis and 
emergent strategies. 
 
10.7.3 Informal controls within Simons’ LOC 
Simons’ LOC (1995) has been criticised for limiting its scope to 
formal information systems at senior management levels.   This research 
makes a contribution by giving evidence of informal controls operating at 
all levels of the organisation.  These are particularly pertinent in the 




voluntary sector. Purpose-driven, voluntary sector organisations are 
inspired by their purpose and values and not just by a mission statement. 
The ethos underpins the success of the hospice in promoting its vision, 
maintaining its independence and inspiring its staff and volunteers.  Clearly 
evident are the high levels of staff motivation and supportive leadership. 
This is much broader than the formal belief lever set out by Simons in his 
LOC. With multiple accountabilities to different stakeholders, a sense of 
felt-responsibility complements the formal boundaries of strategic plans 
and organisation structures. Intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivations 
underpin a hospice’s good performance. Staff control costs by being 
responsible as well as through formal budgetary control. With outcomes 
that are hard to define, evaluation of performance cannot be limited to 
performance measures. There are informal ways in which senior managers 
and trustees evaluate how the hospice is operating, such as spontaneous 
letters from families, corridor conversations, gleaning an atmosphere from 
walking around the hospice. Underpinning these is the importance of 
relationships and good communications between board, senior managers, 
staff volunteers, funders and most especially beneficiaries.   This research 
argues that the fundamental characteristics of voluntary sector 
management, such as being purpose-driven, having multiple stakeholders 
and often lacking measurable goals, should be recognised as making 
important contributions to performance management. It is not just 
through increased performance measurement that performance 
management can be enhanced. 
 
10.7.4 Voluntary sector LOC dynamics and overlapping levers  
This research makes a contribution to the literature in that it 
explores the different dynamics operating within the levers of control 
framework.  There have been two studies using the LOC in the voluntary 
sector. Neither explores the defining characteristic of this framework - the 




dynamic interplay of the four levers – within this context. In a private 
sector context, the belief control is considered to be the ‘yang’  or  
enabling force balancing the ‘yin’ or constraining force of boundary control. 
However, in the voluntary sector these roles are more complicated. The 
ethos lever is not only enabling but is also constraining as it limits the 
organisation by using its mission to define its fundamental purpose. 
External stakeholders need to have confidence that their funding will be 
used for the purposes stated. Mission statements help to resolve internal 
conflicts over priorities, particularly as they become more dependent on 
commercial income, to prevent mission-drift.  On the other hand, rather 
than boundaries being imposed, as the ‘yin’, there is a positive sense of 
moral responsibility to beneficiaries and the community. The hospices, 
with a tradition of independence, demonstrate this paradox very clearly: a 
sense of freedom within certain boundaries. While their strategic plans set 
limits, it also empowers senior managers giving them authority and 
autonomy. 
 
10.7.5 Reconfiguring Simons’ LOC for the voluntary sector 
This research makes a contribution by identifying three levers of 
control: ethos; responsibility; and judgement. These are all broader than 
the formal information systems that Simons originally proposed for the 
private sector (represented by the triangles on the diagram). These 
incorporate informal controls and overlap each other (shown as circles on 
the diagram). It is also argued that Simons’ interactive control is in reality a 
use of control rather than a type of control. It fundamentally underpins 
how each of the control operates in practice, both formally through 
meetings and informally through relationships. Rather than being a ‘design-
attribute’, or lever, it is an ‘attention-pattern’ or a use of controls. This is 
implied by Simons himself in the appendix of his book (Simons, 1995, p. 
180).  This also suggests that diagnostic control is both a ‘design attribute’ 




as well as an ‘attention pattern’; in other words, it can be both a lever (or 
noun), described here as judgement as well as describing the use of a lever 
(as an adjective). This research concludes that a voluntary sector 
framework should not be hierarchical; instead there are complicated 
networks of relationships between internal and external stakeholders. As 
linear, mechanistic causality is not easy to determine with so many 
intangibles, the framework is presented as a series of overlapping circles. 
 
10.8 Limitations of this research 
There are a number of limitations within this research.  While the 
case studies are set in the wider context of performance measures 
reported by 148 voluntary hospices in England and Wales, insight gained 
into how the measures are used is derived from five case studies. While 
thematic generalisations may be inferred from these cases, they may not 
be typical of the hospice sub-sector, let alone the voluntary sector as a 
whole. While there are notable differences between the cases, such as 
proportion of statutory funding, level of surplus’ and reserves, nature of 
their contracts with commissioners, ethnic backgrounds of their patients 
and differing relationships between the board and senior management 
teams, four hospices have similar amounts of revenue and are single 
operational units, rather than having a head office and a divisional 
structure. A second limitation is the range of stakeholder perspectives 
gained through the interviews. Insights were sought from senior managers 
and trustees rather than all levels of hospice staff.  Insights from 
beneficiaries would be interesting but very hard to obtain in such an 
emotionally-charged situation. The views of funders, particularly 
commissioners, would enhance understanding of how control is exercised 
through their relationships with the hospice management teams. A third 
limitation arises from this: it has been argued that performance 
measurement should be limited to what is in the operational control of the 




hospices. Wider societal outcomes can be considered at a higher level and 
through the study of a wider supply chain of palliative care networks and 
partnerships.  There are two methodological limitations. First, as all 
interviews took place on site, something of the hospice atmosphere was 
gleaned. Nevertheless observations of staff would have provided more 
triangulation. Second, Broadbent and Laughlin (1997) argue that to achieve 
a full Habermasian discourse, conclusions from the study should be 
discussed with participants so that they go on and make changes as a result 
of the research.  In one case hospice, the findings were informally 
discussed with the finance director, with comments about how useful this 
approach would be in their future discussions with commissioners. This 
could have been a more extensive process involving other stakeholders 
and hospices. 
 
10.9 Further research 
‘There is a tremendous amount of trust in hospices because of the nature of 
the work’ (Business, Barton). 
 There are a number of ways that this research could be 
developed further. Throughout this research, there are hints at the role of 
trust underpinning these controls. This is in contrast Simons’ (1995, p. 40) 
need for formal boundary controls, where staff are seen as ‘opportunity 
seekers’, in a private sector setting with low levels of trust. The comments 
from interviewees illustrate how trust is instrumental at all levels. The 
hospice culture depends on trust: ‘I think the success of the organisation is 
the culture created, the fact that it is a trusting culture: that is very 
respectful.  People are very respectful and supportive of each other. I think 
that is the heartbeat. I don’t think it is the procedures and processes 
although of course they are important’ (Trustee, Barton). This affects 
relationships between the board and the senior management team: ‘They 
(trustees) have faith in the leadership and trust you actually’ (Business, 




Cavell). Trust between colleagues is also key: ‘There had been discussion 
amongst senior managers about trust; they conclude that trust “is what 
makes it work for us’’ I have to totally trust my clinical colleagues. I have to 
trust that they are professional, they have the expertise, that what they say 
to me is fact’ (Business, Barton). There are also trusting relationships with 
external stakeholders such as the commissioners: ‘l’d say we’ve got a really 
open relationship with them with high levels of trust...it’s a very co-
operative relationship’ (CEO Nightingale). This has implications for the 
governance of charities, particularly where trust breaks down. As the 
make-up of boards and senior management teams are changing, with an 
increasingly competitive environment and more commercially orientated 




The voluntary sector faces a dilemma between measuring all key 
aspects of their mission, however difficult, or acknowledging that some 
aspects of their mission simply cannot be measured. This thesis develops 
this by considering how one subsector manages the unmeasurable. The 
mission of voluntary hospices’ has been described a ensuring ‘a good 
death’; an intangible and complex outcome dependent on a network of 
health providers amongst other factors. Its successful delivery depends on 
both measurable services as well as unmeasurable relationships. This thesis 
advocates that the performance management of voluntary hospices should 
not be limited to performance measures but incorporate broader notions 
of management control. Hospices are committed to a holistic approach to 
the end-of-life; this research advocates a holistic approach to how it 
evaluates its performance. Diagnostic measures should be complemented 
with belief and boundary systems. However, these formal levers of control, 
identified by Simons (1995), were developed in the context of large private 




sector organisations. This research finds evidence of three informal and 
overlapping levers: ethos, responsibility and judgement. These operate 
alongside formal ones in a new framework for performance management   
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Appendix 1:  
Voluntary sector performance measurement literature 







Economic/ financial  
SROI, cost-benefit 
analysis, outcome 
rating scale, social 
audit 
 Ritchie and Kolodinsky 
(2003) 
Schmitz et al. (2011) 
Tinkleman and 
Donabedian (2007) 
Van der Heijden (2013) 
 SROI  Arvidson et al. (2010) 






Lecy et al. (2012) 
Polonsky  et al. (2010) 
Bagnoli & Megali (2011) 
 Programme theory 
Logic model 
 Buckmaster (1999) 
Gasper (2000) 
Kendal and Knapp (2000) 
Macpherson (2001) 
Poister (2003) 
Campbell (2002)  
  Programme 
Evaluation 
Hoefer (2000)  
Fine et al.(2000)  
Aligned, 
strategic 
 BSC Hough et al.  (2015) 
Kaplan (2001) 
Manville (2007)  
Manville & Broad (2013) 
Speckbacher et al. (2003) 
Greiling (2010) 
  Strategic Sawhill and Williamson 
(2001) Bradach et 
al.(2008) Sheehan (1996) 






McEwen et al.(2010)  
Benjamin (2012) Ebrahim 
& Rangan (2014) Lowe 




 Reputational  
  Benchmarking Conly Tyler (2005) 
  Impact Greatbanks & Manville 
(2010)  
Ebrahim & Rangan (2014) 
  Peer review Purcell & Hawtin (2010) 
 Participatory/narrative 
Outcome mapping  
‘MCS’ (Most significant 
change) 
  
Other   Cairns et al.(2005) Poole et 
al. (2000) LeRoux & Wright 
(2010) 
 




Appendix 2:  Summary Information Returns (SIRs) 
 
Question 1 - The charity's aims  
 
What are your charity's aims?  
 
Question 2 - Who benefits?  
 
Who benefits from your charity's work?  
How do you respond to their needs and how do they influence the 
charity's development?  
 
Question 3 - The charity's strategy  
 
What are the key elements of your charity's medium to long term 
strategy?  
How does your charity measure the success of the strategy?  
 
Question 4 - The charity's objectives and achievements  
 
What were your charity’s main annual objectives and were they 
achieved? 
 
Question 5 - The charity's income and spending  
 
What were your charity's most significant activities during the year 
and how much did it spend on them?  
 
Question 6 - The charity's financial health  
 
How would you describe your charity's financial health at the end of 
the period?  
 
 Question 7 - The next year  
 
How will the overall performance last year affect your charity's 
medium to long term strategy?  
 
Question 8 - The charity's governance  
 
How does your charity ensure that its governance arrangements are 











Appendix 3: Interview Protocol 
 
The interviews will be semi-structured, recorded and transcribed. Questioning will 
be guided by the protocol laid out below, taking into account the role of each 
participant and the context of the hospice. Prior to each interview, I will explain 
that their confidentiality will be guaranteed with any references to their 
responses anonymised and all records will be securely held. 
Each interview will cover the following topics/areas for questioning: 
1) Role and background of respondent: trustee, chief exec, accountant, 
operational manager, 
(explore belief control, values) 
How did they come to do this job and why? 
What is their role within the organisation?  
Try to develop their motivations here (before asking further questions) 
What motivates them and their colleagues?      
How is shared vision created?    
Role of mission statements – formal and other mechanism -informal.  
Training & recruitment of staff & volunteers/professional standards 
2) What do they consider ‘good’ performance in a hospice? 
(explore strategy formulation) 
How would they measure the success of a hospice? Do they think it is important 
to know what they consider is ‘good’ performance? 
How might ‘success’ be considered by differently stakeholders (trustees, donors, 
management, patients, staff, volunteers)? 
How is this expressed in their strategy and/or operational plans?  
How is strategic direction determined? (emergent/bottom up, top down) 
Does strategy change within its planned timeframe and how do you respond? 
Include financial strategy 
 
3) How is ‘good’ performance delivered? 
(Strategic uncertainties - explore interactive controls) 
Explore management processes with roles of: 
Operational plans 
Meetings – frequency of formal, informal 
Formal information flows 
Non-routine decisions 
Communication and delegation of Hospice/team/individual goals 
Get details of formal meetings/informal ones 
 
 
4) How do they ensure that poor performance is avoided? 
 (determining risk to be avoided – boundary controls ) 
How do they know the limits of their responsibilities? 
How do they work as team, achieve the same end? 
Operating rules, codes of conduct, policies and procedures 
Activity plans 
Budgets 





(Safety, quality, efficiency, effectiveness) 
 
5) How do they know if they are doing ‘well’ – individually, as a 
department, as a hospice?  
(critical success factors – diagnostic control) 
Performance measures 
User feedback, surveys 
Public sector – CQC inspections 
Thank you letters, complaints 
 
6) How is performance measured? ( diagnostic control) 
To whom does the charity report to externally? (Formats, frequency, content) 
To whom does the charity report to internally? (Formats, frequency, content) 
Can I see specific performance information eg budgets, plans, KPIs, quality stats? 
Do they consider that all performance should be measured?  
What are the costs  and benefits ( financial, psychological) of reporting? 
Are they satisfied with the information produced? i.e. content, amount, clarity, 
format and frequency? What could be done to improve it? 
Specifically: do they produce: 
Annual Review  
Funders’ reports 
Website 
Outcomes  based impact assessment (Outcomes compared to inputs) 
Output based impact ( ie output compared to input) 
Balanced scorecard 
Quality measures 
Statistical data (eg minimum data set) 
Satisfaction surveys 
Description of achievements 
Cost- benefit analysis 
Social Return on Capital 
Other please specify 
 
7) Who or what drives performance measurement? 
    External  - regulator,  donors, public, HMRC 
    Internal – trustees, management 
    Which are most influential?  Which should be most influential?    
  Try to establish formal /informal influences on performance measurement 
8) For what purposes is performance measurement information used? 
Monitoring            ( target setting, performance against plan) 
Decision making   ( strategic and operational; allocation of resources) 




Legitimation          ( accountability, demonstration of achievements, compliance) 
Attention seeking  (problem solving) 
Which of these is most important from the perspective of different stakeholders? 
 How do external reports differ from those produced internally? 
Should financial performance been treated in a different way to operational 
performance? 
Is reporting used more to ‘prove’ than ‘improve’ performance? 
Cause and effect linkages – are they relevant to hospices? 
9) How does performance measurement contribute to the management of 
a hospice? 
(ie overview of what they have just said to get a sense of priority – balance of 
controls) 
What role should performance measurement have in a hospice? 
ie Contrast diagnostic and interactive uses of performance measurement 
information. Ask which is most effective in stakeholder relationships. 
How is performance measurement used in strategic/operational planning 
processes? 
How do values and beliefs influence performance management? 






Funding changes – recession, public sector 
Political – Big Society 
Demographic 
How has this affect hospice management? 
 
Changing relations with partnerships 
 
Costing systems: (delivering cost-effectiveness King’s College/Help the 
Hospices Review) 
 
Tariff proposals: National Palliative Care funding 
 
 




Appendix 4: Participant information sheet 
Research question: How are measures used to manage the 
performance of English and Welsh hospices? 
 
Cathy Knowles  PhD student    University of Bristol, School of 
Economics, Finance and Management 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The study will investigate how the performance of a hospice is managed and what 
part, if any, performance measures have to play. Charities are coming under 
increasing pressure to account for their performance externally, as the availability of 
funding is reduced while demand for services is increasing. With limited resources, 
donors are more exacting in their demands for charities to account for the 
effectiveness of their donations. More funding is received under contracts rather 
than donations, with stipulations of acceptable performance levels. Independent 
hospices in England and Wales are subject to similar pressures. Indeed, there are 
pilot projects being carried out on how a tariff system might be implemented for NHS 
hospice funding. This research will look specifically at how hospices internally 
manage their performance and whether performance measures play a significant 
role in how they manage their operations.  
Aims and objectives 
The main research question can be broken down into a number of sub-questions:  
1) How do hospices perceive ‘good’ performance?  
2) How is hospice performance measured? 
3)   Who or what drives performance measurement in a voluntary hospice? 
4)   For what purposes is hospice performance measurement information used? 
      5)   How does performance measurement information contribute to 




I am hoping to speak to five key people in each hospice organisation, including the 
CEO, a Trustee and a finance manager. 
 
Ethical approval: The research has been approved by the Ethics Committee, 
University of Bristol. 
 
Who am I? 
I am currently a part-time PhD student at the University of Bristol. I am also a 
Senior Lecturer in Accounting at Oxford Brookes University, where I have taught 
for the last 13 years. I qualified as a Chartered Management Accountant with 
Unilever plc, worked as a management accountant for Marks and Spencer and 
was the Financial Controller for New Business Development for H.J Heinz. I have 
also held various honorary Treasurer roles in small charities. My first degree was 
an MA in Modern History from the University of Oxford. 
 
 
Contact for Further Information 








Appendix 5:  Case Interviews carried out  
 
Hospice Role Date Background 
Feasibility 
 
CEO 11/1/2013 Finance, clergy 
Hospice manager 14/9/2013  Nurse, academic 
Two Hospice managers 2/4/ 2014 Nurses 
BARTON Initial briefing 18/10/2013 CEO 
CEO 6/3/14 Forces 
Finance 17/6/14 Private sector 
Care (Nurse) 6/3 /14 NHS 
Business Commercial 6/3/14 Private sector Retail 
Business Fundraising 9/5/14 Banking 
Trustee (Nurse) 17/6/14 NHS, academic 
CAVELL Initial briefing 2/12/14 CEO 
CEO 8/1/15 NHS, army 
Finance 8/1/15 Manufacturing,  
Care (Medical 
Consultant) 
16/1/15 NHS, charity 
Business 16/1/15 Charity 
Trustee (Finance) 8/1/15 NHS 
GUINNESS CEO 24/3/15 Army, charity 
Care (Social care) 24/3/15 Social care 
Finance 23/3/15 Public sector 
Business 23/3/15 Charities 
Trustee (Finance) 23/3/15 Private sector 
NIGHTINGALE CEO 16/2/15 NHS 
Finance 16/2/15 Manufacturing, 
charity 




Business Fundraising 20/4/15 private sector 
Business Retail 20/4/15 Private sector 







CEO 8/5/15 NHS 
Finance 8/5/15 Charity 
Trustee (Medical) July 2015 Academic, medical 
Business 8/5/15 Charity 











Appendix 6: Case documents  
 Barton Cavell Guinness Nightingale Seacole 
External 
Finance 
Annual Review (2014; 2013; 
2015) 
SIR (2011; 2012) 
TAR (2013) 
Financial Statements (Years 
ending 2009-2014) 
Annual Review (2012-13; 
2013-15) 
SIR (2012, 2013 ) 
TAR (2013) 
Financial Statements (Years 
ending 2009-2014) 
 Strategic Plan (2013-18) 
SIR (2012, 2013)  
TAR (2013) 





















Patient Services & Quality 
Account (2012-13; 2013-14; 2014-
15) 
Quality report quarterly (2013; 3 
reports) 
CGC reporting (2014) 
Service improvement, user 
feedback (2013) 
Local quality indicators 
(Commissioners) (2014-15)  


























Minutes Patient forum, Hospice 
Services committee 
Goals/mission/values 
Hospice Strategy (2014-15) 
Critical success factor 
reporting 
Minutes of board sub-
committees  
Operating plan  & scorecard  
(2014-15) 
Minutes board & committees 
Balanced scorecard 






Minutes of Board 
meetings 









































 Appendix 7: Thematic coding of case interviews 
 Original Code Sub-codes Grouping 
1 Benchmarking   D 
2 Board Meetings I 
3 Relationships I 
4 Reporting D 
5 Visits I 
6 Boundaries  BO 
7 Business language  B 
8 Community, social 
responsibility  
B 
9 Divisional structure  Not used 
10 Funders (non NHS) Contract/grant BO 
11 Relationships I 
12 Reporting D 
13 Good performance How is it delivered 4 
14 What is it 4 
15 Informal diagnostic D 
16 Hospice background General Background 
17 Ethos/culture B 
18 Funding review Background 
19 Independence B 
20 Innovation B 
21 Palliative care history Background 
22 Private sector B 
24 IT systems  Not used 
25 NHS Contract/grant BO 
26 Relationship I 







30 Drivers of info 4 
31 Purposes of info 4 
32 Types of 
information 
 
Financial  D 
33 Financial budget D 
34 Financial costing D 
35  KPIs D 















40 Policies/procedures  BO 
41 Regulation  BO 
42 Senior management Appraisals BO 
43 Meetings I 
44 Relationships I 
45 Reporting D 
46 Staff Appraisals BO 
47 Engagement/communications I 
48 Non performance BO 
49 Policies/procedures BO 
50 Recruitment B 
51 Training B 
52 Strategic planning Mission B 
53 Process I/BO 
54 Volunteers  B 
 Code: B= belief; BO= 
boundary;   D = diagnostic; I = interactive 
 





Appendix 8: Examples of thematically aligned aims, strategies, measures, objectives and achievements 
Hospice Aim Strategy Measure Objective Achievement 
St Luke’s Plymouth 
(finance) 
We aim to increase resources 
into the services through 
innovation and enterprise 
To develop additional 
sources of income and 
hence achieve sufficient 
surplus 
To build reserves to 6 
months expenditure 
Annual Review To develop additional sources 
of income and hence achieve 
sufficient surplus  
and develop initiatives. 
Increase income through 
social enterprise 
Domiciliary care agency 
business plan prepared, 
CQC registration obtained 
and tenders submitted to 
gain contracts as well as 




Training and education are 
available to Masters level 
through the Education Centre 
which is facilitated by a local 
university 
 Extend education and 
research in palliative 
care. Build the national 
and regional profile of St 
Helena education and 
research 
Operational plan Extend education and 
research in palliative care 
First year accreditation by 
Leeds University as 
Practice Development unit 
Weldmar 
(partnership) 
We aim to be an active and 
constructive partner in health 
and social care in Dorset 
 
Create excellent working 
relationships within the 
new NHS and local 
authority structure 
Clinical audit of our and 
our partners services 
Create strong commissioning 
relationships with the NHS 
We have worked with 
commissioners to access 
small increases in funding 
at a difficult time 
Heart of Kent 
(staff) 
Utilising the specialist skills of  
its multidisciplinary team 
Having appropriate 
culture and skills 
Staff satisfaction 
questionnaires 
Develop personal and 
professional evidence based 
competencies which will 
inform the appraisal process 
Research and 
benchmarking carried out 
to inform the appraisal 
process 







Appendix 9 :  
Performance Measures     
TAR   Barton Cavell N-gale 
G-
ness Seacole 
Outputs No of beds   x   x x 
  No of bed days x x x x   
  No of referrals x x x x x 
  No of families       x   
  No of patients x x x x   
  No of admissions x x x x x 
  No of deaths/discharges x x x x x 
  No of clinic attendances x x   x   
  No of staff x         
  No of phone calls x x       
  No of visits x x       
  No of drug incidents x x x x   
  No of complaints x x x x x 
  Course attendance x         
  No interventions x       x 
Volunteers No of volunteers x x x x x 
  Value of volunteers x       x 
  Volunteer hours x     x x 
Efficiency Prompt admission           
  Occupancy x x x x   
  Length of stay x x x     
Outcomes No of non-cancer x x x x   
  Patient /carer satisfaction x x x x X 
  Prompt response     x x   
  
Home deaths/pref place of 
death x x x   X 




















Additional measures not in TAR 
 




provision Quality account x   x x x 
  Quality report x    x     
  Patient Services x         
  Contacts     x   x 
  Attendance         x 
  Non attendance     x   x 
  Safe guarding   x x x   
  Slips/trips/falls x   x   x 
  Infection x   x   x 
  Pressure ulcers x   x   x 
  Incidents x x x     
  Impact report       x   
  Compliments     x x   
  shifts offered x         
  shifts not covered x         
  patients died at home x         
  places offered x         
  places taken x         
  throughput x         
  teaching days     x     
  students x         
  student placements x         
  analysis by service x         
  chaplaincy hours x         
  staff visits to chaplaincy x x       
  referrals to chaplain   x       
  chaplain visits/contacts x x x     
  funerals/memorials   x x     
  
people served by 
community events x         
  
CAB 
money/clients/contacts x         
  patient diversity   x       
  
new referrals by month 
by service x     x   
  group sessions       x   
  internal audits x x x x x 
  
external 
audit/inspections x    x x   
  waiting list     x     
  
provision of special 
equipment     x     
 av time telephone calls   x   













av face to face time per 
patient     x     
  no of group sessions     x     
 speed of referral   x   
  
acute admissions 
avoided     x     
  ethnicity       x   
  supported hours       x   
  respite breaks       x   
  transition numbers       x   
  information governance       x   
  episodes       x   
Financial income/expenditure X x x x x 
  balance sheet X x x x x 
  cashflow X x x x x 
  narrative X x x x x 
  
monthly management 
accounts X x x x x 
  longer plan X x x  X x 
  budget  X x x  x x 
  detailed costs   x  x   
              
HR staff satisfaction /survey X   x     
  staff turnover X x x x x 
  staff sickness X   x x x 
  minimum data set     x     
  equality analysis     x     
  volunteer turnover     x     
 volunteer training X     
 volunteer background  x    
  staff training     x x   
  overtime         x 
  employee numbers     x x x 
  recruitment         x 
  
length of service of 
leavers         x 
Bench-
marking      x x  x x 















Retail trading account x x x x   
  narrative x         
  
daily/weekly sales by 
store x   x     
  
moving annual 
target/forecast x         
  
store 
profitability/contribution x         
  av selling price x         
  store margins x   x     
  % donated goods x         
  footfall   x x     
  gift aid% x x       
  customer complaints   x       
  
customer 
survey/feedback x x       
  epos x   x     
  stock turnover     x     
  stock take accuracy x         
  number of transactions           
  
no of volunteers in 
shops/value   x       
  age/gender vol in shops   x       
  no of shops   x       
  
budget sales by store by 
week x         
  income per sq ft     x     
  store ROI     x     
